POL 523: Comparative Political Analysis

Final Essay II

2009-05-06T14:37:00.003-05:00

Mandy McConnell
Dr. Gang Guo
POL 523
8 April 2009
Identifying Common Conceptual and Methodological
Difficulties: Regime type, Regime transition, and
Democratization in Comparative Politics
Like any other subdiscipline of comparative political science, there are many issues re-
lated to the study of regime type, regime transition, and democratization. The abundance
of quality and type of regime over many languages, regions, and eras makes it incredibly
difficult to systematically study these phenomena. This is true not just cross-nationally
but also domestically. We are often unable to pinpoint the exact causes of regime transi-
tions, cannot properly identify what type of regime the polity then becomes, and have a
fantastically difficult time agreeing on proper definitions of democracy and democratiza-
tion. It is even more taxing to compare non-democratic regimes. These polities have little
in common across nations other than the rote suppression of constituent rights. Even
this occurs at different levels and with different motivations. How will we ever be able to
capture such subjective, and often inaccessible, individual predilections and their impor-
tance to regime formation? Evidently, the study of both democracy and non-democracy
is equally tenuous.
Aside from failures to generally identify and quantify regime type, there is the im-
plicit recognition of trust as a main catalyst for the breakdown of autocracies and the
initiation and consolidation of democracy. However, the concepts of trust, or legitimacy,
are extremely abstract and though we may attempt to tackle them methodologically, we
will never reach a rm understanding of this psychological variable and its impact on
political outcomes. When so much of the literature relies on such an undefined concept,
it makes putting faith into the theories and explanations of regime scholars a bit harder
to swallow.
More specifically, operationalizing variables such as democracy or democratic con-
solidation usually requires a tradeoff. In order to be parsimonious we often must make
the arbitrary decision to set regime ff type as, for example, a continuous 3-6 point scale
variable. While this makes our models easier to handle it might not necessarily reflect
the real world; in reality there are many different variations of each regime type creating
a penumbra of various shades of political grey. However, it would also be a mistake to
endlessly quantify regimes { we would simply spin out of control never to meaningfully
test this variable again. A middle ground, if one can be appropriately identified, could
be the best for testing levels of regime type and democratization. Much of the current
literature attempts to discover such a place and hopefully we are getting closer.
After examining Samuel Huntington's widely accepted work on the 'third wave' of
democratization it is diffcult to argue that his theories are less than well thought out.
But it becomes clear that while attempting to explain the different eras of democratic
conversion we have so many different possible causes that we can find no tangible an-
swers. A mix of both endogenous and exogenous factors probably cause democratization
but these factors differ not only between countries but within. Take, for example, the list
of possible contributors to democratization on pages 37-38 (Huntington 1991). Then take
a moment to mull over Huntington's immediately following statement, "The theories re-
lating these factors to democracy and democratization are almost always plausible. Each
variable and theory, however, is likely to have relevance to only a few cases" (1991:38).
Great. So is democratization a generalizable phenomenon or would it serve us well to
move away from the quantitative research and back toward qualitative area studies? Are
there an innite number of causes that can only be explained in one country at a time?
If the work of Huntington confronts such issues, it is safe to say that the work of many
other researchers echoes the same sentiment. Yes, democratization is a diffcult depen-
dent variable to study. Perhaps it is a great example of a subdiscipline that would largely
benefit from a combination of empirical and qualitative work.
Huntington's lengthy discussion of declining authoritarian legitimacy is another area
that may benefit from such a fusion. His opening line to this section, if rather discour-
aging, reads, "legitimacy is a mushy concept that political analysts do well to avoid"
(Huntington, 1991:46). If, as this section goes on to detail, legitimacy is so important to
understanding shifts from autocracy to democracy, is regionally different, and declines
naturally over time how in the world can we model such a thing? Though Huntington
provides extensive qualitative work on the issue, quite convincingly I would argue, there
is a lack of empirical evidence. Again, our field today is one of quantitative work. Is
democratization going to be relegated to the world of the case studies forever?
The inclusion of economic development, while significant in most studies of regime
transition, is a prime example of a concept that is difficult to compare cross-nationally.
While modernization theories became the dominant explanations for democratization
in the mid-twentieth century, we are discovering today that these explanations do not
always hold empirically. Instead, the unique patterns of industrialization, wealth, levels of
taxation, education, and growth rates are all interrelated and heavily impact a country's
democratic path. Again, however, these unique patterns are specic to only one or a few
cases (Huntington 1991). Rather than economic development (traditionally a measure of
GDP per capita) focused on as the causal factor for democratization, it is here described
as leading to other social goods (such as education, literacy, etc) that then work in tandem
to produce democratization (Huntington 1991:106).
Along with the unruly nature of democratization, in this work the author chooses
to define democracy on the basis of elections as opposed to some of the other widely
accepted specifications of democracies as attitudes, civic structures, and institutions. This
definition of democracy is a minimal one (Huntington 1991). However, for Huntington it
is so defined because it allows us the opposite view of non-democratic systems: all of the
electoral hallmarks of democracy are absent in autocracy. It is as simple as that. Where
we often have diffculty pinpointing non-democratic regimes for comparison, Huntington
works to show us that a simplification of democracy may work to allow for an equally
simple view of autocracy. But things quickly become more complicated as we must
differentiate between democratization and liberalization. How can you tell these two
phenomenon apart? Will they look the same in all countries? Next we must make the
distinction between democracy and stability. Again, how do we measure these things
across borders? Lastly, do we treat our regime types as dichotomous or continuous
variables? What about democratically elected leaders who don't actually hold any power
and are instead installations of another group (Huntington 1991:11)? These are just a few
examples of the many problems that arise when defining democracy and democratization.
Huntington goes on to show us just how complicated questions of the concepts of
democratization can be, without even addressing the methodological side of the puzzle.
As you can imagine, operationalizing these concepts and modeling them in a way that
accounts for changes over time, the often dichotomous nature of the dependent variable,
the likely country-group similarities, and the possible multicollinearity of such intertwined
observations is quite a difficult task. Let's turn to a discussion of the Przerowski et al.
paper that faces just such methodological conundrums.
This is another paper that shows us how complex the relationships between democra-
tization and its causal factors can be. The authors nd that several independent variables
bear weight in explaining democratic endurance but they do so dependent upon different
levels of each other. In other words, there are mediating and often collinear relationships
between the variables. Like Huntington, Przerowski et al. nd that international (ex-
ogenous) factors are important to democratic endurance. For example, if there are more
democracies in any one particular year, fledgling democracies are more likely to survive
(Przerowski et al., 1996:3). This is directly related to Huntington's diffusion hypothesis;
if the countries around you are democratic then you probably are too. This is one of
the easiest hypotheses to measure and should have broader implications for the demo-
cratic peace. The authors also find that the institutions of a nation are very important
for democratic endurance. In other words, Przerowski et al. find that democracies are
more likely to succeed in countries with parliamentary rather than presidential systems.
This is especially interesting, as countries who have previously had military regimes are
more likely to adopt presidential structures (Przerowski et al., 1996:6). But this is a time
bound discovery,
Countries in which monarchy was abolished (France in 1848 and again in 1875, Ger-
many in 1919) and colonies that rebeled against monarchical powers (the United
States and Latin America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries)
replaced monarchs with presidents. Countries that emerged from colonial domina-
tion after the Second World War typically inherited parliamentarianism from the
colonizers" (Przerowski et al., 1996:6).
With Huntington we are able to differentiate between three distinct, time dependent
waves of democratization. With Przerowski et al., we see that time affects the types of
institutions a nation chooses as well as the levels of economic development in a nation.
These factors help to explain democratic endurance. But this begs the question: will
democratization and democratic endurance look the same for nations in the future or
are we relegated to studying retrospective cases? This question is not unique to this
particular sub-discipline and speaks to the overall generalizability of our theories.
As another point, the concepts that are intrinsically linked to the authors' findings
are difficult to pinpoint. They point to a pattern of political learning as the basis for
structural choices: countries may see that parliamentary systems work best for retaining
democracy but they still choose presidential institutions because of past experiences and
legacies. This is quite interesting but I'm afraid that it is very difficult to parallel in-
stitutional endurance to democratic endurance without more formalized models. When
the authors state that, "countries that adopt presidential institutions when they transit
to democracy are stuck with them" (Przerowski et al., 1996:7) they are doing so based
on an examination of only two countries' experiences. This is a very bold and a very
broad statement. Despite their statistically significant models I am inclined to think that
this is an area where a larger n is required to make any law-like allegations. In sum, the
conclusion that economically developed countries who adopt parliamentary systems are
the most likely to see enduring democracy is an interesting mix of modernization and
democratization theories. But without a larger sample of countries to test, I hesitate to
apply of these findings cross-nationally.
The Epstein et al. paper (2006) is a direct response to Pzerowski et al.'s claims in
the abovementioned work. Specifically, the authors reference PACL's work stating,
an increase in per capita GDP-is not a causal factor in the process of democratiza-
tion. Rather, they argue, the positive association between income and democracy
results from the reduced likelihood of more modern countries sliding back, as it were,
into undemocratic forms of government once having (randomly) become democratic
(Epstein et al, 2006:441).
The authors reject this wisdom on the grounds that the previous findings were based on a
simple dichotomous dependent variable. Here, however, the authors extend the category
of regime by including 'partial democracy' in their models. Will this make a difference
in the findings? Will the modernization theory still be rejected based on this new regime
classiffication? If so, it teaches an important lesson to the field. A closer and more
thorough examination of our dependent variables may lead to better operationalization.
The authors employ the complicated methods of PACL including the newly classified
regime measures. One question drives them; they want to know what makes countries
democratic and what keeps them that way.
While this is an exciting edition to the literature, the issue of identifying partial
democracies is also a difficult one. Deciding only to include a third measure and not a
fourth or fifth may have further implications. When disaggregating regime type, there is
necessarily some arbitrary assignment of the range of polity scores given to this middle
classication. The Polity IV data set is employed (-10 to +10 point scale) and the partial
regime category is defined as those polities with scores ranging from +1 to +7. Though
this is entirely reasonable, it is also safe to say that another group of researchers may
nd it pertinent to measure partial democracies from -1 to +6, or some other some
change of range, thereby altering the results entirely. This is a common issue for political
economy and as we saw with the discussion of both Huntington and Przerworski. It can
be corrected but that will only come as a result of a large, common body of knowledge
with standardized measures. Unfortunately, we are not there yet.
Wisely, Epstein et al. also consider the historical legacies of democratizing nations
by using a measure of previous democratization. Two other independent variables are
employed in an attempt to make the model as full as possible. These include a log of
trade openness, and another variable capturing the "resource curse" hypothesis (which
argues that "countries deriving a large share of national income from easily extractable
natural resources tend to be undemocratic and unstable) (Epstein et al., 2006:557). The
authors run a number of difficult statistical models including tobit analyses, hazard mod-
els, duration models and Markov regressions. The results report that PACL initially
misinterpreted the standard errors of their Markov model, leading them to report the
impact of GDP on democratization as insignificant (Epstein et al., 2006:566). The intro-
duction of the partial democracy measure helped highlight this mistake and the authors
believe the inclusion of such a variable should become a standard in the field (Epstein
et al., 2006:566). This work should highlight how difficult it is to model the complex
concepts of regime and democratization. The amount of work done to simply reappraise
one particular element of an author's argument is overwhelming. And, unfortunately,
no one but the individual researcher and his or her research design/data are available to
back up the findings.
So far what we have seen is a mixture of both complementary and contrasting theories
and data. Author Barbara Geddes seeks to rectify some of the deepest contradictions
that exist between theoretical approaches to regime type and transition. With Huntington
fresh on our minds, it is interesting to note that, " since 1974, identified by Huntington
(1991) as the beginning of the "third wave" of democratization, 85 authoritarian regimes
have ended" (Geddes, 1999:115). Obviously, then, it is still difficult for us to make
generalizations about the processes of democratization and democratic endurance. This
is mostly our inability to capture inter-regional differences in the actual processes of
democratization (Geddes, 1991: 117). What can we do to x this problem?
Geddes attempts to rectify this by providing systematic explanations for the differences between types of authoritarianism. We have attempted to classify dierent demo-
cratic systems at great length but have neglected defining authoritarian regimes because
of the conceptual difficulty inherent in doing so. She classifies each regime as personalist,
military, single-party, or amalgams of the pure types (Geddes, 1991:121). Though it is
another positive step to even try and disaggregate authoritarianism into individual regime
characteristics, it also may be bit arbitrary. Other intermediary classes of authoritarian-
ism arguably exist. Making disctinctions is necessary in order to maintain parsimony but
we may be making that model vs. real-life tradeoff. It is not necessarily undersirable to
do so; the alternative may be the inability to statistically examine real-world phenomena.
That certainly wouldn't get us anywhere.
In response, Geddes addresses these classification issues by emphasizing control over
access to power and influence rather than by formal institutional characteristics (Geddes,1991:123). This is an excellent decision as it captures the more nuanced elements of
individual regimes rather than the often rigid structures we use for cross national com-
parisons. And although she must adopt traditional assumptions regarding the nature of
power (i.e. leaders want to maintain power and they will please constituents in order to
do so), she tweaks them to t the unique perspective of autocrats. This mostly includes
the latter assumption; we must empirically analyze the different levels of support needed
by dierent autocratic regime types because there does not exist an across the board need
to pay attention to constituents' demands (Geddes, 1991:125). Perhaps sometimes leav-
ing institutional explanations for ones that better capture the psychological tendencies
of executives is a useful change.
Through a thorough examination of both game theoretic and regression analyses,
Geddes is able to conclude that "strong evidence supports the argument that economic
development increases the likelihood of democratic politics. Available evidence also sup-
ports the claim that authoritarian regimes are more likely to break down during economic
crisis, though some forms of authoritarianism are more susceptible to economic down-
turns than other" (Geddes, 1991:140). Her work helps us understand the different paths
democratic transitions may take in light of the specific nature of their authoritarian lega-
cies. The concepts and methodological issues, though existent, are addressed in ways
that give us hope. We needn't believe that the contradictory theories of our field can
never be rectified.
Regardless of the difficulties comparative political scientists face, the field is of ex-
treme importance and must continue to be pursued in earnest. Each of these authors
has contributed a great deal of insight into his or her eld and serve as solid examples
of the benefits of continued scholarly dialogue. Identifying what triggers the switch to
democracy as well as what will make democracy last may lead to a more peaceful and
verdant world. In order to do this, we must find a field wide standard for defining our
concepts. This may be possible if we continue to collaborate and empirically explore
regime transitions and democratization. The qualitative elements of the field are ex-
tremely important as they are able to capture the deep historical, sociological, and often
psychological underpinnings of our outcomes. Questions of trust may be answered by in-
cluding tenets of the broad literature on the subject found more generally in comparative
politics. Drawing on the methods this sub-field has learned to employ, we may be able to
better incorporate measures of legitimacy into comparative political models and thereby
increase their explanatory power. In sum, the theoretical development of regime, regime
type, and democratization has advanced greatly since the 1950s and 1960s. However, if
we would ultimately like to come to conclusions that are law-like and irrefutable we must
keep pushing forward; political science has not yet reached the same scientic standards
found in the hard sciences. Yet no matter what the issue, it can be resolved. We must
have faith that work in this area will lead us to a better understanding of the world
around us.

References
Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and
Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006. "Democratic Transitions." Midwest Political
Science Association, Vol. 50, No. 3, Pp. 551-569.
Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know About Democratization
After Twenty Years?" Annual Review of Political Science, 2:115-144.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. The Third Wave: Democratization in the
Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
(chapters 1& 2:1-108)
Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and
Fernando Limongi. "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of
Democracy. 7:39-55.
10

2009-05-06T14:33:00.000-05:00

First topic:

Conceptual and Measurement Issues Regarding the Study of Regime Types, Regime Transitions, and Democratization

The study of democratization is one of the most venerable literatures in the comparative politics field. The transition of more than thirty countries from nondemocratic to democratic political systems has challenged scholars in the field of comparative politics to engage in cross regional research. The study of the democratization phenomena invites students of comparative politics to understand and explain processes of political regime change and functioning.

In the 1980s, many authoritarian regimes around the globe succumbed. The most extreme changes were observed in Eastern Europe. A great deal has been written on the subject by enthusiastic and intrigued scholars and hundreds, if not thousands of case studies have been done. Most of the research on this topic has been empirical and little attention has been paid to the examination of the concept “regime” and how it is distinct from “state” or “government.” Another problem regards the question of basic regime type. A regime change necessarily implies that a state is shifting from one regime type to another. A clear distinction between democratic and nondemocratic regimes is indispensable for the study of democratization and regime change. A third problem regards the little interest on the role of some important agents and/or institutional factors in the process of democratization. Some scholars argue that political parties, for instance, have been left out of the analysis of regime change and the process of legitimization. The success of these scholars’ responses to the challenge of furthering research on this topic will depend on their ability to overcome conceptual and measurement issues – which are prerequisite for theory-building and theory-testing.

Barbara Geddes in “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years” synthesizes the result of the large number of studies of late-20th-century democratization published between the early 198os and late 1990s. Through her work we can see some of the problems scholars face when they engage in cross national studies. Conceptual and measurement problems are just among the many this research agenda has to overcome.

The past research has found that one of the few stylized facts to emerge from studies of regime transitions is that democracy is more likely in more developed countries. Scholars such as Jackman (1973), Bollen (1979), and Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) have found beyond reasonable doubt empirical evidence that there is a positive relationship between democratic government and economic development. These studies have covered several different time periods, and have used the best sophisticated statistical models; therefore, we can conclude that the positive relationship between economic development and the likelihood of democratic government exists.

Another stylized fact is also reasonably well established. Transition specialists argue that poor economic performances increases the likelihood of authoritarian breakdown, as it increases democratic breakdown and defeat incumbents in stable democracies. But as Geddes points out, virtually every suggested generalization in this literature has been challenged. There seems to be little agreement between different specialists working from different parts of the world.

For instance, one of the most widely acceptable generalizations was that transitions of regimes took place as a consequence of important divisions within authoritarian regimes. This claim was specially supported in transitions that took place in Latin America. In Latin America, the first steps towards democratization could be traced back to splits within the military. The story also fit the transition from a nondemocratic government to a democratic government in Greece. However, democratizations that occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union could not in most cases be traced to splits within the military; nor can the most transitions in Africa.

One of the conceptual problems raised by cross national studies on this topic is that there is a lack of important clear definitions of crucial concepts in the analysis of transition such as state, regime, government and democracy.

Margaret Levi in “The State of the Study of the State” writes that the “consideration of the state as a conceptual variable ebbs and flows; there are good reasons for claiming that the state is useless as concept and equally well founded resistance to shelving it” (2003:34). The notion of nation-state is problematic because it is possible to observe a number of states without nations and a number of nations without a state. Levi argues that the European model of state is limited in descriptive and theoretical usefulness in understanding the degree of stateness of various countries.

There are several reasons why it has been so difficult to use the concept of the state in comparative analyses; these reasons have to do more with the methodology of understanding state than with the applicability of the concept itself.

First, the state is a result of various factors, not just a single one, even though at times, one variable accounts for most of the explanatory work such as the ruling party or bureaucracy. A good analysis of the state will be able to differentiate between factors and determining the importance of each. Second, the state is abstract. The state decisions are not made by the state per se but by state personnel or rulers. Third, the state seems to the agent of transformation and what is being transformed at the same time. This aspect of the state requires a dynamic model. And fourth, the state is “historically and geographically bounded” (34); a notion that does not endure across time and place. States not always exited and they are not everywhere.

The problems scholars face in trying to use the state as a conceptual variable is how best to define it. Since there is no clear and shared definition of what the state is, it is difficult to determine what role it is playing and how strong it is. Levi states that state theory has gone through several modifications and distinct controversies have dominated the discussion at different times. Early theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau were concerned with the problem of social order, and they based their arguments on assumptions about the state of nature. In the nineteenth century, anthropologists gave rise to the ongoing debate about the circumstances under which cooperation and the production of public good is possible without a state. Another controversy is whether the origin and maintenance of the state is based on consent or coercion. Those are ongoing debates that deal with state intervention in the market or individual lives. These ongoing controversies reflect the difficulties of determining what role the state plays in our lives and how strong this institution is.

Levi also tries to shed some light into discussion of what defines and distinguishes states from governments (41). She explains that states are comparable but distinct from city-states, empires, other forms of institutionalized power and identity over a given territory. States contain but are also different their laws, bureaucracies, and governments. States can be formed but not selected; governments are selected. A government is the institution that sets and administers policies, and the different types of governments are distinguished by arrangements for making and implementing legislation and law.

Levi concludes that “state theory remains in its infancy” despite all the literature. Writing and thinking that has been addressed to the consequences state intervention in the economy and of the problems of democratic accountability (55). Defining a clear concept of state will enable us to untangle the complex relationships within the state ad among the state, government and civil society (55).

Geddes also discusses some of the conceptual problems faced by scholars conducting cross national studies. Geddes discusses some of the conceptual problems of identifying different authoritarian regimes. Some may think that all authoritarian regimes are the same but as Geddes points out they “differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy” (121). This conceptual issue may cause controversies in findings. Since for a period of time scholars were not aware of the differences between authoritarian systems, theorizing was at an abstract level and scholars did not really know how the characteristics of regime influence transitions.

Different authoritarian regimes draw on different groups to staff government offices and different segments of society for support. These different authoritarian regimes have different procedures for making decisions, different ways of responding to opposition and the public needs, and different ways of handling the choice of leaders and succession. Because authoritarian regimes are different, they also break down in systematically different ways.

Geddes proposes a way of facilitating the analysis of these different authoritarian regimes by classifying them into: military, personalistic or single-party. In military regimes, a selected group of officers decides who will rule and exercises some influence on policy. Examples of military regimes include the Brazilian (1964-1985) and the Argentine (1976-1983). In single-party regimes, even if other parties exist, only one party exercises control and has access to political office. Examples of single-party regimes include that of Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico and the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM). Personalistics regimes differ from these two authoritarian regimes because access to office and policy outcomes depends on the discretion of an individual leader. Examples of personalistic regimes are Rafael Trujillo’s in the Dominican Republic (1930-1961) and Idi Amin’s in Uganda (1971-1979).

Although the distinction between authoritarian regimes seems clear, it is not always easy to classify them (123). Scholars need to create criteria for classification of regimes – which it is not an easy task. Even though Geddes emphasizes control over access to power and influence as criteria for classification, the difference between authoritarian regimes are not so obvious.

Military regimes are led by military officers, where one group of officers determines who will lead the country and still exercise influence over policy. Some military regimes are institutionalized and senior officers have agreed to share and rotate in power. Many regimes headed by military officers are not in reality controlled by a group of seniors. During military interventions, one can easily observe that there are short periods of military rule followed by the consolidation of power by one individual and repression of the rest of the officers. These regimes are not military regimes; these are personal regimes even though the leader wears a uniform. Also because many dictators end up forming parties to support themselves, it is difficult to distinguish between real and nominal single-party regimes.

In addition to the barriers in creating criteria for distinguishing between authoritarian regimes, area experts criteria for distinguishing dominant party authoritarian regimes from democratic regimes vary by region. Specialists in Latin America usually classify Mexico as authoritarian regimes and African specialists classify Botswana, Senegal and Zimbabwe as democratic regimes. A common set of criteria must be developed so scholars will be able to compare across regions.

Democracy is a classic essentially contested concept. We have not reached, and maybe will never reach a final consensus on its definition and content. The concept of democracy as a form of government goes back the Greek philosophers. Samuel Huntington in “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century” discusses some of the problems surrounding the definition of democracy.

Huntington explains that as a form of government, democracy has been defined in terms of sources of authority for government, purposes served by the government, and procedures for constituting government. Serious problems of ambiguity and imprecision arise when we define democracy in terms of either source of authority or purposes.

The central procedure of democracy is the selection of officials through the competitive elections by the people they govern. Joseph Schumpter (1942) developed the most important formulation of his concept of democracy in his study “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.” Schumpter criticized what he classified as “classical theory of democracy.” He defined classical theory of democracy in terms of the “will of people” (source) and “the common good” (purpose).

After World War II, scholars tried intensely to define democracy in terms of source and purpose. But Shumpter had proposed what he called “another theory of democracy.” Shumpter’s theory stated that the democratic method is “an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (as cited in Huntington, 6). The earlier theory was based on rationalist, utopian and idealistic definitions while the latter was based on empirical, descriptive, institutional and procedure definitions. By the 1970s Shumpeter had won the debate after scholars concluded that only Shumpeter’s definition provided analytical precision and empirical referents that make the concept a useful one.

Following a Shumpeterian tradition, Huntington defines a political system as democratic to the extent that the “most powerful collective decisions makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” (7). His definition also implies existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, organize, assemble, and publish that are necessary to promote political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns.

Huntington makes several additional points regarding the concept of democracy. First, the definition of democracy in terms of election is a minimal term. People want to associate democracy with effective public control over policy, responsible government, honesty and openness in politics, and so on. But doing so raises again the problem of source and purpose of governments. The problem with the subjective nature of many political democracy indicators such as freedom of the press, openness and fairness of elections, restriction on political parties and such are more appropriate measures for political freedom or right than of democracy.

Second, even a society chooses its political leaders through competitive elections, these leaders might not exercise real power. These leaders may be just representing a larger and more powerful group; they might be just puppets or the front of some other group. And if the most powerful decision makers are not elected through competitive elections by the people then the political system is not democratic.

The third issue regards the fragility or stability of a democratic political system. Stability is a central characteristic of any political system. A political system may be however, more or less stable or more or less democratic. So systems may be appropriately classified as democratic but may be also unstable systems at the same time. The practice of combining political stability and democracy creates a source of invalid measures because democracy and stability do not have same causes or consequences.

Fourth, is the issue of whether treating democracy and nondemocracy as dichotomous or continuous variable. When analyzing variations in the degree of democracy among countries, scholars have chosen to use continuous variables. They develop measures of democracy combining indicators of fairness elections, restrictions on political parties, freedom of press and other criteria. The problem of choosing this path is that it creates several problems such as the weight of indicators. For instance, Huntington presents twenty one variables that seem to contribute to democracy and democratization (37) but we do not really know which variables weight more since no single factor accounts for democracy, and the combination of causes producing democracy varies from country to country. Another problem is choosing between a dichotomous or continuous variable.

Huntington’s point about treating democracy and nondemocracy either as dichotomous or continuous variable sheds light in some of the practical measurement problems scholars face when conduction cross national studies on this topic. Measuring democracy it is not an easy task. The scholars attempting to measure this ambiguous concept has to choose between a categorical versus continuous measurement, objective versus subjective indicators, and single-time versus multiple-time measures.

Analysts choosing a dichotomous variable know that there are countries that will fall in between the two categories. The treatment of democracy is a dichotomous variable seems to be based on convenience and simplicity of such a measure. Advocates of a continuous variable argue that categorical variables incorrectly treat countries within a category as homogeneous with respect to democracy.

David L. Epstein at al. challenge Przeworski et al (2000) findings regarding the key hypothesis in modernization theory – that political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita income rise – on the grounds of methodology and substantive dissent.

Epstein at al. review and critique the work of Przeworski and argues that they mistakenly employed a dichotomous classification of political systems, which governments were either democratic or authoritarian – with rather stringent requirements for being included in the democracy category. Epstein at al. argue that the approach ignored the possibility of an intermediate category, so they propose a trichotomous measure of democracy rather than dichotomous. After employing this different method, Epstein at al. find, contrary to Przeworski et al., that the modernization hypothesis stands up well.

Fifth, nondemoncratic regimes do not hold competitive elections and nor promote voting participation. Nondemocratic regimes have little in common. There are several categories of such regimes: absolute monarchies, bureaucratic empires, oligarchies, aristocracies, fascist and communist and more. The distinction between regimes is crucial to understanding twentieth-century politics.

In conclusion, the study of democratization is one of the most venerable literatures in comparative politics. The study of the waves of democratization has challenged students to engage in cross regional research. A great deal of research has been devoted to this topic by enthusiastic and intrigued scholars, and a variety of theories has been developed. However, little attention has been paid to the examination of the crucial concepts in the analysis of transition – such as regime, government, state, and democracy. In other to further research on this topic, scholars will have to overcome conceptual and measurement problems.

Second Topic:

Conceptual and Measurement Issues Regarding the Study of Social Movement, Revolutions, and Civil Society.

According to Goodwin and Jasper (2009) social movements are “conscious, concerted, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means” (14). Social movements are more conscious and organized than fashions; they last longer than protests or riots. Ordinary people form and join social movements in order to fight against something, either explicitly or implicitly.

Our understanding of social movements has grown as these movements themselves have evolved. In the nineteenth century, much of the protests that took place were urban riots, so scholars focused on the nature of crowd. In the 1950s, scholars focused on theories of mass society since there was a need to understand how the Nazis could have taken control of an otherwise civilized nation. Scholars studying America, who have had examined the labor movement and the civil rights movements, focused on the political dimensions of protest. Scholars the came after 1960s, had a tendency to see protestors as reasonable people since protest in decade did not involve a fight for equality, but they were mainly concerned about lifestyles and cultural meanings. In recent years, social movements have become more global in scope. The research in this field is undoubtedly evolving.

Most of the literature on social movements was developed by students of collective behavior. The two main problems generated by this collective behavior perspective is that despite looking at movements as purposeful phenomena, many students of collective behavior placed most attention on unexpected dynamics rather than on strategies devised by rational, strategic actors. Also the analyses were often limited to a description of reality, without devoting attention to the structural origins of conflict which in turn became movements. Structuralist approaches deals with the latter deficiency and the organizational perspective deals with the former. It is important to emphasize the dynamic of collective action to social movements because only through collective action social movements emerge. Also the collective action problem has received a great attention within this literature.

Jeffrey Berejikian (1992) in “The Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem” describes the two most prominent methodological approaches to explain revolutionary collective action, and argues that the two approaches result in theoretical inconsistencies and/or explanatory inconsistencies. Berejikian proposes an alternative utilizing the concept of framing which addresses the agent-structure problem and in turn leads to greater theoretical coherence and resolution if anomalous cases.

In the late 1970s, the study of revolution took two distinct paths. Theda Skocpol (1979) in “States and Social Revolutions” argued for a structural and nonvoluntarialist study of revolutions. Skocpol focuses on social structures. At the same time, Samuel Popkin (1979) in “The Rational Peasant” argued for a study of peasant revolutionary action based upon the axioms of rational choice. Popkin focuses on individual actors. The two scholars basically deny the legitimacy of each other. In a sense, these two studies are methodologically incompatible.

This methodological incompatibility reflects a larger theoretical debate in the social sciences – the agent-structure problem. This problem reflects the two “truisms” about the social world. First, intentional and conscious individual (agents) actions reproduce and transform reality. Second, society is made up of interconnecting social relationships (structures) that constrain the interaction between agents. The challenge for political scientists is to disentangle the interaction between agents and structures.

Skocpol’s approach to the study of revolutions is an explicit defense of methodological structuralism. Her research denies methodological individualism, which assumes that revolutions are consequences of intended actions, because it incorrectly assumes that social order does not rest in consent and it is not supported by evidence. She sees individuals as participants in this complex unfolding of multiple conflicts, rather than purposive actors.

Skocpol presents two assertions about the nature of peasant revolt. First, peasants are in a constantly revolutionary condition. The logic behind this assumption is that peasants are always subject to economic, political and cultural marginality; therefore, she assumes that peasants always have a reason to rebel against landlords and state agents. This idea of grievance is inherent and defined by the peasants’ position as a social class. The peasants will collectively mobilize as a function of structural positioning. In order to revolt, peasants needs to be connected by solidarity and community autonomy (tactical freedom), which in turn gives them a degree of leverage against the elite. Second, tactical freedom will only be successful if accompanied by a relaxation of state coercive power. The state is important here because Skocpol assumes that the landed elite are depended upon the state for support and even the use of force. So if the state does not have the capacity and ability to repress peasants, then tactical freedom is translated into attacks against the landed elites.

Even though Skocpol is defendant of structuralism, she implicitly makes the argument that revolts are a consequence of individual action. A model of a rational maximizer peasant is implied throughout Skocpol’s work and it is also appear to be a necessary condition for the structuralist explanation to work.

One of the measurement problems one may be able identify with Skocpol’s analysis is the difficult in measuring grievance. As just discussed, Skocpol assumes that peasants are, in a variety of ways, subject to marginality and they will collectively mobilize as a function of their position in society; peasants want more land, greater autonomy, and so forth. Many studies of civil wars have taken into account grievances but the results usually do not support this assumption. In studies of civil war, grievance has usually been seen as one of the proxies for motive but there is little agreement on which variables would be most appropriate to measure such a complex and broad concept. Some of the objective measures of grievance are ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality. Even these objective measures of grievance are still too broad and scholars have to be very careful is choosing variables that will enable them to truly capture grievance.

On the other hand, Popkin’s work is based on an individualistic methodological perspective. For Popkin, individuals will choose to participate in revolutions as a result of a calculated effort to improve one’s future position. Popkin asserts that peasant virtually employ a rational maximizing decision rule to all of their activities. In focusing on the individual, as a rational maximizing actor, Popkin rejects what Skocpol proposes to be the central analytic variable – social structures. For Popkin, the “aggregation of intentional individual actions, rather than the permissive structures, accounts for revolutions” (Berejerkian 650).

One of things that these two approaches share in common is the lack of a clear solution to the free-rider problem. In the “The Logic of Collective Action,” Mancur Olson wrote on the collective action problem:

“The notion that groups of individuals will act to achieve their common or group interests, far from being a logical implication of the assumption that the individuals in a group will rationally further their individual interests , is in fact inconsistent with that assumption” (Berejerkian 649).

Given the above discussion, Skocpol’s analysis findings – peasants will act collectively to address their class-defined goals and aspirations – does not match the assumption of rational maximization as a decision rule. Evidence is found on historical instances in which, given the necessary and sufficient structural conditions as described by Skocpol, peasants chose not to revolt. Even though Popkin goes further than Skocpol and acknowledges the free-rider problem, his four conditions under which peasants would contribute to a revolutionary movement are unable to provide predictions about revolutionary action.

Popkin’s first condition is a cost-benefit calculus. There are two instances for this set of explanation. First, the benefits of participation flow only to those that contribute. Second, costs of defection outweighed those of contributing. The first condition is problematic. There is little data available to show evidence the peasants would in fact incur the risks of engaging in open revolt. The second is there are sufficient selective incentives. This notion is always problematic because revolutionary struggles require increased popular action – and therefore contributions – above and beyond what was hypothesized by the organization when it first emerged. The final condition is that each individual must view a personal contribution as critical and necessary for the success of the organization. This is view is also problematic for several reasons. One of the reasons is that during the process of revolution, some task will require more from specific individuals than others. For example, helping make protest signs will incur fewer individual costs than engaging in a fight against the state.

Also, the rational-choice theory is unable to account for the ways group solidarities, moral commitment to the collectivity, and nonrational values may become incentives for people to mobilize and act independently of individual self-interest. Explanations based on the individual level of analysis cannot account for effects of acts of defiance that at times motivates rebellions.

Berejikian intends to present a model of peasant revolt that will make explicit the connection between the structural context and individual decision rules by expanding the concept of “framing.” Berejikian argues that understanding revolutionary movements requires acknowledging that individuals invoke different decision rules n alternative structural contexts.

Berejikian has an ambitious goal, bridge the gap between the agent and structural analysis; however, I do not think his fixes the problem. The author argues that the point is that the decisional determinant is not the expected outcome, but how the choice is perceived relative to the status quo (reference point) (652). In order for this status-quo-sensitive model to move beyond a tool of criticism and add to our understanding of revolutionary action, it is necessary to conceptualize a social-structure frame.

He defines social frame as “the perceptions by individuals that participation in the existing social structural arrangements means either gains or losses” (652). Berejikian’s definition of social frame does not convince me that the agent-structure problem is solved. It seems that the methodological Individualism has a lot more weight and explanatory power the methodological structuralism.

Some scholars say that what distinguishes social movements from other types of political activities or demonstrations is the adoption of unusual patterns of political behavior. But the distinction between social movements from revolutions and other forms of political or social demonstration is not clear.

Some may say that protest is a core feature of social movements but there are some objections to this perspective. First, public protests play a minimal role in movements advocating personal and cultural change, religious movements, and such. It is also debatable the notion that are unconventional and/or violent forms of political activity. In the past decades, protests have taken the form of public expression and no longer belong to extremists groups or radical sectors. Also it is unclear if protests pose a challenge to democratic stability and the legitimacy of elected governments. On one hand, some could argue that protests are no longer an extreme and unusual form of showing public discontent but rather they are just one form of political participation. On the other hand, others may argue that protests represent a warning sign of deep-seated public disaffection that could challenge the legitimacy of representative democracy.

Whether protest is a core feature of social movements or not and whether is poses a challenge to order or not, many studies have drawn attention to this political phenomenon. Pippa Norris et al.(2005) finds evidence that protest politics has risen dramatically in many countries in the late twentieth century (198). Because of the increase in frequency of this form of political demonstration, scholars should pay more attention in developing a clear concept that either distinguishes protests from other forms demonstrations – rebellions, revolutions, strikes and so forth – or places protest as some have suggested, as core feature of other types of demonstrations.

While scholars debate the importance and implications of protest, others go a step further and emphasized the importance of a strong and active civil society to the consolidation of democracy – which to me sounds ironic due to the ambiguity of what makes up civil society. This research agenda focuses on the influence of norms and networks of civic engagement and associates these with the performance of representative government.

Robert D. Putnam concludes, after a twenty year quasi-experimental study of subnational governments is different regions of Italy, “systematic inquiry showed that the quality of governance was determined by longstanding traditions of civic engagement (or its absence). Voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies and football clubs … were the hallmarks of a successful region” (66). Putnam also points out that historical analysis suggested that these networks of organized reciprocity and civil solidarity were a precondition for socioeconomic modernization. In “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Putnam suggests that there has been a decline in the level of participation of group activities in America and that it turn, poses a threat to democracy and quality of life.

Social scientists from several fields have suggested a common framework to understand these phenomena. This framework rests on the concept of social capital. Social capital refers to “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 67).

Social capital boils down to networks, norms, and trust – networks foster strong norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. The concept of social capital is too complex and broad. For instance, the norms of social capital can range from norms of reciprocity between two friends all the way to complex doctrines of religion. Trust is also a very complex variable to measure, but Putnam presents some very convincing evidence supporting the decline in trust. Putnam used an instrument survey that asked the question “can people be trusted?” Overall Putnam’s research convinces even the skeptical that individuals are indeed, less involved in group activity. What is not clear is how this decline in social capital affects stability and quality of life even though some attempts have made to establish that relationship.

E. Spencer Wellhofer(2003) in “Democracy and Fascism: Class, Civil Society, and Rational Choice in Italy” focuses on the conditions fostering transitions to democracy or fascism. Wellhofer finds only mixed support for the civil society thesis. The author suggests that “if civil society is predicated on trust fostered by civic organizations, trust appears to be more strategic than unconditional and, when broken, decays markedly” (104).

There are still answered questions about the relationship between social capital and democracy and Putnam recognizes. Putnam suggests that we must sort out the dimensions of social capital and unravel the types of organizations and networks that most effectively embody and generate mutual reciprocity, resolution of dilemmas of collective action, and the broadening of social identities.

Social movement and other forms of political demonstrations studies have grown impressively in the last decades. Scholars from different schools of thought have proposed a great number of theories and efforts have been made to merge all these distant approaches into a more comprehensive one. While innumerous analytical definitions have been put forth, we still lack a systematic comparison of conceptualizations. Heterogeneous social and political phenomena such as single-issue campaign, religious movements, and revolutions are usually all defined as social movements; the concept is ambiguous. Concepts are the cornerstone of theorizing; therefore scholars should pay attention to concept definition. The study of social movements is lacking an explicit and empirical agreement about the use of the term.

-Thati

p.s: Have an awesome summer guys!

Final Papers

2009-05-06T14:23:00.002-05:00

Test "Title"

Test "Title" Dan Blazo

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, REVOLUTIONS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Although the subfield of Comparative Politics claims an extraordinarily broad scope of analysis, certain sociopolitical issues are generally regarded as more intriguing or more important than others. Political revolution is one such issue. In some ways, revolution is the most fundamental research topic for Comparative Politics, for a domestic transition of regime-types typically affects entire populations in more salient ways than any other political phenomenon. Moreover, the particularities of each revolution invite the comparativist to search for patterns of social behavior. Theoretical constructs from other social sciences have been borrowed, compared, and refined to fit the particular research questions. Classical democratic theories are continually modeled, quantified, tested against one another, and remodeled accordingly. Thousands of case studies and hundreds of cross-national comparisons have been the product of comparativists’ dire yearning to answer the question: Why revolution? Indications of progress in solving this timeless riddle are evident in the elucidated parameters and integration of the relevant research. As scholars have cultivated diverse approaches to solving the riddle, a collaboration of their findings has shed light upon certain macro-theoretical deficiencies as well as measurement issues that must be addressed in order to maintain the scientific integrity of comparative solutions.

In his 1965 seminal work on the dilemma between collective action and rational choice, Mancur Olson suggested that “only a separate and ‘selective’ incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way” (2). This dilemma became known as “Olson’s problem,” the “free rider problem,” or “the Collective Action Problem” among subsequent researchers, and remains a major logistical obstacle in comparative studies on revolution despite more than four decades of research. What social forces and/or personal incentives compel individuals to risk their lives in revolutionary attempts? Given that collective action is necessary for any successful revolutionary effort, the inclination to “free ride” must be either dismantled by social “virtues” or perceived as disadvantageous for the personal aspirations of revolutionaries. Most scholars in the comparative subfield have approached the issue from the latter hypothesis, for which individuals’ incentives for participating in the revolutionary effort are preferable over the free rider alternative. However, scholars are quick to point out that the appeal of a “free ride” is inextinguishable when the alternative involves risking one’s life. This theoretical dilemma has led scholars to overlook the fundamental link between individuals’ instigations of revolutionary efforts and the social constructs that help determine the outcomes of such efforts.

Jeffrey Berejikian’s 1992 article, "Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem,” reveals the ongoing theoretical difficulties in accounting for the free rider problem. Berejikian explains how two distinct approaches have come to dominate the comparative research on revolutions: Methodological Structuralism and Methodological Individualism. The former is essentially the application of neo-institutionalism to the study of revolution, as epitomized in Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions (1979). Methodological Individualism, on the other hand, is a rational choice approach exemplified in Samuel Popkin’s book, The Rational Peasant (1979). Both approaches fail to draw a link between agents and structures, or, between individuals’ motivations to revolt and collective revolutionary efforts. Popkin concentrates exclusively on the agent, while Skocpol’s focus is almost entirely on the structure. As a consequence of implicitly denying the other’s legitimacy, both methodologies fail to provide solutions to the free rider problem.

At the heart of the agent-structure problem is the fact that agents and structures are ontologically inseparable (at least in the context of this research topic). Social structures are made up of individuals, who are concurrently agents of social activity. Both methodological structuralism and methodological individualism approach revolution by means of conceptual reductionism, focusing on either the agent or the structure. The interaction between agents and structures is fundamental for the outcomes of each: individuals affect social structures and vice versa. Agents, structures, and their interactions are all embodied in a single human being, just as they are in a widespread social movement.

Skocpol’s focus on structures leads her to extrapolate class preferences across individuals of the particular social class. This leads to some theoretical problems. Although peasants may collectively benefit from a successful revolution, individual peasants are unlikely to affect the outcome of the revolutionary effort. In addition, peasants are likely to benefit from a class revolution even if they were not participants in the revolutionary struggle. Free riding is arguably the most rational option for the individual peasant. Berejikian addresses the contradiction that arises from Skocpol’s theoretical gap:

“The assumption of rational maximization as a decision rule on the part of individual peasants does not logically lead to the conclusion Skocpol's analysis assumes, namely, that peasants will collectively act to address their class-defined goals and aspirations. Thus, while the structural hypothesis directs itself to explaining the timing and scope of peasant revolts, the individualist assumptions implicit throughout would seem to argue for a nonevent” (649)

To provide further evidence of the “missing link” in Skocpol’s analysis, Berejikian mentions several historical examples for which Skocpol’s enumerated structural conditions for revolutions have not led to a peasant revolt. These findings imply that social class interests are best understood as overlapping individual interests. However, comparativists must keep in mind the fact that individuals will always have incentives that are not class-oriented, such as personal safety during a time of war.

Methodological Individualism, as portrayed in Popkin’s Rational Peasant, also fails to provide a coherent theoretical explanation for a revolution’s surmounting of the free-riding inclination. Popkin’s defense of rational choice theory in the context of revolutions relies upon the rationality of maintaining a positive reputation among members of a community. In other words, a peasant will join a revolutionary effort if refusal to join would result in his ostracization among fellow villagers. However, this concept of rational participation in a revolutionary effort is unable to explain the incentives for those individuals who joined the revolution before it became so socially obligatory that refusal incited ostracization. Social pressure to revolt derives from individuals, and its effectiveness depends, in part, on the number of individuals applying the pressure.

Unlike Skocpol, Popkin explicitly confronts the inclination to free ride. His use of social pressure to justify the rationality of revolting, however, implies that structure does indeed affect the agent’s incentives. Conversely, according to Berejikian, Popkin frames revolutionary efforts as, “the aggregation of intentional individual actions, rather than permissive structures, accounts for revolution” (650). In contradiction to the Popkin’s focus on the individual, social pressure is a structural component that Popkin views as influential upon individual rationality. In addition, Popkin’s complementary justifications for rational revolt rely upon the manipulation of private incentives regarding collective goods. For a peasant revolution to gain sufficient support, all peasants must accordingly recognize their direct participation in the revolution as necessary for the final outcome of collective good distribution. Not only is this consensus improbable, it is incomplete, for it emphasizes economic rationality without acknowledgement of the uselessness of economic outcomes for those who lose their lives in the struggle. The real dangers of revolution alter the dynamics of incentive structures typically employed in rational choice models. The free riding tendency is especially appealing (or “rational”) when participation in collective revolt sharply increases the likelihood of violent death.

The conceptual obstacles exposed by Berejikian can essentially be described as the effects of utilizing a narrow approach without regard for the insight of alternative approaches. The result of using a narrow approach is a failure to account for the interactions between agents and structures. This failure is revealed in the theoretical deficiencies of both Methodological Structuralism and Methodological Individualism, specifically, in their failure to adequately address the free rider problem in the constructs of their theories. While the structural approach overlooks individuals’ incentives to revolt in spite of the likely insignificance and high level of personal risk, the individualist approach is unsuited for explaining the original collective formation of a revolutionary effort, as it fails to address the structural context for which revolution is amenable.

The conceptual obstacle of explaining collective action and the free rider problem has been the topic of much scholarly literature over the past two decades. Despite the vast amount of theory and research intended to model collective action, however, Mark Lichbach concludes that “…most scholars recognize that the marriage between the CA (Collective Action) research program and conflict studies has largely failed” (1994 9). The obstacle that has yet to be surmounted, according to Lichbach, is the formulation of a “useful modification of a solution to the free rider problem” (30). Finding a solution to the free rider problem is not the obstacle, as around two dozen different solutions have been developed and refined in theoretical works. The difficulty lies in modeling a solution for use in testable comparative models. The mere presence of so many different solutions has caused conceptual dilemmas for any research seeking to analyze the causality chain of social occurrences.

Each solution to the “Rebel’s Dilemma” is somewhat predictable, as they require strategic planning on behalf of the rebelling parties. This predictability ensures that the regime in power—whose interests must lie in direct opposition to the rebels—will attempt to counteract the strategies (or “solutions”) employed by the rebels. Therefore, gauging the usage and effectiveness of such strategies is extremely difficult, especially for empirical and cross-national research. Moreover, the solutions are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually dependent, in some regards. Lichbach explains: “Any one solution must be an incomplete explanation of the CA… The major difficulty is that each solution presupposes the existence of at least one of the other solutions… While each type of solution might be necessary to either create, maintain, or transform CA, taken independently, none is sufficient” (23). The vast amount of research addressing the collective action problem has clarified some of the ways in which the dilemma may be overcome in practice, but has not resulted in an applicable component for a comparative research model.

Nonetheless, the findings of the CA research program should not be disregarded in comparative studies of revolution. The first measure that should be taken by comparativists wishing to implement these findings is the acquisition of thorough knowledge about the specific societal circumstances of the revolution or revolutions under analysis. Upon acquiring comprehensive information on the relevant societal conditions, certain solutions are likely to emerge as more accurate depictions of the particular rebels’ strategies than others. Researchers can reduce the number of potential solutions in regards to social context and further predict which ones were most influential over the course of particular rebellions. However, they must also keep in mind that “in practice, CA problems are overcome by combinations, mixtures, adaptations, and modifications of the two dozen sets of pure solutions” (Lichbach 27). The social context is crucial in determining which combinations or hybrids of solutions are likely to be effective. In fact, the effectiveness of different solutions relative to the social context is, to Lichbach, more important than the “missing link” between rational choice theory and collective action. He explains:

“…the problematique of the CA research program, as I see it, is to determine the conditions under which a particular CA solution is adopted and the conditions under which a particular solution is effective. In short, we bypass the initial problem of why rational people rebel and never reach the ultimate problem of aggregate levels and outbreaks of rebellion. A midrange approach best elaborates CA ideas” (30)

This approach is not only better suited for integrating CA research into comparative studies, it also provides a more conducive medium for testing CA research in empirical models. Necessary for the advancement of integration between CA research and comparative politics is systematic evidence directed at gauging the specific components of the many CA solutions. This evidence has not been a top priority among the rivaling structural and rational choice approaches, for “…those who have applied CA theories to conflict have focused almost exclusively on the initial problem of whether anyone who is rational will actually participate in protest and rebellion” (9). A more productive course would include an explicit assumption that rational people do rebel, and would aim to identify the most effective strategies used to garner support by providing evidence, rather than mere logic. The evidence is currently trailing far behind the theories regarding conceptual solutions to the free rider problem.

Modeling the solutions to the free rider problem is clearly a difficult task for comparativists. Measurement issues add to the difficulties, as traditional empirical data generally obscures personal motivations and group strategies. Although survey evidence may be appealing for certain research questions on the topic, such data is generally unavailable and unreliable, due to the psychological tendency of misinterpreting personal motives. Any quantitative approach to the issue must be grounded upon intensive qualitative observations of particular societies in order to ensure the validity of the models. Cross-national studies on revolutions are especially prone to yield spurious findings, given the importance of the social context for this particular subject. Such comparisons should not be avoided altogether, however, for the scientific integrity of any comparative research demands the falsifiability of theories. The specific methodological caveats of this research topic are discussed below.

A prime example of the importance of thorough case-level analysis is portrayed in E. Spencer Wellhofer’s 2003 article, “Democracy and Fascism.” Rather than accept the traditional reasoning for the rise of fascist regimes, Wellhofer examines the particular circumstances surrounding the rise of Italian Fascism in 1919-21. The extensive research on the fall of Weimar Germany and rise of the Third Reich has led to the overgeneralization of conclusions, with the German case as the basis for explanation. For example, the formation of particular interclass alliances was generally accepted as a universal requirement for the rise of a fascist regime, due in large part to the interclass coalitions of the Weimar Republic. Wellhofer’s analysis reveals that the rise of Italian Fascism occurred under much different societal circumstances than the rise of the Third Reich. As part of his in-depth analysis of the Italian case, Wellhofer tests the most prevalent theories addressing a link between civil society and democratic sustainability. Exhibiting the importance of cross-approach analysis, Wellhofer includes in his model a test of the rational choice explanation, which is measured according to voting demographics and elections. The format of this piece is intellectually satisfying because it includes the necessary thoroughness of case-specifics as well as tests of multiple alternative explanations. Moreover, the results vindicate the case-level analysis in that they reveal a unique case that does not “fit the mold” of Weimar Germany. Wellhofer is careful not to generalize his conclusions, aside from the encouragement of case-level analysis preceding cross-national research models of revolution.

Wellhofer’s article also emphasizes the particularly rich diversity of civil society across nations. For the same reasons that make the topic of revolution unfavorable to cross-national generalizations, civil society is impossible to measure without a keen knowledge of specific societal attributes. Robert Putnam’s article, “Bowling Alone,” is latent with some of the basic conceptual and measurement problems that scholars should avoid. This article lacks both a research design and a systematic depiction of evidence. Ad hoc conglomerations of evidence are presented to support the author’ claims, yet the sources of evidence are never validated as being representative of the implied trends. Moreover, Putnam’s reliance on a few very specific indicators of civil society strength (Elks Club membership, Boy Scout membership, etc) makes his conclusions vulnerable to social transitions over time, which are not necessarily indicative of fluctuations in the strength of civil society. A more inclusive, systematic approach would produce more reliable findings.

Norris et. al.’s article, “Who Demonstrates?” takes such an approach in examining the strength of civil society. The indicator of civic fortitude is participation in demonstrations. This variable’s strength is its compatibility with cross-national comparisons and time-series analyses. Norris et. al. do not provide the in-depth case study analysis that most research on civil society demands. The authors’ dependent variable, however, depicts interesting trends across nations and other independent variables, such as economic factors. The particular social context certainly affects the extent of participation in demonstrations, and this article helps expose some of these structural and economic influences. As the focus of this article is not civil society per se, demonstration participation may be an imperfect indicator of civic engagement. However, the research design is clearly stated, the evidence used is systematically acquired, and the results certainly cast doubt upon Putnam’s contention: that civil society is atrophying in the U.S.

Comparative research on revolution and civil society is as methodologically problematic as it is intellectually appealing. The empirical standards of social science, as expounded by King, Keohane and Verba in Designing Social Inquiry, suggest some especially difficult standards for research on revolutions. These standards are tremendously important, however, and should be followed as closely as possible. One particularly stringent DSI standard that poses unique challenges to revolution research is falsifiability. KKV suggest that “…to make sure that a theory is falsifiable, choose one that is capable of generating as many observable implications as possible. This choice will allow more tests of the theory with more data and a greater variety of data, will put the theory at risk of being falsified more times, and will make it possible to collect data so as to build strong evidence for the theory” (19). Since revolutions can only be studied after they occur, and research is highly dependent upon the particular social context, researchers face a particularly difficult challenge in formulating conclusions that can be tested against other cases. Nonetheless, this challenge is necessary for progress to ensue, so creative ways of ensuring falsifiability are beneficial to the subfield. For example, Lichbach explains that CA theories are not considered to be either right or wrong, but rather better or worse than one another for explaining social phenomena. Better theories essentially falsify worse ones because they reveal that the worse theory is not the best one in existence. This process leads the conditioning and refining of theories in a competitive environment.

Unit homogeneity, as described by KKV, is another measurement obstacle for cross-national research on revolutions (KKV 91). The importance of social context inhibits the generalization of findings due to unit heterogeneity. Even case study research must take caution when extrapolating its conclusions across time, as social transformations may alter the effects of different variables within the same nation. Another important issue of consideration is the fact that correlation does not imply causation, despite the appeal of drawing such a link. The mere presence of two dozen solutions to the CA problem reveals that a spurious link can easily go undetected when the variables do not specifically gauge the factors for which they are intended. In addition, KKV’s warning: “…do not select observations based on the dependent variable so that the dependent variable is constant,” is often violated in revolution research. When the occurrence of a revolution is the topic of inquiry, researchers often compare nations that witnessed a successful revolution against those who did not. Such comparisons should only be made after the selection of cases and testing of hypotheses; otherwise the case selection will be biased.

The vast array of comparative research on revolutions and civil society has led scholars to endorse and enforce the rules of comparative research. These rules are necessary for the integration of research, and thus the advancement of the subfield. While revolution is an especially intriguing topic of comparative politics, it presents particular obstacles that must be addressed in the research design. The high level of interest in the topic of revolution has most likely encouraged the strict enforcement of social science “rules” upon the relevant literature. This is a positive feature of the research topic, albeit an additional obstacle for scholars to surmount.

4. REGIME TYPES, REGIME TRANSITIONS, AND DEMOCRATIZATION.

One of the most highly developed topics of research in comparative politics is that of regime transition. Within this body of research, the lion’s share of scholarship is focused on the process of democratization. This should come as no surprise to those living in the twenty-first century, for recent history has witnessed the most extensive “wave” of democracy the world has ever witnessed. Today there are more people living under democratic rule than during any previous time in history (Geddes). These developments have essentially given the comparative subfield a unique and important duty, for no other academic school of thought is better equipped to answer the most pressing questions on the topic. What social forces are imperative for democratization? What inhibits the process? Why do some democratic regimes collapse during economic crises while others sustain? Comparativists have made substantial progress in providing solutions to these riddles of history. In the process, they have specified some important conceptual and empirical considerations for future research.

One of the most prominent works on the subject of regime transition and democratization is Samuel Huntington’s 1993 book, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century. By the time this book was published, it was already clear that the basic concept of “democracy” required a consensus among scholars. While political philosophy has witnessed more than two thousand years of the concept’s evolution, contemporary social scientists require a concise definition for the integration of research. Converting concepts to empirically testable criteria, as is necessary for large n quantitative studies, has proven to be quite difficult, for generic indicators inherently negate some of the unique features of each case. The challenge is to account for the most generalizable variables that denote the features of the concept in mind.

Although it is always difficult to achieve a consensus among social scientists, Huntington makes an impressive effort for developing a definition of democracy that is suitable for the entire subfield of comparative research. This definition, however, is not independent of historical eras, but rather specifically constructed to address the “third wave” of democracy that began in 1974. Timeframe is important to consider for studies of democracy because a static definition will prove irrelevant across historical eras. For example, minority groups and women have historically been unable to participate in elections, yet the exclusion of such governments from the “democracy” category would make the term inapplicable to all governments of earlier times.

At its core, Huntington’s definition is very similar to Joseph Schumpeter’s 1942 explanation, which reads: “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (6).

Anticipating scholarly debate over the applicability of this definition, Huntington provides five specifications at the onset of The Third Wave, most of which explain the parameters of the “minimal” or “procedural” approach as derived from Schumpeter. Huntington’s second specification is often overlooked in the research. This stipulation concerns the limitations on the power of democratically elected governments, especially in regards to other groups within society. Huntington reminds researchers, “If those democratically elected decision makers become… simply a façade for the exercise of much greater power by a nondemocratically chosen group, then clearly that political system is not democratic” (10). The author later suggests that “such allegations are often made, and they may be true. But they should not be judged to be true until they have been demonstrated to be true. That may be difficult, but it is not impossible” (10). This caveat reveals that even Huntington’s definition lacks the conciseness that further research is likely to demand, and that a more extensive definition of “democracy” will develop as the research progresses. For now, however, very little attention is granted to this specific stipulation. The minimal definition advocated by Huntington is generally the basis of empirical modeling, which compels researchers to forego the assessment of a democratic government’s power limitations and adhere only to the positive screening for “democratic” criteria. In other words, most comparative approaches are unable to detect any “façades.”

An important measurement issue embedded within Huntington’s five stipulations is the empirical treatment of democracy and nondemocracy as either a dichotomous or continuous variable. Huntington is justified in noting the inherent complication of using a continuous variable: that the weighting of indicators is inherently subjective or arbitrary. He asserts that a dichotomous approach is better suited for his particular research project, since the topic is the transition from nondemocratic to democratic government (11). However, this assertion faces legitimate criticism in subsequent comparative research.

Rather than employ a dichotomous variable for democracies and nondemocracies, Epstein et. al.’s 2006 article, “Democratic Transitions” introduce a trichotomous scale to include an intermediate category for “partial democracies.” If the transition from one regime-type to another is the issue of consideration, they argue, the regimes in the process of such transitions ought to be examined. The authors’ empirical research suggests that “partial democracies” are unique, in many ways, from both authoritarian regimes and democratic ones. These governments are defined as having some, but not all components of democracy. They are demonstrated to be far more unstable than either of the other two regime-types. In addition, they are most likely to go to war. Most importantly, however, is Epstein et. al.’s finding that dispels the general wisdom of the subfield: “that higher incomes per capita significantly increased the likelihood of democratic regimes, both by enhancing the consolidation of existing democracies and by promoting transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems” (566).

An important contribution of Epstein et. al.’s article is the methodical deconstruction PACL’s prominent work on democratization. This work serves as the means of comparison for use of the trichotomous variable, and one of the fundamental of PACL’s conclusions is discredited on several accounts. First of all, Epstein et. al. reveal that PACL reported the wrong p values in their original analysis, and that the correct p values lend support for the opposite conclusion reached by PACL. The broader lesson here is that empirical analysis must be meticulously proofread and understood by those who employ it. Moreover, it is always a good idea to retest the models of other research before utilizing findings in one’s own research. By the time PACL’s error term misrepresentation was discovered—several years after the original publication—the misinterpretation had been accepted as common knowledge among comparativists. While sophisticated statistical models provide new opportunities to comparative research on regime transformation, a thorough comprehension of the statistical techniques must precede publication of findings. This is a measurement issue that applies to all social science research.

Epstein et. al.’s analysis exhibits the advantages of a trichotomous variable for regime-type over a dichotomous one. The discoveries of partial democracy trends lead the authors to conclude that this new category is “critical to the understanding of democratic transitions… upon which future research should focus” (566). This finding represents progress in the field, as Huntington’s prescription has given way to more refined, empirically sound systems of measurement that are able to provide more leverage in providing solutions to the most salient comparative riddles.

On the opposite side of Huntington’s dichotomy, a diverse array of authoritarian regimes are combined into a single category. In fact, any government that does not satisfy the minimum criteria of democracy is automatically labeled “authoritarian” in Huntington’s analysis. However, these regimes are very diverse in their systems of governance, and therefore violate KKV’s rule of “unit homogeneity.” Of course, some level of overgeneralization is necessary for large N comparisons such as these. But what could come of a further specification of authoritarian regimes? Preceding Epstein et. al.’s clarification of democratic regime-types, Barbara Geddes explores the potentials of specified measure of authoritarian regimes in her 1999 article, “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?”

Noting the lack of scholarly concern for the ongoing authoritarian regimes, Geddes seeks to illuminate this dark corner of the political climate. In fact, she is quite critical of the relevant comparative work on the topic thus far, stating:

“It seems as though there should be a parsimonious and compelling explanation of the transitions, but the explanations proposed thus far have been confusingly complicated, careless about basic methodological details, often more useful as description than explanation, and surprisingly inconsistent with each other. The basic problem faced by analysts is that the process of democratization varies enormously from case to case and region to region. Generalizations proposed have failed either to accommodate all the real-world variation or to explain it” (117)

This critique of the literature underlies an important conceptual dilemma for democratization research. The tendency to overgeneralize is rampant, and comes at the cost of reproducibility. The importance of case study information has been increasingly underappreciated during recent decades, and Geddes has long been a critic of this trend. In her 1999 article, Geddes explains that an analysis of specific types of authoritarian regimes is important for understanding the process of democratization, as well as the many unique components of authoritarian regimes themselves. Most nondemocratic regimes can be accurately described as either personalistic, single-party, or military regimes. These are the subcategories employed by Geddes in her analysis.

Geddes examines 163 authoritarian regimes in 94 countries and finds that the patterns she predicts hold true under the microscope. Each subcategory is shown to exhibit unique tendencies regarding durability, resilience to exogenous shock, and the source of regime-dissolution (where applicable). Personalistic regimes, for example, are the most unstable among the three, while single-party regimes are the most stable. Military regimes are peculiar in that they are far more likely to initiate democratic governments to replace their own authority. These stark differences offer an incredible source of new insight into the research on the democratization process. Furthermore, Geddes’ findings suggest that Huntington’s dichotomous measure of regime-type obscures some imperative components of the transition process.

The brutally simplified dichotomy of regime-types has probably served its purpose in the development of democratization research. It was a starting point for refinement and scholarly expansion by subsequent researchers. To use such a blunt classification system today, however, would severely impair one’s potential for explaining cross-national regime transitions. Epstein et. al. and Geddes have collectively exhibited the advantages of using intermediate categories for research on the democratization process. Evidently, scholars must stay up-to-date on the developments of research in their particular subfield.

Huntington’s contribution to this particular body of research remains influential, despite the academic evolution of some of his proposals. The Third Wave is valuable to researchers today in part because of its cautious approach to claims of causality. Huntington notes that the modeling of the causal chain of democratization is rife with conceptual difficulties. This point is made clear with his list of twenty-seven different variables that have been defended as crucial components of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy (37). Causality is a fundamental issue in the research, but also one of the most difficult ones to assess. In part, this is because of the contemporary academic focus on large n quantitative analyses. Regime change is one of the least generalizable topics in comparative politics, as cross-national comparisons are bound to obfuscate the intricate social context of each regime transition. The process of democratization is a different process for each country that experiences it. Therefore, “the search for a common, universally present independent variable that might play a significant role in explaining political development in such different countries is almost certain to be unsuccessful if it is not tautological. The causes of democratization differ substantially from one place to another and from one time to another” (38).

Comparativists should take note of some simple conceptual issues which Huntington underscores in his book. First, the concept of democracy is not necessarily the catch-all word for everything good about government. A “procedural” definition is far more appropriate for the purposes of comparative politics, thus the acceptance of a minimum criteria approach must precede any comparative analysis of democratization. Democracies may be unstable, ineffective, or otherwise flawed. Second, the causes of the breakdown of authoritarian regimes are not necessarily the same causes of democratization. In fact, authoritarian regimes are more likely to be replaced by new authoritarian regimes than by democracies. This point is expanded by Epstein et al in the passage:

“To this fruitful, ongoing debate we add a reminder that leaving autocracy is not the same as entering democracy. Between these two lie partial democracies, which often act in a manner distinct from those countries either more or less democratic than they, and whose dynamics, while shaping contemporary politics, remain poorly understood” (567)

Third, the problem of overdetermination, or “a multiplicity of plausible theories to explain an event and the consequent problem of establishing the relative validity of those theories,” (36) should not necessarily deter a course of research. Huntington explains, “to occur historically, an event almost has to be overdetermined theoretically. Such is clearly the case with democratization” (37). Excessive efforts to avoid overdetermination are likely to inhibit the development of new theories and approaches. For explanatory purposes (as opposed to inferential ones), overdetermination is not an important concern.

Huntington’s in-depth examination of the “third wave” of democracy leads him to several important conclusions regarding controversial explanations of democratization. Economic factors are often seen as the most influential variables in the course of regime transition. The macroeconomic conditions of the 1970s and early 80s, Huntington finds, “provided the economic impetus and context for democratization” (59). The economic dynamics that served to weaken authoritarian regimes were, for most countries, either the oil crisis that caused prices to soar or the “Marxist-Leninist constraints” that instigated economic downturns (59). By the early 1970s, many countries under authoritarian rule had already developed economic infrastructures dynamic enough to facilitate the initiation of democracy. Economic prosperity typically increased the likelihood of democratization, especially in countries with internationally resilient economic infrastructures. Furthermore, very rapid economic growth appeared in some countries, which weakened the grip of authoritarian regimes. This destabilizing effect on government rule led some authoritarian leaders to liberalize accordingly. Of course, the process of regime transition was not constant across nations, but rather, “the relative significance of these general causes varied from region to region and from one type of authoritarian system to another, as well as from one country to another… also varied over time during the third wave” (107).

Democratization cannot be reduced to merely economic factors. An influential social norm that pervaded the third wave was the issue of legitimacy and regime-type. The international community had clearly adopted the democratic conception of legitimacy, which led to pressure on authoritarian regimes from both foreign and domestic sources. The term “democracy” has consequently been exploited by dictators in their quests for social legitimacy. Authoritarian leaders have rigged elections or systematically intimidated voters, issued single-party ballots, censored political opponents, and otherwise sought an image of democracy without truly committing themselves to such a system. Fortunately, comparativists use their own definition of democracy and do not accept the self-identification of national governments. This tendency to exploit the international consensus on the legitimacy of democratic rule should lead the comparativist to employ a close examination of each national government before categorization.

Probabilism is the most basic practical assumption that comparative models must employ. Deterministic theories, especially in a cross-national context, are sure to fail tests of reliability. There are far too many factors at-play for comparativists to accurately predict societal events. Individuals play a crucial role in the outcomes of political developments. Nonetheless, the likelihood of general outcomes or developments can be assessed with the tools of comparative politics. This point is made clear in the second chapter of The Third Wave:

“General factors create conditions favorable to democratization. They do not make democratization necessary… A democratic regime is installed not by trends but by people. Democracies are created not by causes but by causers… The emergence of social, economic, and external conditions favorable to democracy is never enough to produce democracy… Political leaders cannot through will and skill create democracy where preconditions are absent” (108)

The research on regime transition and democratization has certainly progressed over the decades, but the potentials for comparative insight remain bountiful. Less than a decade ago, Geddes stated that the research project is still in its “infancy,” despite the thousands of publications on the subject. It is important for future researchers to pay close attention to the findings of their predecessors, as the first segment of the trail has already been blazed. Progress within the subfield is the goal of all good research, and thus the collaboration of discoveries must occupy a top priority among scholars. Conceptual and measurement issues have been revealed over the course of academic developments. These lessons and caveats must be recognized in order for progress to ensue.

Test "Title" References:

Berejikian, Jeffrey. 1992. "Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem." American Political Science Review 86(3): 647-657.
Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006. "Democratic Transitions." American Journal of Political Science, Volume 50 Issue 3, Pages 551-569.
Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" Annual Review of Political Science 2:115-144.
Huntingdon, Samuel P. 1993. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. (chapters 1&2: 1-108)
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Chapters 1-3)
Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1994. "Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion: Theories of Collective Action and Problems of Collective Dissent." Rationality and Society 6(1): 8-39.
Norris, Pippa, Stefaan Walgrave, and Peter Van Aelst. 2005. "Who Demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, Conventional Participants, or Everyone?" Comparative Politics, 37(2): 189-205.
Putnam, Robert D. 1996. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." Journal of Democracy 6:65-78.
Wellhofer, E. Spencer. 2003. "Democracy and Fascism: Class, Civil Society, and Rational Choice in Italy." American Political Science Review 97(1): 91-106.

Final Essay I

2009-05-06T13:23:00.004-05:00

Mandy McConnell
Dr. Gang Guo
POL 523
8 April 2009
The Complex Issues of Comparative Political Economy
What role do economics play in politics and vice versa? To what extent are these
two fields dependent upon one another? Are conclusions about political economy gen-
eralizable? The study of comparative political economy must account for these difficult
puzzles in every theoretical approach, research design, and empirical analysis. Each time
a researcher defines her concepts or operationalizes his variables a multitude of complex,
causal factors must be included. Unfortunately, the exact nature of the relationships
between these variables is hardly ever known. It follows that regardless of the individual
phenomenon under study, there are common issues that all of the political economic pa-
pers, the sub-discipline generally, and the greater comparative field must face together.
Misspecifications, arbitrary classifications, and vague definitions are often not about a
particular researcher's shortcomings. Instead, it is regularly the result of trying to make
cross-national comparisons in the face of multiple cultural, institutional, and sociological
contexts. In other words, the definitions of concepts are oftentimes contextually depen-
dent. Historical factors create unique industrialization patterns that must be factored
into the current national contexts. Furthermore, the fact that cultures matter is extraor-
dinarily difficult to model. How does one empirically measure or express cultural tenets?
This, along with other abstract concepts such as partisan ideology or individual policy
preference, are integral to studying comparative political economy.
Unfortunately, conceptual issues alone do not plague the literature. Because of our
complex concepts and theories, our research may be limited to small n studies and specic
time spans. In addition, it is difficult to create parsimonious models that do not involve
multicollinearity. This is truly an obstacle to generalization. It remains that much
of the work in political economy is heavily dependent on (historical) case studies; this
qualitative area is an island left within a largely empirical field. Zuckerman (1997) may be
right. Perhaps to rectify the lack of appropriate methodologies for our research we must
shift from our focus on causal relationships to a search for specific, process mechanisms.
Currently, the body of literature on comparative political economy holds both promise
and dismay. Will we ever nd answers to our questions?
David Cameron, a foremost researcher in the field, presents a comparative analysis of
public welfare systems in his 1978 piece The Expansion of the Public Economy. Though
dated, this piece stands as a solid example of the comparative potential of political
economy. Specifically, he examines what gives rise to the welfare state in advanced,
industrialized nations. His empirical examinations result in the conclusion that political
and institutional theories best work to explain the existence of an extensive welfare state.
Yet despite his efforts and contributions, Cameron also falls prey to conceptual and
methodological difficulties. For instance, regarding the political explanations Cameron
states that,
two aspects of politics may influence the magnitude of expansion of the public
economy:(1)the effect of electoral competition in "bidding up" the scope of expen-
diture programs; and (2)the effect of variations in the partisan composition, and
presumably the ideological preferences, of government (Cameron, 1978:1246).
Although a mostly institutional paper, both of these categories of political explana-
tion strike me as variants of sociological approaches. There are obvious drawbacks in
attempting to explain economic and political outcomes this way. The largest being that
the complications caused by sociological approaches tend to create more questions than
provide answers; attempting to compare cases cross-nationally from a sociological vantage
point is more difficult than comparing institutions.
Furthermore, properly measuring these concepts cross-nationally may be impossible,
as cultural preferences often arise from endogenous and almost infinite mechanisms. Set-
ting a continuous range of 'ideological preferences' to be used in comparisons would be
arbitrary at best. Though Cameron mentions the importance of these tenets, he does
not explicitly propose a way to empirically address their unwieldiness. It seems that
he operationalized ideological preferences by measuring the percentage of parties in the
government's electoral base (Social Democratic or Labor parties)(Cameron, 1978:1254).
These parties only truly apply to a handful of Western European countries. Some of
these are even regionally grouped. Are the preferences of these two parties constant
across borders? Can we draw generalizable conclusions from the use of this variable?
Furthermore, how does Cameron capture the amount of 'bidding up' going on? An in-
clusion of more major party labels or a measure of total policy earmarks given to certain
patronage groups could be better indicators of these issues. Perhaps these problems are
simply a function of the limited amount of time and number of cases.
Regardless, Cameron's most important nding is certainly institutional in nature.
The author posits,
the best explanation of why public authorities in some nations have expanded their
control over the appropriation and allocation of resources while those in other na-
tions have not is international in character. Among the nations considered here, the
expansion of the public economy was most closely associated with a relatively high
exposure to, and dependence upon, external producers and consumers" (Cameron,
1978:1255).
In other words, the amount of trade dependence works best to explain the existence
of the welfare state. This explanation, called the openness of the economy, "rests on the
following governmental structures:(1)the formal relationship among levels of government
within a nation-in particular, the existence of multiple, independent centers of public
authority; and (2)the degree of fiscal centralization" (Cameron, 1978:1248). But he also
states, within his political explanation, that voters are likely to provide short-term sup-
port for candidates when they see a surge in real income. Politicians participate in a
'political business cycle' pumping public funds into the economy just before an election
(Cameron, 1978:1247). It is difficult for me to understand how this is not an institutional
explanation. Though the specific structures of national electoral cycles are not mentioned,
electoral systems, in my mind, are institutions. Separating these two concepts to be mea-
sured separately may present problems. Perhaps it is Cameron's political explanations
that are actually driving the amount of 'trade openness' in a country. Is one measure
simply a proxy of the other? A clarification of the exact definition of institutions used
may provide more insight into this potential problem. Maybe more importantly, with
a study focused only on advanced, industrial nations will we ever be able to compare
these findings meaningfully to third world or otherwise under-developed nations? Basing
our theories on outcomes from such similar nations might exclude the ability to explain
across all regions and nation types. Only further tests will reveal the true efficacy of these
explanations.
If Cameron's findings are correct, we might expect to find the so-called international
explanations working to analyze the size and presence of the welfare state in most, if not
all, of our advanced, industrialized nations. However, Lange et al. (1991) place a different
emphasis on the existence of trade interdependence. Specifically they ask: has increased
trade interdependence resulted in a decrease in the impact a political party may have on
domestic economies? If Leftist parties are indeed associated with higher levels of welfare
spending, will welfare programs begin to decrease as left and right ideals converge in a new
political economic context? Here the authors argue that increased trade interdependence
has not led to the convergence of left and right ideologies (Lange et al, 1991:541). Instead,
endogenous, as opposed to exogenous, explanations may account for the 'state' of the
welfare state. This plays on a huge body of historical literature associated with the role
and size of political parties in Western Europe, especially Scandinavia. The presence
of Leftist parties has often told us much about the political and economic systems of a
particular country. In our present-day study of political economy, however, it is right for
researchers to question how useful these older practices may be. These authors take on
this task.
To begin Lange et al. nd that, "the results suggest that while economic interde-
pendence had a marked impact on the macroeconomic strategies in all of the advanced
industrial democracies, the effects of differences in the degree of openness between indi-
vidual countries have been much smaller" (Lange et al., 1991:554). In other words, eco-
nomic interdependence may be important but trade openness does not markedly change
a nation's policies. This may indicate that regardless of the domestic party situation,
measures of interdependence will be running the show. Unfortunately the authors also
tell us that, "the effects of interdependence may be more a function of financial integra-
tion than trade openness, but it is extremely difficult to test this proposition empirically"
(Lange et al., 1991:555). Are the concepts the authors wish to test too difficult to ac-
curately capture in a model? From a methodological standpoint, the results they obtain
are rather statistically weak. This, like Cameron's piece may be a nod to a very small n
(15 countries) or of the short time period under observation (1960-1987). For example, a
discussion of current Leftist corporatist states highlights the existence of multiple policy
preferences in the face of rather advanced trade interdependence. However, there are only
several viable corporatist states and they mostly exist in one particular European region,
sharing similar histories and economies. I am inclined to think that perhaps our authors
are inadvertently testing on the dependent variable: the case selection reflects what they
hope to find. These conclusions and examples illustrate the point that it is very difficult
to empirically evaluate our political economic concepts. Yet, this should not, and does
not, stop the field from grinding forward.
Another sticking point highlights the difficulty of generalizing political economic theo-
ries. The authors, "used the trade openness of national political economies as a measure
of the degree of their vulnerability to changes in the global economy" (Lange et al.,
1991:553). Lange et al. do not go on to provide a more thorough explanation as to how
this variable was operationalized. Not all nations are going to respond in the same way
to the same levels of trade openness. I would think that Great Britain might have more
trade openness than France but that France's traditionally regional, high-end product
production model would leave them more vulnerable in the face of trade openness than
Britain. My apologies if I am missing a more nuanced or implicit argument regarding the
use of this variable, but it seems, again, a bit difficult to apply cross-nationally. With-
out an historic understanding of the trade systems of the nation in question, the same
variable may have very different implications for different regions.
The conclusion that the left still exists and that there has not been total partisan
preference convergence in the face of globalization and trade interdependence is certainly
intuitive. The authors leave us with,
In sum, these results conform well with the hypothesized partisan separation over
government supply-side strategies for enhancing competitiveness and
flexible adjustment in world markets. The stronger the combined political and organizational
power of labor, the more extensive were government interventions with respect
not only to directly redistributive measures and labor market policies but also to
industrial and investment strategies" (Lange et al, 1991:562)
In sum, this work, again, falls prey to larger conceptual and methodological issues.
Some of the operationalized variables do not seem to be captured with any degree of
specificity. It is also another example of research that must rely only on advanced, indus-
trialized societies. Just like Cameron, the models are attempting to capture particular,
ideological stances that may actually be the product of a region's culture rather than its
institutions. In the end the best the authors can oer is a cautionary statement against
ruling out viable Leftist party preferences and impacts; institutions cannot be expected
to expel the differences between left and right ideologies.
Hopefully the above discussion of work by Cameron and Lange et al. has exemplified
some of the difficulties associated with applying concepts and methods to multiple na-
tional contexts. Let's not forget that there are also triumphs to be had. Paul Pierson's
work, The New Politics of the Welfare State shares in the struggles of the field but also
provides a great deal of insight on this topic. As progress moves forward, it makes sense
that we would expect work in political economy to move toward welfare program retrench-
ment as domestic and international issues shift to deal with burgeoning populations and
globalization. Yet this is not necessarily true. What accounts for the maintenance, and
sometimes expansion, of social welfare programs? A critical link to understanding the
welfare state and potential policy retrenchment lies in Pierson's distinction between the
processes that create welfare policy and those that take these policies away. This is an
excellent place for subsequent researchers to begin empirically evaluating both processes
as separate from one another. However, Pierson also mentions the difference between
welfare policies being 'popular' when enacted and being 'unpopular' when repealed. Is
this necessarily always the case? Can we build a measure of popularity/unpopularity
regarding policy initiation/retrenchment into our models or is this immeasurable? Col-
lecting survey data on such issues may suffice, but we should take time to address this
issue before moving on with future modeling.
Importantly, Pierson's findings include explanations found in both of the last two pa-
pers: "A combination of economic changes, political shifts to the right, and rising costs
associated with maturing welfare states has provoked growing calls for retrenchment"
(Pierson, 1996:145). But as we see with his inclusion of four country-level cases studies,
though theoretically feasible, this is not the reality of the modern welfare state. Instead,
we see moderate reforms or in some cases social program expansion. As usual, I must
ask, is there something inherent in each of these countries, though he does pair most-like
cases together for comparison, that allows us to explain the popular ideological distaste
for retrenchment? Could we make this into a viable quantitative paper or are Pierson's
institutional explanations rooted too deeply in culture and history? Perhaps the lesson
we can take away from this initial evaluation is that neither quantitative nor qualita-
tive explanations suffice alone. Perhaps KKV is right: we must combine these logically
connected approaches to produce meaningful causal theories.
Another group of authors, Stephens et al. (1993), do not shy away from the issues
plaguing their field. They almost immediately state that there are significant problems
with the methodologies, conceptualizations, and operationalizations among the sub dis-
cipline of comparative political economy. I couldn't have said it better myself! They also
quickly point out that there is a large degree of collinearity between commonly employed
explanatory variables (Stephens et al., 1993:712). The remedy: using the largest n pos-
sible and conducting studies on pooled data over time. Furthermore, bad independent
variables, the authors feel, should be deleted based on statistical, substantive, and theo-
retical criteria (1993:716). While a worthwhile recommendation, we also must remember
that the omission of explanatory variables can be risky territory. Though continued dis-
agreements in the sub-discipline should be addressed in order to create a better body
of knowledge, we need to be quite conservative in our omissions as they may lead to
misspecication. Mostly, the authors seem to champion the cause for more parsimonious
and better models.
But for all of the talk about these great concepts, the authors still fall victim to
conceptual and methodological issues. Here, we will be examining our dependent variable,
existence of the welfare state, across several party types and mitigating structural set-
ups. "A single, carefully constructed measure is far preferable to a composite index of
convenient but inappropriate indicators," (Stephens et al., 1993:716). This is absolutely
true but who is to solve the issue of which indicators are inappropriate and which are
not? What about collapsing measures into a single variable to serve as a proxy? Is this
allowable? The authors go on to present a number of very complex hypotheses that
focus on institutional factors regarding power sharing and parties. They include three
separate indexes as their dependent variables using, as always, advanced, industrialized
nations with a small n (17) and a constricted time period (post WWII). Could it it be
the time period that is affecting the results? Perhaps expanding the model to include
cases prior to WWII would provide us with more insight? Their findings show that
the contrast between Christian Democracy and Social Democratic parties provide strong
confirmation for the refinements of the political class-struggle argument (Stephens et al.,
1993:734). But the constitutional structure is also signifi all three main explanations
of welfare state emergence. Though this paper is not perfect, it is perhaps proof that
facing the problems of comparing cross-nationally by empirically addressing common
conceptual and methodological issues can increase the explanatory power of our models
and find connections amongst previously competing theories.
Unfortunately, I am constrained here by both space and time. Yet it should be obvious
that comparative political economy remains one of the most complex sub-disciplines of
comparative political science. Its historical legacy, combined with time and sample size
limitations calls for creative approaches to some of its biggest puzzles. All of the authors
discussed above have significantly contributed to the literature in this field by employing
the critical thinking skills expected of every liberal arts researcher. Continued empirical
modeling along with solid theoretic development is perhaps the best prescription for any
methodological or conceptual ills that plague the literature. Whether or not there will
ever be one, single consensus in this area remains to be seen. I am inclined to believe
that the multiple explanations employed here are not mutually exclusive but neither can
they be compressed into some 'one-size-fits-all' package. The unique face of every nation
will not allow for this. However, we can continue to expand our body of knowledge and
examine our quantitative and qualitative work for signs of patterns and improvement.

References
Cameron, David R. 1978. "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative
Analysis." The American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 4, Pp.1243-1261.
Huber, Evelyne, Charles Ragin, and John D. Stephens. 1993. "Social Democracy,
Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State." The American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 3, Pp. 711-749.
Lange, Peter and Georey Garrett. 1991. "Political Responses to Interdependence:
What's "Left" for the Left?" International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 4, Pp.539-564.
Pierson, Paul. 1996. "The New Politics of the Welfare State." World Politics, Vol. 48,
No. 2, Pp.143-179.
Zuckerman, Alan S. 1997. "Reformulating Explanatory Standards and Advancing
Theory in Comparative Politics." in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman
editors, Comarative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure. Ch. 10, Pp. 277-310.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10

POL 523 Final Exam

2009-05-04T14:40:00.002-05:00

Consider the following four substantive areas of comparative political studies that we have covered in the second half of this semester:

social movements, revolutions, and civil society;
political institutions and party systems;
comparative political economy;
regime types, regime transitions, and democratization.

Pick two topics from the above list of four and write an essay of around 10 pages in length for each of the two chosen topics by answering the following question:
Leaving aside the practical difficulties associated with conducting research outside of the United States, describe some conceptual issues and problems raised by a cross-national study on the particular topic. Also, discuss the measurement issues and problems that researchers must take into account when studying the topic. Use the readings assigned in this course to illustrate your points.
The titles of both your essays should clearly indicate the topic that you will be writing on. You have 48 hours to complete and post your two essays, during which time you may not discuss this exam with others.

2009-04-28T20:25:00.000-05:00

The Problem of Conceptualization

"Before we can investigate the presence or absence of some attribute ... or before we can rank objects or measure them in terms of some variable, we must form the concept of that variable.
-Lazarsfeld and Barton (1955)

Creating an effective research design it is not an easy task. It is actually one of the most difficult tasks in designing a research project. An effective research design will link stylized and abstract concepts and questions with real world complexities – which is one of KKV’s (1994) criteria for all research projects in social science. One of the most difficult tasks in designing a research project is to overcome the issues of conceptualization. According to Gary Goertz (2005) a good concept is:

A good concept draws distinctions that are important in the behavior of the object. The central attributes that a definition refers to are those that prove relevant for hypotheses, explanations, and causal mechanisms. In a theoretical and empirical view of scientific concepts their semantics change as our understanding of the phenomenon changes.

I compare two of the week’s reading and how the authors defined the critical concepts of their research.

In "Sex, Lies, and War," Baum finds that information about foreign crises, and other issues of similarity, presented in soft news coverage, has attracted the attention of politically uninvolved Americans. After testing his hypotheses, Baum even suggests that the soft news media coverage of foreign policy may have significant practical consequences for American politics" (105). However, there is a big flaw in Baum’s research design.

A big flaw Baum’s in work is that the author does not make a clear distinction between soft and hard news. Baum suggests that competition for viewers forced broadcasters to find new ways to raise their profit margins, such as increasing audience but at the same lowering production costs. In order to achieve that goal they "repackaged" news into inexpensively produced forms of entertainment – referred as soft news. He also adds that soft news is also a residual category for all news that is not "hard," as "a particular vocabulary in presenting news (e.g., more personal and familiar and less distant or institutional)" (92). After all these explanations, one still wonders what makes different types of news fall into one of the categories. Baum admits that the definitions are imprecise but that for his purposes he will use the latter definition. However, I do not see why "internet sources" were not included in his model as soft news. After all, internet is also an inexpensively produced form of entertainment and surely provides the inattentive public with information regarding foreign crises.

Baum’s inability to provide the reader with a clear definition of one of his main independent variables makes the reader wonder how valid his findings and the implications of his findings are.
In "The Dynamics of the Partisanship Gender Gap," Box-Steffensmeier at al examine the nature and he causes of gender differences in partisanship. They show that gender differences are pervasive and that they are a product of societal conditions and politics. Contrary to Baum, the authors are rigorous in presenting their research design.

Intuitively, at first, readers will assume the authors examine women’s and men’s individual partisanship, but the authors are interested in the gap itself, not individual partisanship. For the unfamiliar reader, even if the distinction between the gap itself and individual partisanship sounded a bit blurry and confusing at first, the authors are able to clarify the difference between them. They define gender gap as the difference between the partisanship of men and women. They explain that they are "less interested in whether men and women both penalize the incumbent party for poor economic performance than whether women punish them disproportionally more severely than men do" (519). The analysis of gender gap will allow them to draw conclusions about the differences between men and women and about the different effects on the independent variables.

One of the most difficult tasks in designing a research project is to overcome the issues of conceptualization. The conceptualization of the components of our research, the dependent and independent variables has enormous implications for empirical analyses and causal inference; therefore scholars should pay more attention to this process.

2009-04-28T20:18:00.000-05:00

Mandy McConnell
Dr. Gang Guo
POL 523
29 April 2009
Final Essay
In political science we often explore questions of the utmost complexity. In contrast to the hard, physical sciences, the social sciences must attempt to quantify and operationalize variables that are illusive and multifaceted. Whether a researcher is defining democracy or measuring ideology, a host of problems is likely to arise with attempting to quantify such inherently qualitative concepts. Perceptions and subjectivity are also likely to play a role in the methodological decisions any political scientist must make. Because of these issues we must spend time carefully examining our model, sample, and variable choices to ensure the most accurate and unbiased criteria are selected with which to examine our hypotheses. Yet regardless of our statistical rigor, all sub-fields of political science are likely to face similar methodological issues. The pieces in this week’s readings are by no means immune.
As Box-Steffensmeier et al tells us, there are marked differences between the partisan preferences of men and women often referred to as the ‘partisan gender gap.’ The reasons for the existence of such differences have long been debated and range from institutional explanations to more vague conceptions of cultural and societal pressures on preference formation. The fact remains that gender is a salient to our political ideologies. Despite the extremely interesting theoretical implications of this line of research, little empirical testing has been done that takes into account the complicated nature of measuring partisanship. Here the authors simply create a dummy variable to capture whether a respondent was a democrat or republican. This fails to take into account the various other political identifications as well as the strength of partisanship that may explain the variation in the data better than the model’s simplified measure. Furthermore, I argue that the measure of ideological polarization, here ‘Conservative Macroideology’, is another over-simplified measure of the political environment that cannot reflect the real-world. Perhaps dis-aggregating the political affiliation measure into an ordinal (i.e. conservative, moderate conservative, moderate, etc.) variable would be more appropriate. And though I do not have a current recommendation for accurately capturing the ‘political climate’ I am not convinced that a measure of democratic polarization , as well as conservative polarization, should be excluded from the model. These are not issues of nuance; these are measures that make the model more theoretical and less applicable.
Departing from the American context, Gershkoff and Kushner’s paper Shaping Public Opinion also suffers from its own methodological issues. Though I do not doubt that the rhetoric of the Bush administration worked to inform the public’s opinions about the ‘war on terror’ , there is no measure that safely captures the extent of said rhetoric’s affect. Simply showing that there is correlation between speech dates, selective news coverage, and manipulation of the terrorism index does not immediately imply causation. Public support for the Iraq war is most likely based on a number of interrelated issues including economic, religious, and ideological factors. In other words, I am not convinced that Bush convinced us. Perhaps the public’s support of the Iraq war is really a proxy for the support of underlying issues that the administration worked to exploit but that are not explored in this particular paper. I realize that the scope of an individual research project must necessarily be limited; but a balance must be found between parsimony and the examination of the proper variables.
That said, there are identifiable problems with our operational concepts in and across all fields of the social sciences, including political science. I do not have all of the answers and will readily admit that I am also constantly struggling to find a better way to define the variables most useful for our studies. The purpose of this paper was to provide examples that address the common issues that belie all of our political work. The exceptional pieces discussed above are some of the best examples of new work in our field and it works to show us that the questions and methods of one sub-field are not necessarily any farther along than another. Keeping the lines of communication open across all of these schools will prove to be important for our continuing development. I firmly believe that only by working together will we finally find the most parsimonious and realistic ways to define, operationalize, and test our multitude of dependent and independent variables.

The State of the Subfield

2009-04-21T20:56:00.002-05:00

This week’s readings present some caveats as well as suggestions for the future of comparative politics research. The authors reveal that empirical analysis has been subjected to widespread misusage in the subfield. Empirical research has helped comparative politics progress in many ways, but social scientists cannot afford to lose sight of the inherent deficiencies and limitations of quantitative analysis.

A major priority on the agenda for scholars of comparative politics is that of reminding empirical researchers that their quantitative data derives from oversimplified, imperfectly measured aspects of social activity. Quantitative analysis, especially with large Ns, has steadily assumed dominance in comparative politics. While this development has helped make social theories more testable, it has been hurriedly accepted as “The” method of social science research. However, quantitativists have oftentimes lost sight of the link between numerical data and social reality. This has resulted in overconfidence, overgeneralization, and overextension of quantitative inferences.

Empirical data can be misinterpreted if: inferences are substantiated with spurious relationships of surrogate variables; observed relationships apply only under particular conditions of unmeasured variables; or, if empirical findings are too broad to explain unit-level circumstances. The last instance describes many misapplications of empirical data, such as the overlooking of long-term trends that may conceal cyclical, short-term patterns (Zuckerman 296). Misuse of empirical data can also be found in the utilization of quantitative data for explaining, rather than testing, social science theories. This caveat is described in a quotation used by Zuckerman in “Reformulating Explanatory Standards”:

These models are not ‘tested’ against historical data; rather they are
‘applied.’ The models are logical constructions, their propositions are
logically true. The question is whether they are useful, which is to say,
whether they enable the scholar to better understand the empirical world.
A model is compared to the historical record, and if it ‘fits,’ if its
propositions are reflected in the empirical record, then it is a candidate for
being an element of the explanation of that record (Fiorina 1996)(Zuckerman
295)

Empirical researchers have often made assumptions about empirical tendencies that do not reflect social phenomena. For example, non-linearity is prevalent in tendencies of social behavior, yet simple linear models are used excessively to explain nonlinear relationships (Zuckerman 297). In addition, models should anticipate probabilism, yet results are sometimes interpreted as evidence of determinism. Models should not aim to find such deterministic causal relationships, as they will inherently leave out influential variables. Models are often overextended to explain social actions, rather than probabilities of social developments. As Zuckerman explains, “Formal models provide a framework for analysis, core assumptions about the nature of political reality and the factors that drive political processes. They offer interpretations, but they do not explain particular events, decisions, or processes” (295).

The research on developing democracies and authoritarian regimes has taken a back seat in recent decades, in part due to these same empirical misusages. Third-world countries often fail to provide evidence for a model, and are accordingly left out of comparative works. The “state” has reoccupied a leading role in the subfield, which has led researchers to leave out the empirically inconvenient third-world. Universalistic conclusions are derived from these works, when in fact, they do not apply to developing states (Levi 51). This reflects a broader problem in the subfield: selection on the dependent variable. If the “state” is truly the topic of analysis, scholars ought to account for the variables that produce the divergent outcomes of developed and developing states. For the same reason, “inconvenient” autocratic states are increasingly being left out of comparative analyses, despite the dozens of enduring autocratic regimes (Geddes 367).

Theoretical universalism may be convenient for empirical research, but much research aimed at universality infers a causality chain with missing links. A series of chain links is often reduced to a single variable, leaving the fundamental components of this variable unexplored.

As a whole, the readings add weight to the claim that the subfield of comparative politics cannot advance empirically without corresponding advancements in the qualitative realm. Quantitativists cannot produce theoretically coherent findings without a thorough qualitative understanding of their data.

-Dan Blazo

2009-04-21T18:18:00.000-05:00

Advancing Scientific Understanding in Comparative Politics?

Are we advancing scientific understanding in comparative politics? According to Caporaso (2000) comparativists have a commitment to explanatory accuracy that results in a fragmented discipline (Laitin 631). To mention a few, disagreement regarding the appropriate methodology and research norms and the different ontologies of research schools in comparative politics are among the sources of fragmentation. This fragmentation in turn, limits the ability of the field to advance scientific understanding. In order to make progress in our field, and advance knowledge about political phenomena we need to overcome these barriers and establish a common ground for the exchange of ideas that will only benefit the field.

One of the goals of our discipline, or any discipline, is to advance its scientific knowledge. The goal of comparative politics is to advance knowledge about political phenomena. But what is exactly scientific understanding? Zucherman (2003) contends that “the search for nomological explanations has bedeviled political scientists, leading some to suggest scientific understanding is an illusion” (281). Covering laws and causal theories have defined the forms of acceptable explanations, but Zucherman makes a point when he argues that these are inappropriate and inadequate standards for scientific understanding (281). There are several flaws in the standard forms of scientific understanding. Among them are – the strong intuition that explanation needs to establish causal relationships, and covering laws do not explain because they abstain from causal claims. Given these flaws, explanations in science, argues Zucherman, need not to include covering laws or causal accounts (284) – a relief for those that feel pressured to fit their research into the “standard form of acceptable explanation.”

Among the sources of fractionalization within the field is the selection of the appropriate methodology. Barbara Geddes, in her chapter “The Great Transformation in the Study of Politics in Developing Countries,” argues that large-N studies had a bad reputation among scholars in comparative politics due to the poor quality of data available and the common view that quantitative research lacks sensitivity to real world scenarios (366). Historical institutionalists and comparative historical sociologists place a very high value on empirical evidence. However, they do not agree on one thing: the value of small-n versus large-n. Both research schools place great emphasis on description of processes leading up to their observed outcome. For practitioners, this process is considered solid evidence. Historical Institutionalists are defenders of selection of cases based on the outcome, the use of small-n research designs, and the idea that path-dependence process cannot be explain in terms of causal mechanism. They believe conventional norms limit their ability to focus the processes central to understanding. In contrast to historical institutionalists, modelers do not place great emphasis on the presentation of evidence. They seem to reject the idea that arguments need to be confirmed empirically; they are arguments are written in mathematical form.

The discussion of the state of research of the state by Margaret Levi captures the distinct nature of these two research design schools. Levi argues that in order to improve the quality of the research regarding the state, scholars should “go beyond thick descriptions of specific states at specific times to develop models and falsifiable hypotheses derived from realistic and logical presuppositions … which are then tested against empirical evidence” (51). The field needs the input of historical institutionalists, comparative historical sociologists (descriptions and empirical evidence) and modelers (models and falsifiable hypotheses) in order to improve the quality of the field’s findings.

Also, the ontologies of the research schools limit the field’s ability to explain political phenomena. Zuckerman suggests that rationalists need to reduce the domain of what they study or expand their theoretical principles (291). Structuralists need to reject their realist assumptions.

The above narrative suggests that the field of comparative politics suffers from an internal division, leading to the inability to advance in scientific understanding. There is no unified methodology, research design, nor ontology. However, even in the midst of disagreement there is a light at the end of the tunnel. According to Zucherman, the field enhances scientific understanding in political science in two forms: (1) by testing general propositions that stand as covering laws across states and points of time, offering a mode of counterfactual analysis and (2) by establishing boundaries of general propositions and theories (281). There is no doubt - the field is indeed advancing in scientific understanding, however, if we would overcome some of the internal divisions within our field, we would not only grow as a subfield faster, but also we would become a more unified discipline, bringing different research schools together.

Democratic or Authoritarian?

2009-04-14T21:06:00.025-05:00

“If the constitution of a state is democratic, then every exceptional negation of democratic principles, every exercise of state power independent of the approval of the majority, can be called dictatorship.”

-Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy

Why do countries change their governments from authoritarian to democratic, and vice versa? This question is one of the most essential in comparative political science, but its broad scope poses many problems for scholars. Defining regime-types and classifying national governments accordingly has proven to be a major obstacle for scholars. The relevant literature has developed a unique approach, but has yet to exhibit theoretical consistency. National-level variables—such as the extent of government, the role of the elected government in overall governance, and national wealth—are unduly assessed either theoretically or empirically.

Case-studies are prevalent in the literature. Large N quantitative studies are inherently problematic in one way or another, given the rich diversity of political institutions and economic environments across nations. As evident in Geddes’ work, much of the empirical work lacks unifying statistical models and relies on single variable statistics and analyses.

Perhaps a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis is the only reasonable approach to this research question. Prior to determining the right approach, however, the qualitative components of the dependent variable must be clearly defined. Unfortunately, conceptual ambiguity remains prevalent in the literature.

Dichotomous and trichotomous measures of regime-types are inherently broad generalizations. Even these categories, however, lack clear definitions. “Democracy," according to the qualitative analyses in each of the readings, describes liberal democracies. A regime that does not meet the standards of democracy is described as “authoritarian," though it may or may not pass the "democracy tests" of the models. Huntington discusses the converse circumstance of a democratic regime, “If those democratic decision makers become, however, simply a façade for the exercise of much greater power by a nondemocratically chosen group, then clearly that political system is not democratic”(10), but devotes just one sentence to the most illiberal feature that has, at times, arisen in “free and fair” democracies: “Implicit in the concept of democracy, however, are limitations on power”(10). I perceive the author’s conception of these limitations to be in line with the concept of liberalism, or the limitations of government. However, these “limitations” are neither defined nor accounted for in any of the authors’ classifications.

Moreover, the authors fail to recognize that their conception of democracy is necessarily that of liberal democracy. “…Popular election of the top decision makers” essentially serves as the requirement for democratic rule in the empirical models(Huntington 9). However, such electoral systems have, at times, produced authoritarian democratic regimes. Democracy—as defined by the authors—and authoritarianism are not mutually exclusive; liberal democracy and authoritarianism are. False classifications are likely if liberalism is not taken into account in the classification process, which seems to be the case for all of this week's literature. A country that meets the minimum criteria for the "democracy" category is automatically categorized as a democracy. There is no positive screening for authoritarian elements, for the authors assume (empirically, but not conceptually) that the minimum criteria for the democracy category is enough to ensure that no government that could meet these standards could ever be considered an authoritarian regime. The "façade" is undetectable.

Both qualitative and quantitative aspects of the authors’ approaches are theoretically ambiguous. One example is Huntington's "façade " scenario, which is too essential to the "procedural" conception of democracy to shrug off with a single paragraph, as the authors do. How is one to determine what qualities denote a "the exercise of much greater power?" concealed behind the facades? (10)

Contemporary Marxists make a persuasive argument that according to the authors' descriptions, the United States' government is not a democracy, but a façade. A “much greater power” than that of the elected government may reasonably be considered the control of the monetary system (in a system of fiat currency, as we have today). Are the IMF, the World Bank, or the Federal Reserve “democratically chosen”? Of course not. Nor are the Supreme Court, the UN, NAFTA, NATO, the EU, etc. Yet all of these governing bodies play central roles in the lives of civilians. How are we to define “power” and “democratically chosen group”s? The literature makes no apparent effort to address these legitimate concerns while classifying national governments.

On the contrary, Libertarians may reasonably argue that the authors' descriptions of regime-types would imply that the United States government is not a democracy because it exceeds the "limitations on power," in the sense that it violates the principles of classical liberalism, rather than being not powerful enough, as the Marxists suggest.

Another instance of theoretical ambiguity is apparent in Chapter Two of The Third Wave, where the author explicates a conceptual difference in the “democracies” of the second wave and those of the third. A government elected by at least 50% of male voters is deemed a democracy in the second wave, while such a government would be classified as “authoritarian” in the third. Therefore, Huntington conceives democracy to be conditional across time—but not space. However, each country experiences a unique history that cannot be generalized across time any more than it can across space.

Aside from conceptual ambiguities, the large N empirical analyses suffer from overgeneralization. For example, Epstein et al find that, "higher incomes per capita significantly increased the likelihood of democratic regimes, both by enhancing the consolidation of existing democracies and by promoting transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems"(556). However, this phenomenon is probably underrepresented by the data. The economic variables are measured incorrectly by Epstein et al and Geddes, since the value of national currencies does not reflect the real worth of the unit of currency for which the values are associated. Inflation cannot be accounted for among different countries by means of an aggregate value. This way of measurement implies that the “modernization” process has no effect on the prices of goods relative to the national currency. In fact, the decreased cost of living complementing industrialization counteracts the real value of international inflation. This is due to the decreased costs of production, increased trade, and greater domestic demand. The value of a national currency in a “modernizing” nation is expected to increase domestically, relative to the international currency exchange (ceteris paribus). Therefore, the wages of industrializing nations as measured do not reflect the changes in real income of a nation, but rather the shifts of currency exchange values relative to the international community.

Further research should specify the pertinent concepts affecting national classifications. When employing large N analyses, researchers should take greater caution in controlling for cross-national disparities that are not intended to influence the values of the independent variables.

-Dan Blazo

2009-04-14T19:55:00.000-05:00

Mandy McConnell
Dr. Gang Guo
POL 523
14 April 2009
Democratic Transition
The now familiar research question of this week’s readings, though approached in multiple ways, is that of why some countries transition to democracy while others do not. Furthermore, our authors wonder why democratic regimes flourish in some regions while they languish in others. What is it about our structures, cultures, and economics that allows for maximum democratic growth and retention? We have spread our wings since the modernization theories of the 1960s and look predominately to economic and structural explanations for democratization in the current literature. While it is broadly accepted that the level of development and governmental structure matters, and matters deeply, the authors acknowledge that it is important we empirically evaluate the claims made regarding the extent to which these things explain the rise of democracy. It is no leap to assume that each researcher must, at some point, make arbitrary distinctions in order to maintain parsimonious models. Here, that most often involves simplifying the nature of regime type into neatly packaged categories: democracy, partial democracy, autocracy, etc. Are we willing to accept this tradeoff between parsimony and reality?
The Przeworski et al. article suffers from a blatant case of such over simplification. Their classification of democracy, as per Dahl, as “all regimes that hold elections in which the opposition has some chance of winning and taking office (p. 1)” leaves quite a bit to be desired. It may be true that they are conservative in their estimate of regime type, but the extraordinarily broad and arguably lacking definition of democracy makes me wonder if we will actually collect observations that are useful for general comparisons at all! Using such a definition we may be comparing democratic to oligarchic or semi-repressive autocratic regimes under the guise of comparing two pure democracies. A lesser, though additional, example of simplification issues arises from their claim that “countries that adopt presidential institutions when they transit to democracy are stuck with them (p. 7).” I will not argue that the authors provide an interesting qualitative, and limited quantitative, background but it is mostly useful as a semantic exercise. There are many subtleties that hallmark institutional change and even without widespread structural overhaul, there may still be elements of mixed, presidential, and parliamentary systems across each regime type not rendered under Przerworski’s criteria.
Geddes and Epstein et al. also simplify regime type. In these instances, each author disaggregates autocratic and democratic institutions. Geddes’s paper, though very well done, must assume that three specific manifestations of autocratic regimes (military, personalistic, and single-party) represent the wide spectrum of institutional options available to autocrats. Epstein follows suit, creating a trichotomous model by setting the dependent variable, regime type, as equal to democracy, partial democracy, or autocracy. While we do not want an infinite or immeasurable amount of alternatives, arbitrary simplification may cost us the ability to apply our models to real life.
For Huntington it is the very ‘clarification’ of democracy that speaks to this issue. He is sure to emphasize the fact that his definition is used specifically in his book and he admits that it is necessarily a compromise among other available conceptions. On page 9 he tells us that, “the definition of democracy in terms of elections is a minimal definition.” His reasons for describing the term as such are certainly convincing, but I am not sure that I am willing to buy into such an undemanding conception of such an immensely important ideal.
Despite the issues of ambiguity and the ability of researchers to manipulate definitions of regime to fit the specific question at hand, the readings in this week’s unit are theoretically thick and useful. We must keep in mind that the importance of methodology can sometimes be trumped by well conceived theory. However, it is important that we find some threshold; we need common ground so that we are not setting arbitrarily simple definitions for terms that are extraordinarily complex. Coming to a consensus about such issues within the democratic transition literature should be one of our main priorities. Without fulfilling our responsibilities to rectify this shortcoming in the literature, I worry that we will not properly develop a generalizable understanding of democratic transition and endurance. After all, is it not comparison that we are interested in, in our field?

2009-04-14T18:52:00.001-05:00

Political Dissatisfaction

What elements contribute to democratization? This is one of the most puzzling questions left to be answered by scholars in the field of comparative politics. As Barbara Geddes (1999) argues, one of the common problems faced by analysts is that the process of democratization varies enormously from region to region. In addition to the variety of regional explanations, Epstein at al. (2006) argue that research in this area is methodologically flawed. However, most scholars do seem to find a common ground in one conclusion: there is a positive relationship between economic development and democratic government. There is compelling evidence that economic development is correlated to democracy. Geddes, Huntington, and Espstein at al find support for the positive impact of economic variables on democratization. However, what other factors should contribute to democratization across regions? I think political dissatisfaction, mainly expressed in the form of demonstrations, is an important predictor for the analysis of democratization and it seems to be overlooked in our field.

Geddes (1999) sheds some light in the importance of political dissatisfaction. Geddes explains that military regimes “contain the seeds of their own destruction” (131). The seeds Geddes mentions refer to the factional splits within regimes. Military regimes are more susceptible to internal disintegration due to internal rivalries within the ruling military elite. Internal splits, or dissatisfaction among elites, have a high probability to lead to military regime breakdown. Other types of regimes are less likely to experience splits but as Geddes demonstrates even cohesive dictatorships have limited life if it is not supported by its own cadres (138). Geddes also mentions that all authoritarian regimes suffered from the economic crises and the public started blaming the government and took the risk of demanding change. Here we can identify two types of political dissatisfaction, elite and public dissatisfaction, and how they can possibly lead to first, the breakdown of regimes and consequently lead to changes in the form of government.

Huntington (1993) mentions the presence of “yearning for freedom” by people oppressed by authoritarian rulers as what may distinguish countries that did democratize from those that did not (45). He points out two reasons regarding the relevance of demonstrations. First, demonstrations showed leaders and groups in one society how demonstrations in another society replaced an authoritarian regime with a democratic system. Second, demonstrations revealed techniques and methods of how it could be done. One example mentioned was how the Korean groups emulated the “people power” approach that ended the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines in the 1980s. Huntington concludes that the demonstrations effects were much more important in the third wave of democratization than in the two previous waves (101).

Political dissatisfaction is possibly an important predictor for the analysis of democratization. Dissatisfaction leads to a demand for change. If people living under authoritarian regimes are satisfied with their government, it is intuitive to assume that no efforts will be made to change the existing order. As Geddes points out even factional splits, or dissatisfaction among elite members, may lead to regime breakdown. Huntington presents an even stronger argument regarding the relevance of demonstrations when he presents cases where demonstrations in nearly every region of the globe provoked a snowballing effect not only in the neighboring countries but also across regions. For instance, the downfall of authoritarianism in Portugal had an immediate impact in southern Europe and Brazil (102). Even though political dissatisfaction is often overlooked in our analysis, it seems to be a driving force in democratization.

2009-04-08T15:27:00.000-05:00

Papers will now be due at 9:00 PM on Tuesdays.

Free the Markets!

2009-04-07T17:55:00.003-05:00

A dire premonition screams from between the lines of contemporary comparative politics research. The eternally ambitious “welfare state” tightens its grasp on the markets. The markets beg for mercy as their remaining freedoms lament helplessly, unnoticed, besieged by political short-sightedness. Representative democracy twirls the ratchet unremittingly: tightening; constricting. Murdering.

The inception of a welfare state once offered hope to the lower social classes of democratic nations, and was generally met with acquiescence from the remainder of society. However, the incompatibility between “welfare” policies in representative democracies and long-term macroeconomic success has since been exposed. A solution to the problem, unfortunately, has yet to surface.

The theoretical warnings of extensive government intervention have long been theorized, as evident in the economic theory of Ludwig von Mises. The revelation of this incompatibility has been developing in empirical research for at least thirty years. David Cameron’s 1978 article, “The Expansion of the Public Economy,” marks a scholarly reassessment of Keynesian economics. Cameron explores the across-the-board rise of government spending in industrialized nations from 1960 to 1975, seeking to locate the sources of expansionist policies. The most notable contribution of this work is its evaluation of international trade in regards to redistributive policies. Cameron finds that political parties and economies’ dependence on trade are at the source of government expansion. The increasing globalization of the markets, combined with the increasing uniformity of parties’ expansionist agendas, suggests that the “rise” of the welfare state is still underway.

Garrett and Lange’s article, “Political Responses to Interdependence,” examines the impact of market globalization on partisan politics. The relatively expansive policies of market intervention traditionally advocated by leftist parties are no longer suitable for international markets. Leftist parties are now compelled to lessen their support of corporatist arrangements, due to international market integration. However, the redistributive policies of the Left remain a distinctive feature of leftist party platforms. Both the Right and the Left face political pressures to protect their national economies from international competition. Both sides converge on the expansionist policies of supply-side spending. Increased spending is the dependable political solution to globalized markets.

But is it the best macroeconomic solution? Mark Gasiorowski contends that it is not. Moreover, Gasiorowski exposes a link between democratic governance and poor economic strategy, finding that, “…democracy undermines macroeconomic performance because of the adverse effects of unrestrained political participation” (345). Democratic rule is shown to promote higher inflation and slower economic growth. The level of democratic rule, not the level of economic or political development, is the causal variable for macroeconomic performance across nations. Although Gasiorowski offers constructive suggestions for economically sound democratic policies, the political incentives for implementing these reductionary policies cannot compete with the institutional incentives for increased spending policies. Less democracy—the inherent opposition to the preferences of the people—is Gasiorowski’s solution.

Paul Pierson’s, “The New Politics of the Welfare State,” explores the institutional incentives for economic policymaking as embedded within democratic governments. The author reaffirms the widespread contention that politicians’ preferences to get reelected effectively refrain their economic policies to the short-term. Moreover, democracies offer almost no political incentive for “retrenching” the policies of wealth redistribution. In fact, such retrenchment would be political suicide for many politicians. A substantial reduction of expenditure would require a strong coalition within government, which would have to offer the recipients of government aid something in place of their revoked benefits. The institutional structure of representative democracies discourages any such collaboration. Special interests and pervasive bureaucracies have added to the insurmountability of retrenchment. Increased spending is much easier, politically, and offers many opportunities for politicians to gain votes.

Until the masses become aware of the looming economic collapse of the welfare states, government expansionism will progress. Inflation will rise rapidly; real wages will decrease reciprocally. Markets can survive some regulation and modification, but can never flourish in strict captivity. Deficit spending and bureaucratic interests, in the context of democratic rule, ensure the social procrastination in “paying the bills.”

If economies continue to stagnate, and populations continue to grow, the welfare state will be regarded as the most severe economic blunder of the twentieth century.

-Dan Blazo

2009-04-07T17:36:00.000-05:00

What Factors Influence Economic Policy?

What are some of the factors influencing the determination and pursuit of economic goals? That is one of the central questions to the study of political economics. Major efforts have been made to answer this question, however, as Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) argue, most empirical studies examining democracy and economic performance suffers from a variety of weaknesses including – narrow samples of countries or narrow time periods, simultaneous bias, and poorly specified regression models (Gasiorowski 323). The difficulties in determining the important factors influencing economic policies are great but this week’s readings pinpoint a variety of factors influencing the complex process of formulation and implementation of economic policy.

Cameron (1978) investigates the causes of the expansion of the extractive role of government in 18 developed capitalist economies from 1960 to 1975 and he finds that politics is important in influencing the scope of the public economy (1251) and that a high degree of trade dependence is favorable to a relatively large growth of the public economy (1252). Cameron’s findings suggest that partisanship of government is related to the rate of expansion, and that control by left or right parties dictate the relative degree of change in the scope of public economy. In countries where leftist parties held a majority of government’s electorate, increases in public revenue was much higher than in countries where the Left was just a majority or did not participate of the government. Also, countries with open economies have sought to counter the effects of openness by expanding their control over public economy through nationalization. Even though Cameron finds supportive evidence to claim that politics is important in influencing the scope of public economy, he suggests that the dominance in government of leftist parties was a sufficient condition, not necessary, for a relatively large increase in the scope of public economy and that degree of trade openness is the best predictor.

The work of Geoffrey (1991) confirms, in part, Cameron’s argument that partisanship in government is an important factor influencing economic policy. Geoffrey and Cameron look at a similar time period (1960s-late 1970s) which makes the partisanship argument even stronger. Geoffrey argues that due to the openness of economy, governments will be unable to pursue independent macroeconomic strategies effectively. Therefore, in the long run, the monetary and fiscal policies of the right and left will converge, but that does not impede parties to further their partisan goals; there are distinct supply-side paths leading to the attainment of these goals.
Other than partisanship in government and degree of openness in economy, another factor influencing economic policy is political participation. Gasiorowski’s findings (2000) suggest that unrestrained political participation will ultimately undermine democratic performance. The poor macroeconomic performance of democracies, new and matures ones, seems to be a consequence of larger fiscal deficits and wage growth. In democracies there is a high demand for higher net public spending and wage increases, which in turn are the most common economic outcome of increased political participation. One may conclude for Gasiorowski’s work that the spread of democracy ultimately undermines the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy.

Remmer’s “The Political and Economic Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s" (1991) also mentions popular participation as a factor influencing economic policy. Remmer looks at the impact of economic crisis on electoral outcomes in Latin America from1982 to 1990. Remmer’s evidence supports the claim that when people do not support retrenchment, major cutbacks are unlikely to take place. Governments will most likely negotiate packages with the public rather than take unilateral action. From this we may also assume that interest groups also play a role in the process.

We may conclude that there at least three important variables relevant to the study of the what influences economic policy: partisanship in government, level of openness, and political participation by the public. None of these variables appear as a surprise to the examination of the link between democracy and economic performance.

Overall, the results from the week’s reading seem to be pessimistic in nature. Democracy appears to harm economic performance. Counter to the overall findings and presenting a more positive perspective, it would be intuitive to some to argue that democracy guarantees transparency which in turn reduces the probability of rent-seeking or self-serving policies.

In conclusion, there have been major efforts to answer the question of what influences economic policy. This is one of the central questions to the study of political economic and the answer remains unclear. One of the major difficulties regards the shortcomings in our research design. This week’s readings do shed a light in the debate enabling the reader to recognize some of the important variables in the investigation of the link between democracy and economic performance.

2009-03-31T17:56:00.000-05:00

“It’s ok. We Will Just Change the Rules of the Game”

The broader theme of this week’s readings focus on electoral and party systems. Neto and Cox address the classic question in political science regarding the factors that contributes and determines the number of competitive parties in a given country. Boix explores the conditions under which ruling parties choose different sets of electoral rules to maximize political survival. Kitschelt investigates why left-parties have been able to attract significant groups of new voters in some Western democracies. Shugart develops a theoretical justification for why the electoral and electoral rules are important in observing variations among divided governments. All of these works contribute, implicitly and explicitly, to a better understanding of political stability and change.

Boix’s argument regarding the rules of the game in electoral systems in advanced democracies seems very simplistic. Boix asserts that “electoral systems derive from the decisions the ruling parties make to maximize their representation” (609). The following conditions prepare the way for changes in the electoral system. When the electoral arena does not change and the current system benefits the ruling parties, there will be no changes in the rules of the game. When the electoral arena changes and the ruling party feels threatened, when there is a shift in voters’ preferences or/and entry of new voters, ruling parties modify the rules of the game in an effort to guarantee political survival.

This view seems very simplistic for two reasons. First, it does not take into account party discipline and coalitions. Second, it implies that once a party becomes the ruling party, that party will always be represented in government since they are able to change the electoral system’s rules.

In order to perform any changes in the laws of an advanced democratic state, some type of voting has to occur. Institutional changes in a presidential system take place, generally only if, a bill is approved by the majority of members in Congress first, and then if it is signed by the president. These steps usually apply to parliamentary systems as well. If there is no party discipline within the ruling party, if members within the same party do not share the same voting position, then changes in the rules of the electoral system may not occur. A party without party discipline has no power to change the rules of the game. Another barrier to changes in the electoral system is the idea of a coalition in government. If the government in place is made up of a coalition, electoral change will only occur if the modifications in the rules will maximize both parties’ share of seats. If only one of the parties, in a collation government, is dissatisfied with the status quo electoral system, the implementation of new rules is doomed.

Boix’s argument also implies that once a party becomes the ruling party, that party will always be represented in government since they are able to change the electoral system’s rules. As I have discussed, at given circumstances, parties will not be able to change the rules of the game and the inability to implement changes actually indicates that parties might be subject to electoral systems, not the inverse.

In conclusion, on one hand, Boix’s argument sounds coherent. One the other hand, it is very simplistic. Boix does not take into account party discipline and coalitions. The addition of these two elements to Boix’s claim shows us that setting the rules of the game is not that simple.

Parties are Fun

2009-03-31T17:51:00.006-05:00

Dan Blazo

Despite the political philosophies of early liberal democratic theorists, contemporary democracies operate by means of political parties. The term “political party” denotes a context-dependant meaning. A major party in a two-party system will generally represent a broader social and/or ideological faction of the population than a party in a multi-party system. So why do some countries have two-party systems while others have multi-party systems? Is a two-party system an indicator of a bifurcating social cleavage? Or is the institutional framework of electoral systems responsible for the political party landscape?

The majority of quantitative research on political parties upholds the Duverger Hypothesis—an institutionalist explanation. However, this explanation does not address the first of the three stages in the “process of reduction,” as enumerated by Neto and Cox. This stage is defined as, “the translation of social cleavages into partisan preferences” (152). By not accounting for this link, political scientists disregard the societal demographics that may account for partisan homogeneity or heterogeneity. In fact, Neto and Cox find that a multiplicative synthesis of the Duvergian and social cleavage approach accounts for more of the variance than either individual methodology. The Duvergerian explanation—which alleges that proportional representation and “winner-take-all” electoral constructs are the primary causes of cross-national party system differentiation—accounts for most of the cross-national variance.

The methodological synthesis employed by Neto and Cox, however, addresses a broader scope of party formation and produces more reliable estimates. The authors examine fifty-four countries using this methodology, including third-world countries. Unfortunately, they do not break down the results according to level of development. First and third world countries have been shown to exhibit different political trends in many circumstances, and a development categorization might offer insight into the effect of industrialization on party systems. Even the lack of an effect would provide valuable insight to the study of political parties.

Herbert P. Kitschelt’s article, “Left-Libertarian Parties,” oversimplifies two concepts: political parties and strategic voting. Kitschelt treats political parties as ideologically static, allowing for no inter-party influence. The endless strategic exercise of competing for votes, oftentimes through ideological shifts, is not addressed in this article. Small political parties may exist primarily because of this potential for influence, hence the recurring “flash parties” or “single-issue parties.” Left-Libertarian parties may exhibit such tendencies if they are successful in pulling a bigger party in their direction. The potential for a party’s political success without winning elections calls into question the validity of his conclusions.

The second of Kitschelt’s oversimplifications is the concept of “strategic voting.” While this term does not affect the most important conclusions of his work, it does come into play in his evaluation of Left-Libertarian support bases. Well-educated voters with left-libertarian ideologies are more likely to vote “strategically,” thus the potential for a party to win the election affects the way they will vote. Such “strategy” is a mere logistical fallacy, though it may describe the mindset of many voters. If one is to consider the potential for a party to win and, accordingly, vote for the party he prefers over the other potential winner, he inherently considers his vote to be a potential influence on the outcome of the election. In addition, he considers a vote for an unlikely winner as a vote for the less preferable party, since the preferable potential winner would otherwise receive the vote. Although this logic is self-perpetuating, it is nonetheless fallacious.

A vote for a party that one does not consider the most preferable is, and always will be, a vote that does not represent one’s preferences. The “strategy” involved in voting for the most likely winner is nonsense, given the extremely low probability of affecting the outcome of the election. I once read a report conducted by statisticians showing the probability of a single vote affecting the outcome of a presidential election in the U.S. to be so low that this would occur once every 250,000,000 years. Even then, there would be a recount, and the inevitable human error would ensure that not every vote was counted. Thus one’s vote can never be strategic from a rational standpoint. Rational choice suggests that one not vote at all, unless, perhaps, he seeks to express his ideological preferences. In this case, there is no strategy involved, for he is fully aware of the pragmatic insignificance of his vote.

Political Parties

2009-03-31T16:24:00.002-05:00

Mandy McConnell
POL 523
Dr. Gang Guo
31 March 2009
Essay VII
The number of viable parties in an electoral system differs widely from country to country. Often, the formation of certain types of parties can be indicative of important political cleavages, at least this is the premise of one particular line of comparative political research. In an effort to further understand the implications of party presence, Herbert Kitschelt looks at the existence of left-libertarian parties in selected Western democracies. He finds explanatory power in his model by using a combination of structural and resource mobilization explanations for party formation. Unfortunately, rather than clarifying the underlying causes for party creation Kitschelt left me with several unanswered questions.
Firstly, this paper only looks at the existence left-libertarian parties leaving out the possible importance of other parties that form in response to societal issues (i.e. nuclear power, abortion rights, etc). Perhaps these particular party manifestations only occur under a specific set of conditions that cannot be used to predict the birth of other types of party structures. More generally, I believe that this speaks to the difficulty of defining parties in a simplified, multi-national manner. It is nearly impossible to capture the nuances that exist within party structures and we can only work within the overarching identities given to our most broad political groups (republicans, democrats, socialists, etc). But studying the divides that arise within these party lines could be just as important, if not more so, than investigating the presence of viable left libertarian parties. For instance, though convenient to do so, Kitschelt’s work excludes the rise of non-traditional right wing factions that have gained significant political clout. Although these groups fall under one general conservative heading, at least in the United States, their presence marks a divide in the Republican Party that I argue can be paralleled to the introduction of an additional party. I think Kitschelt is failing to capture one entire side to the story which could add better explanatory power to his work. In other words, I am not sure that studying the conditions that give rise to left libertarian parties tells us much about the political situation in general.
I am also not sure that Kitschelt rules out alternate explanations. For instance, perhaps the rise of left libertarian parties is a function of the age of democracy and at some point we will all experience such phenomena. Or maybe left libertarian parties exist because of the particular form of a country’s industrialization. After all, his results show groupings of countries with similar industrializing patterns, such as Scandanavia, with expected anomalies such as West Germany and France. With this in mind, I would argue that party presence and structure has much deeper underlying causes than Kitschelt’s simplified model allows for. The nature of industrialization patterns, historical crises and shifts, as well as a state’s market choices (CME vs LME) all must be examined if we want a holistic explanation for the presence of viable left libertarian party initiatives.
In sum, I think focusing on left-libertarian parties is too narrow to do us much good. Just because Kitschelt is able to predict their existence does not, in my mind, lend absolute value to his aggregate variable model. Furthermore, his synthesized explanation does not account for why we see failure to create such parties. Though its explanations are intuitive and quite theoretically feasible the model is lacking balance between its ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ concepts; it is missing the depth that provides us any complete understanding of a particular country’s party situation and also lacks generalizability due to its small n.

You Say You Want a Revolution? well, you know, we ALL want to change the world...

2009-03-24T17:39:00.006-05:00

Dan Blazo

Jeffery Berejikian contributes to the cross-discipline integration of research on the causes of social revolutions in, “Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem.” Berejikian highlights longstanding dilemmas within the Rational Choice and Methodological Structuralism approaches. The strength of this article is its specificity in exposing the theoretical shortcomings of each approach in the context of describing dramatic social events; particularly revolutions. Using Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions as an example of Methodological Structuralism, Berejikian exposes several theoretical deficiencies—namely the failure to account for the free-riding tendency in the relationship between strictly individualist action and collective action. Rational-choice explanations of social revolutions, as epitomized in Popkin’s Rational Peasant, fail to represent the role of individual decisionmaking in the inception of a revolutionary movement. The exposed theoretical inconsistencies are presented as examples of “inattention to the agent-structure problem” (647).

The theoretical caveats emphasized by Berejikian represent complementary shortfalls of the two approaches. In other words, each methodology successfully accounts for the hole in the other’s theory. Therefore, a collaborative “meta-theory” offers a more inclusive scope while accounting for the theoretical deficiencies of the each "sub-approach." Moreover, Berjikian illustrates how careful examination of theoretical constructs is a necessary component of academic progress. This tenet applies as much to quantitative research as qualitative, though such research does not typically require quantitative analysis.

In “Bowling Alone,” however, the scientific rigor exemplified by Berejikian is withheld. Rather than introducing hypotheses and developing a model to test them, Robert Putman employs an arbitrary conglomeration of statistics to strengthen his initial assertions. While the cited statistics are certainly relevant to the discussion, the significance of the particular data is unclear and unexplained. For example, the author cites the membership trends of the Elks, Lions, Boy Scouts, Masons, Red Cross, and other groups, but fails to show that these groups are representative of the larger trends. They may be excellent indicators indeed, but the academic reader is left wondering: How many members are in each group? Are these examples typical for all similar groups? How do these statistics complement one another, and which are more indicative of the alleged trends than others? I consider this article to be more journalistic than scientific. Since the alleged trends lack a consensus among researchers, only a scientific approach can adequately refute the opposition.

Norris et al.’s article, “Who Demonstrates?” argues that civic engagement in developed democracies (including the U.S.) has actually been on the rise since the 1980s. This contention is supported by empirical evidence accumulated through surveys and represents a scientific assessment of the research topic. In contrast to Putman’s indicators, civic engagement is measured by participation in demonstrations. More citizens participate in demonstrations than in previous decades in nearly every nation analyzed. The focus of this article, however, is more concerned with the demographic trends and components of those individuals actively demonstrating. The research offers valuable insights of demonstration participants, but lacks an empirical evaluation of the significance of political demonstrations.

Spencer Wellhofer addresses the social components of democratic sustainability by evaluating the downfall of democratic rule in Fascist Italy. This analysis aims to explain the social composition and transformation of the Fascist Party’s core constituency. In doing so, the authors account for some of the factors that led to the historical failure of democratic rule. Of the three approaches considered in light of extensive evidence (primarily of voter demographics), the Rational Choice model receives the strongest support. Class Theory fails the empirical tests while Civil Society Theory receives mixed results. In short, Tocqueville’s veneration of the American civic spirit is unsupported by the evidence, while Machiavelli’s vision of of self-interestedness and hierarchical subjugation withstands scientific examination.

For a relevant example of civic engagement and political demonstration at Ole Miss, see: Rebels Resisting Apartheid.

Political and Civic Culture

2009-03-24T16:38:00.001-05:00

Mandy McConnell
Dr. Gang Guo
POL 523
26 March 2009
A general focus on the impact of civic associations on regime type is, though quite interesting, perhaps a bit misled. This week’s readings include the explicit and implicit arguments that such civic ‘robustness’ is what dictates the creation of successful, democratic regimes. However, in the face of declining civic involvement, at least in the United States, several questions are raised regarding the utility of such a theory. Are we to expect a decrease in the efficacy of our democracy? Will we see an all out failure of the American pattern of governance? Placing the explanatory weight squarely on the shoulders of civic society may be tempting, but I am not sure it is appropriate.
First, expanding this discussion with Putnam’s essay, I feel that the implications of the declining trend of civic associations may be mis-measured. Perhaps it is not an all out decline but a shift in civic alignment we are seeing. For instance, we may bowl alone more often but participate in non-traditional community activities, such as HIV outreach programs, that are not yet commonplace in our political landscape and so escape inclusion in our current realm of measurable options. In other words, who is to say that the loss in participation we see is not made up for elsewhere? What is more is that the implications of technology on our changing civic culture landscape must be undertaken if work such as Putnam’s is to provide any utility. If we assume that civic culture is one, if not the, causal variable for political outcomes we need to find a way to measure it that is appropriate to our particular times. I think that Putnam is wise to point out that we must not idealize the culture of the 1950s but that he fails to explicitly state the importance of our current technological context.
There is also, in this week’s literature, an explicit reference to strong civil society and the correlated trust necessary for democracy. My question regarding this is that other than the two examples we read about, the Weimar republic and Italy, do we have any other solid evidence that this is a generalizable theory? The evidence regarding this thesis seems anecdotal; I am not convinced that the author did not pick cases that supported his theory and rejected those that did not. The information regarding trust formation is very unclear and the operationalization of variables surrounding such a task is muddied at best. Again, though these ideas provide an interesting set of hypotheses, perhaps they are not the most useful for building comparative political theory.
Another problem I developed with this particular literature regards choosing to study civic culture over economic structure as the direct cause of regime type. It seems to me that because class systems developed out of the specific economic models dictated by the unique industrialization patterns of each country, they are less generalizable than the economic models themselves. What I mean to say is that it would be more expedient to study political economy than to study the culturally defined class structures that arose out of such contexts. The variables here would be much easier to define and fall prey less often to the uncertainty cultural definitions introduce to models. Perhaps this is just a semantic issue, but, to me, the inextricable link between economics and culture is better understood by examining the more mathematical of the two issues.
Again, I want to stress how interesting this literature is, but it feels like its best use lies in the sociological field. There seems to be some disconnect between our civic and our political behavior that cannot be accounted for in a quantitative analysis. Much like the cultural approaches we are left with more unanswered questions than answers. Though I do not deign to have all of the answers, the civic society approaches warrant a deeper and more thorough study before they I will strictly adhere to its utility as a theory of political behavior.

Comparing Comparative Politics Approaches

2009-03-11T18:10:00.019-05:00

Comparative Politics is a diverse and perpetually evolving field of academic study. Over the past forty years, Comparative Politics has been dominated by three academic approaches: Rational Choice, Institutionalism, and Political Culture. Each approach is best suited for addressing particular research questions. The three realms of analysis have evolved alongside one another by means of constructive interaction as well as field-specific advancements. Over the course of the past four decades, the methodologies of each approach have become so distinct from one another that authors are generally quite specialized in their respective fields. This has made collaboration across approaches challenging for scholars, despite the frequent calls for integration among comparativists. Each approach offers a unique insight to the discipline of political science. A field as broadly defined as “Comparative Politics” will inherently comprise of diverse methods of analysis, thus making the discipline a confederation of revealing findings that complement our understanding of social tendencies.

The Rational Choice Approach

A seminal work of Rational Choice theory in Comparative Politics is The Logic of Collective Action, written by Mancur Olson in 1964-5. This book’s innovativeness arises from its application of economic theories to social tendencies. The economic theoretical concepts of markets and competition are introduced alongside logistical explanations of group interactions. Olson dispels the generally accepted notion that individuals act from a shared motivation of common interests as efficiently and directly as in the context of pursuing self-interest. This author argues that individuals must perceive group cooperation as beneficial to the advancement of their personal interests in order to participate in the group. Individuals are viewed as rational actors with predispositions of self-interestedness. “Common goals” are essentially the overlap of multiple individuals’ goals. By incorporating these hypotheses of human nature into group theory, Olson redefines the constructs of social interaction in such a way as to embody strict amenability to scientific analysis.

The Rational Choice approach inseminated by Olson contains three core assumptions: (1) that individuals are rational actors; (2) that individuals interact strategically with one another to achieve their own goals; and (3) that individuals’ choices are constrained in various ways, most often by institutions. Some works within the rational-choice field, especially early ones, assume that individuals possess full information about their choices and the consequences attached to each. Most scholars recognize the shortcomings of this assumption and have made efforts to account for them. It should be noted that these assumptions are not necessarily regarded as completely accurate claims about human nature, but rather as useful foundations for exposing reliable and insightful findings.

The most practical advantage of rational choice theory is the testability of its claims. Many scholars are drawn to this approach for precisely this reason. By considering the incentives for making particular decisions, rational choice scholars predict specific choices for which individuals are most likely to make. In the process they are able to make generalizable conclusions. Empirical evidence must support the predictions if the theory is to survive, therefore rational choice theories are constructed to provide amenability to empirical testing. Rational choice theories enhance their explanatory capabilities as new sources of incentives are evaluated as potential causal factors in the decision-making processes of individuals.

An additional strength of the rational choice approach is its robust and simple theoretical framework. The austerity of theoretical claims allows for a wide range of applications. The basic contention that “individuals will act rationally” can be subjected to nearly any conventional topic of comparative politics. Of course, comparative politics is generally concerned with the interaction of groups, thus making the group theory component of Olson’s brainchild the backbone of the rational choice comparative model. Why do particular groups favor particular policies over others? What incentives do individuals have for joining particular groups? What accounts for the consequences of inter-group interactions and membership fluctuations? These are the types of questions for which rational choice theory in a comparative context is best suited.

The rational choice approach is not without weakness, however. Chalmers Johnson contends that rational choice scholars either ignore or do not understand the role of culture in studying politics (1997). Other culture-oriented scholars share this critique of rational choice models in comparative politics. This allegation stems from the rational choice model’s emphasis on the pursuit of self-interest and the accompanying disregard of social identity. In the same vein, culturalists argue that an objective rationality does not exist, but rather that rationality is dependent upon societal constructs. If “rationality” is purported to account for all variations of the term, it can be used to explain any choice as being a “rational” one.

In addition, some may argue that humans cannot be described as rational beings. Irrationality may play a vital role in the experience of self-existence. However, this argument is more philosophical than scientific, as it lacks scientific testability. Moreover, while the denial of man’s rationality may contradict the assumptions of rational choice theory, it cannot dispel the empirical findings in support of rational choice models. If one considers the assumptions of rational choice theory as useful analytical frameworks rather than claims about human nature, this philosophical contention may be regarded as a mere footnote within a scientific theory.

Rational choice theory has developed substantially since Olson’s seminal work. In “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis,” Margaret Levi introduces the rational choice approach in the context of various comparative political phenomena. She begins to explore this technique in the realms of political party behavior and the causes of economic outcomes. In addition, Levi defends a sort of “natural” rationality that is shaped by social variables; for example: “Institutions… structure the individual choices of strategic actors so as to produce equilibrium outcomes” (25). These developments help provide a rational-choice explanation for what many had claimed to be a weakness in rational choice theory. It should be noted, however, that contemporary rational choice theory has come to accept the importance of previously disregarded variables and is not simply a carbon copy of Olson’s 1965 theory.

Institutionalism

Institutionalism itself contains a broad range of methodological approaches in comparative politics. That said, comparative institutionalists share in common the focus on institutions as the center of their analyses. Three subfields encompass the diverse explanations for the relationship between institutions and social behavior and the ways in which institutions originate and evolve. All three approaches were originally developed as alternatives to behavioral analysis. Behavioral comparative studies, however, have had a definite influence on the developments of the Institutionalists’ research.

Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor enumerate three subfields of comparative institutionalism: Sociological, Historical, and Rational Choice. In their 1995 article, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” the authors claim the seminal work of Sociological Institutionalism to be, “Institutional Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony” by John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan (947); the seminal work of Historical Institutionalism to be Bringing the State Back in by Peter Evans (938); and the seminal work of Rational Choice Institutionalism to be, “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions,” by William Riker (943).

Sociological institutionalists argue that institutions themselves are the products of “macro-level” variables such as society and culture, implying that individuals are primarily socially dependent and unimportant as explanatory variables. Sociologists view institutions as formal and informal social structures, often including conventions and customs in their analyses. They claim that the very concept of rationality is dependent upon the environment. Historical institutionalists agree that institutions play an active role in shaping the actions and incentives of individuals, yet they emphasize that the structures and functions of institutions are affected by both collective and individual action. The rational choice model contends that institutions are intervening variables capable of affecting individuals’ choices and actions, but are incapable of de-prioritizing pursuits of self-interest. In contrast to the other two approaches, the rational choice model views cultures, fields, and other groups as “obscure phrases for collections of individuals” (Koelble). The rational choice subfield views institutions as “intervening variables” that serve to decrease the costs of acquiring information relevant to advancing personal goals.

Some of the most significant contentions among the three fields divide sociologists on one side and the historical and rational-choice theorists on the other. While sociological institutionalists argue that the motivations for individuals’ action is the product of social institutions, historical and rational choice theorists claim that rationality and individuals’ actions are driven more by the practical motivations that derive from institutional structures. Historical and rational choice institutionalism are better suited for quantitative analysis and for universalistic theories. These approaches typically compare several populations based upon their variances in independent variables and similarity in the values of control variables. However, the aim for a wider application of theory may result in obfuscation of the factors truly responsible for the populations’ values of the dependent variables. The social complexities and unique attributes of each society are generally unaccounted for in these analyses.

The sociological institutional approach relies more on qualitative data than the other institutionalisms. In addition, sociologists place greater emphasis on case studies, often for longitudinal analysis, and in the process produce theories that cannot be accurately applied to other populations. The N is typically smaller in sociological analyses and the number of variables is typically greater. While this may increase one’s understanding of a specific society, it often requires extensive immersion in a society on behalf of the scholars. Moreover, the very requirement of social immersion combined with a propensity of qualitative research denotes a lack of verifiability of the research. Most comparative political scientists seem to agree that sociological institutionalism is the least “scientific” of the three institutionalisms.

Institutionalism in comparative politics has been predominantly used by scholars to explore political economy (Hall, Steinmo, Thelen, Immergut). These analyses are especially concerned with national-level institutions and the results of endogenous and exogenous sources of influence.

Political Culture

The Political Culture approach can be understood as a sociological version of comparative politics. This approach aims to achieve a more thorough understanding of society-specific political phenomena. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that political developments are best understood as dependent upon the theoretical backdrop of society. Political culturalists assume that enduring differences across cultures have substantial effects on the political climate. They also assume that behavior is different across societies due to the specific processes of assimilation in each culture, and that these behavioral characteristics are lifelong attributes of individuals. Political climate, including the structure of political institutions, is seen to embody a mutually reinforcing relationship with the incentives and choices made by individuals. Political culture generally does not designate particular values or opinions to particular cultures, but rather “the points of concern to be debated” (Laitin 81).

A seminal work of comparative political culture is Ronald Inglehart’s article, “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” Inglehart attempts to examine cultural variables quantitatively, thus bridging the gap between cultural studies and empirical political science. The political culture approach offers a means to explain the factors that account for formations of political preferences. Inglehart’s analyses of postmaterialism exhibits the approach’s ability to account for these factors when purely economic explanations fall short. Variables such as interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and political satisfaction are inferentially linked to deep-rooted components of the political and cultural climates of a society. So although the culture variables of Inglehart’s examination are not “direct” indicators of cultural norms, they successfully bring the issue of culture to the forefront of quantitative political science.

As in sociological institutionalism, the political culture approach’s strength lies in the thoroughness of examination of particular societies. In many ways, Inglehart’s quantitative analysis is an exception the qualitative rule of political culture. In fact, Inglehart’s piece can be seen as evidence of the validity of culturalists’ major claim: that a cultural component does affect political outcomes. By measuring personal characteristics of trust and satisfaction, Inglehart lumps the effects of cultural variables to reveal the differences between societies that cannot be explained by political economy. However, the majority of work in the political culture field is more concerned with cultural immersion, longitudinal analysis of a small N, and qualitative research. Therefore, work in this subfield is typically difficult to utilize in other fields; but this does not imply that political culture is an inconsequential variable. Cultural analysis remains somewhat isolated from the quantitative subfields of comparative politics.

While Inglehart’s seminal work applies the political culture approach to the study of postmaterialist values, Ruth Lane’s article, “Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory,” advocates implementing the approach for a variety of purposes. Specifically, she considers an integration with the rational choice approach in order to account for the differences in individuals’ rationalities. While scholars of political culture contend that rationality is dependent upon society, a reassessment of the rational choice model within the context of socially-dependent rationalities could fill some of the gaps in both approaches.

Conclusion

Although the field of Comparative Politics is made up of several diverse approaches and sub-approaches, the field’s reliance on scientific standards assures the absence of outright contradictions across the approaches. Each approach is best suited for explaining particular phenomena. Despite the increase of specialization within each subfield, scholars have integrated their findings, to some extent, across disciplinary lines. Rational choice theorists have adjusted their assumptions in response to some critiques from the other approaches, most notably those concerning the availability of information and transaction costs. Theories deriving from each approach have challenged one another in their explanatory capabilities. Competition between approaches has led scholars to apply their theories to previously unchartered terrain, and the integration of the rational choice approach with the institutionalist school of thought has produced some of the best literature on political economy to date. While many authors call for increased integration between the fields, there is no question that the confederation of approaches has benefitted comparative politics as a whole. Integration may help to address some research questions, but the specialized subfields can never be compiled into a single methodological approach. Social science is too complex of a subject for any one methodology to encompass.

Approaches to the Study of Comparative Politics

2009-03-11T17:43:00.001-05:00

1. Introduction

Three approaches have dominated the study of comparative politics: institutional, rational choice and political culture approaches. In this essay I will be addressing a series of question and topics within each literature—seminal works, assumptions, strengths and weaknesses, and applied areas of research.

2. Institutional Approach

The study of institutions has been central not only to the field of comparative politics, but to the political science field as a whole. Many authors have argued that institutions have shaped political behavior and social change. These authors have taken an “institutionalist” approach which treat institutions as independent variables. In the last twenty-five years the field of comparative politics has experienced the emergence of the “new institutionalism,” which developed in reaction to the behavioral perspectives that exercise a significant influence on the field during the 1960s and 1970s. The new institutionalism body can be divided into three analytical approaches: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. These three theoretical islands developed independently from each other. I will provide a review of the three analytical approaches.

Historical Institutionalism

This approach developed in response to group theories of politics and structural-functionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). Historical institutionalists sought to expand both approaches by “borrowing” existent ideas and adding new assumptions to them. From group theory, historical institutionalists borrowed the assumption that conflict among rival groups for resources is at the heart of politics (Hall and Taylor 1996). From the structural-functionalists, historical institutionalists borrowed the assumption that the state is made up of interacting parts.

The big contributors to this approach are Steinmo and Thelen. Steinmo and Thelen see institutions as a constraint upon individuals and their choices (Koelble 1995). They argue that institutions are a determinant of choices and preferences. Steinmo and Thelen critique the rational choice approach for viewing institutions as a constraint upon individuals but not as determinants of choice.

Historical institutionalists define institutions as the “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall andTaylor 1996). When it comes to the one of the big questions of institutional analysis, how institutions affect the behavior of individuals, historical institutionalists use two approaches – the calculus and the cultural approaches.

The calculus approach emphasizes the aspects of human behavior that are based on strategic calculation – individuals seek to maximize their goals given by their preference and they act strategically in the pursuit of those goals (Hall and Taylor 1996). It is important to note that preferences and goals are exogenously to the analysis. Institutions affect human behavior mainly by providing actors decreasing the level of uncertainty about the behavior of other actors by providing information, rules and norms.

The cultural approach argues that human behavior is not fully strategic; rather it is bounded by an individual’s worldview. This approach does not see individuals as utility maximizers, but as “satisficers” whose actions are dependent on context rather than strategic calculation (Hall and Taylor 1996). Also, institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation which in turn affect the identities, self-images, and preferences of individuals.

Historical institutionalists are attentive to the relationship between institutions and ideas. They emphasize the importance of institutions but they do not posit institutions as the only causal force in politics; other factors play a role such as socioeconomic development and diffusion of ideas. Some of the weaknesses of this approach is that it does not incorporate some aspects of individual decision making to its analysis. Some of the strengths of this approach include its emphasis on the effect of political struggle on institutional outcomes and how institutional outcomes then affect political struggles. This approach should be more useful to the analysis of institutional development and policymaking (Koelble 1995).

Rational Choice Institutionalism

The rational choice institutionalism was born out of the study of American congressional behavior (Hall and Taylor 1996). These scholars were trying to explain why congressional outcomes were considerably stable and they decided to look at institutions. They found that institutions of the Congress lowered transactions costs among legislators making the passage of legislation stable.

Some of the big names of this approach are North, Levi and Rothstein. North and Levi respond to the historical institutionalists and sociological institutionalist’s view that individuals act upon bounded rationality. They argue that if individuals do not realize their interest, it is because they do not have complete information and are subject to transaction costs (Koelble 1995).

Rational choice institutionalists assume that individuals have a fixed set of preferences and they behave in manner that maximizes the attainment of these preferences. One of the unique assumptions of rational choice institutionalists see politics as a series of collective action problems (Hall and Taylor 1996). Individuals are constraint to take actions in the absence of institutional arrangements that pose guarantees complementary behavior of other individuals.

Some of the weaknesses of the rational choice institutionalism include: (a)rational choice institutionalists are unable to provide an adequate predictive theory of action since it does not specifies how preferences come about and why they vary from individual to individual; (b) sociological institutionalists argue that the rational choice institutionalists view that individuals create institutions in order to further their goals is incorrect because individuals cannot choose among institutions and rules; (c) rational choice institutionalism ignores social structure. The rational choice institutionalist approach ought to be more useful for the analysis of interactions between organizations and individuals (Koelble 1995).

Sociological Institutionalism

This approach emerged from organizational theory. These scholars wanted to challenge the view that some parts of the world reflect a formal rationality while some others reflect culture. They argued that the “institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizations were not adopted simply because they were most efficient for the task at hand … instead… these forms and procedures should be seen as culturally specific practices” (Hall and Taylor 1996).

Sociological institutionalists define institutions more broadly than any other approach. Powell and DiMaggio define institutions not just as “rules, procedures, organizational standards, and governance structures, but also as conventions and customs” (Koelble 1995). They go further and make the assumption that institutions define “rational actors.” When it comes to the relationship between individuals and institutions, scholars use the cultural approach to explain outcomes. They argue that institutions affect behavior of individuals by socializing individuals into particular institutional roles and individuals consequently internalize norms related to these roles.

One of the weaknesses of this approach is that it does not explain how institutions originate. Another weakness is the operationalization of culture. Some of the strengths of this approach are: (a) it is able to explain how institutions affect individuals’ preferences or identities; (b) it provides an explanation how actors choose strategies from culturally-specific repertoires (Hall and Taylor 1995).

3. Rational Choice Approach

The rational choice approach derives from the neoclassical economic model and it has been applied to a variety of subfields of political science including interest groups and bureaucracy, formation of coalition in government, electoral politics and so forth.

Many scholars have contributed to the rational choice approach. Mancur Olson was one of these scholars. In his The Logic of Collective Action (1965), Olson emphasizes strategic interaction and the individual decision making process. Olson argues that “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common of group interests” (1965:2). Olson explained that rational individuals will not ct to achieve a common goal because he knows that his efforts will not have an effect on the situation, and he will be able to enjoy any improvement brought about by the other actors whether or not he supports the organization. Members of a group have a common goal but they have no common interest in paying the costs of providing that collective good. These assumptions led scholars to investigate conditions under which individuals will come together in an effort to influence government or each other (Levi 1997). Olson also brought up to light the discussion of the fee rider problem which called into question the assumption that interests are automatically translated into organization.

Douglas North is another contributor to the rational choice approach. North emphasis on transaction cost theory, economic institutionalism, and the role of relative bargaining power have stimulated investigation of the variation in state action and state outcomes.

The model of rational choice conceives individuals as goal-oriented actors who act to pursue the best available outcome. This approach is methodologically individualist and purposeful action (Kim 1997) but it also focuses on the aggregation of individual choices. Thus all group choice ultimately is explained by individual choice.

One of the core assumptions of the rational choice theory is that individuals are rational actors. This assumption is the subject of much criticism. There is little agreement on what it means to be rational. Levi suggests that the most useful assumption of rationality for the field of comparative politics research is that “individuals act consistently in relation to their preferences” (1997:24). Another assumption is that individuals act strategically in order to attain their goals. Here an important evaluation or consideration of behavior of other relevant actors takes place before decision-making process. In order to make decisions, a strategic player should have expectations about other players. Another key assumption regards the forms of constraints on human behavior. Constraints come in two major forms. First is scarcity of resources. An individual that wants to spend his vacation time in Hawaii, cannot realize his objective if he does not have the capital to afford the trip. Another source of constraint is institutional or organizational. Institutions shape individual choices in order to produce equilibrium outcomes. On the other hand, some may also argue that institutions may facilitate action.

According to Margaret Levi, the strengths of the rational choice approach includes: (a) it has the capacity to produce testable theory; (b) its ability to make sense of a correlation or a set of events by providing a story that indentifies the causal mechanisms linking independent and dependent variables; (c) its universalism that allows us to make generalization that are applicable to cases beyond those cases of immediate investigation.

Among the weaknesses of this approach are: (a) the approach seems inadequately sensitive to the historical, political, and cultural contexts (Levi 1997). As a matter of fact, political culture scholars argue that the conceptual weakness of rational choice theory can be corrected through the use of political cultures; political culture when conceptually clear and empirically defined is able to specify the whole range of human objectives or goals (Lane 1992).

4. Political Cultural Approach

Political culture has been used a conceptual umbrella that wraps around values, perceptions and beliefs, dealing with every political phenomena. Political culture emerged out of the need, emphasized especially by Almond, to deepening and broadening the scope of political explanation. The goal of political culture was to explain the diversity among and continuity within states (Lane 1992). The origins of the modern political and cultural analysis can be related to the Political Culture and Political Development (Pye and Verba 1965). Political culture has also adopted a psychologist or individualist approach, an example is The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba (1963).

The political culture approach, like the other approaches, faces conceptual problems. Scholars within have not reached a compromise in defining “culture.” In Political Culture and Political Preferences, David Latin criticizes Wildvsky for his definition of culture. Wildavsky defines culture as “shared values legitimating social practices” (Latin 1988:499). Latin argues that by focusing only on shared values, Wildavsky misses the point that people with strongly opposed views can share a culture and people with strongly similar views may come from different cultures. Latin proposes that we should see culture as not as values that are upheld but rather as “point of concern” (idea presented initially by Thomas Metzger). Latin argues that to share a culture means to share a religion, language, or history. As one can assume, if the difficulties in reaching a common definition of culture are great, its operationalization is even greater.

Ronald Inglehart is one of the major contributors to the political culture approach. Inglehart tries to operationalize culture through levels of what he calls “civic culture.” Civic culture refers to a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for existing social order. In his The Renaissance of Political Culture, Inglehart hypothesized that societies that ranked high on this syndrome are much likelier to be stable democracies than those that ranked low. He also argues that publics of different societies are characterized by durable cultural orientations that have major political and economic consequences which are closely linked to the viability of democracy (Inglehart 1988). He finds that “wealthier nations and those with highly developed tertiary sectors are most likely to be long-established democracies, and the publics of these societies tend to show ‘civic’ political culture, have less materialist values priorities” (1226).

In our unit we saw the political culture approach been applied to explain levels of democracy and postmaterialism attitudes. Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson develop a model that allows them to make inferences about the possibility of unidirectional or reciprocal causation between civic culture attitudes and democracy. They find that most civic culture attitudes do not have any impact on changes in levels of democracy. Their findings contrast with the assumptions made by Almond and Verba (1963) and later Inglehart, as discussed earlier, that the viability of democratic institutions is affected by individual attitudes and beliefs. Raymond Duch and Michaell Taylor in their Postmaterialism and the Economic Condition test the notion that early economic experiences have a lasting effect on postmaterialism values as proposed by Inglehart. And their findings suggest that education and economic conditions at the time of the survey are much more relevant explanations for variations in the postmaterialist measure.
Some of the weaknesses of this approach are: (a) the conceptualization and operationalization, as discussed earlier; (b) the inability to draw a distinction between subcultures and the overall political culture; (c) the inability to bridge the inferences made on the individual level to the state or system level. In my opinion the greatest strength of this approach is its potential to correct the rational choice theory conceptual flaw of not being able to indentify the range of human goals. Marc Howard Ross is an advocate of the political culture approach and he points out to two features of culture relevant to comparative politics (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997). First, people use culture to define meaning; second culture is the foundation of social and political identity which affects individual behavior.

5. Conclusion

These three discussed approaches have dominated the field of comparative politics. They all have the same aim, explain social phenomena – they just have different assumptions and use different methods.

I think that these three approaches are more useful if seen as complimentary rather than as antagonistic. As Zuckerman and Lichbach indicate, no approach displays rigid and uniform orthodoxy; and they share an ontological and epistemological symmetry. (1997). In order to improve theory in our field we should embrace creative confrontations and try to absord the best out of each school of thought.

Reference
Kim, HeeMin. 1997. “Rational Choice Theory and Third World Politics: The 1990 Party Merger in Korea.” Comparative Politics 30(1): 83-100.

Midterm

2009-03-11T16:25:00.000-05:00

Mandy McConnell
Dr. Gang Guo
POL 523
11 March 2009
Midterm Essay Response
The various approaches to comparative politics should be viewed as multiple frameworks for understanding, each with its own hypotheses about the political world around us. The commonality underlying each approach is the dependent variable: all seek to explain, through distinct mechanisms, political outcomes. As comparative politics continue to form an identity unique from other schools of political science, we must evaluate the potential contribution of each of these approaches so that we may discover what works best as an explanatory model. Regardless of how we get there, the ability to uncover underlying causes for patterns of behavior is of high value in political science generally, and comparative politics specifically. What follows is a brief review of each of three main approaches, institutional, rational choice and political culture, to studying comparative political science, their respective contributions to the field and their strengths and weaknesses. As we will see, the divided nature of our school makes for a lively and engaging debate on the efficacy of each model.
Institutionalism, as we see it today, is not one, unified approach. Instead it is broken down into three subfields, each imbued with a distinct name and identity. Each of these subfields, or categories, of institutionalism developed independently of one another and though often closely related they continue to remain divergent in their explanations of political outcomes. However, the general institutional approach arose out of a common response to the behavioral perspectives that dominated the comparative field throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Hall & Taylor 1996). The recent ‘rediscovery’ of institutionalism, as March and Olsen call it, provides us with the ‘New Institutionalist’ heading we use to describe the contemporary field (Koelbe 1995).
Despite their differences, there is one burning question each of our sociological, historical, and rational choice institutionalists, respectively, are dying to answer: how exactly do institutions affect the behavior of individuals? For these scholars, institutions are generally seen as rules of conduct that govern our daily interactions and are the most important independent variables for explaining our dependent variable, political outcomes. Regardless of each category’s take on the extent to which, and precise way in which, these institutions affect people’s behavior they all agree that institutions shape the preferences of individuals. It is from this common point of departure that we may examine the underlying assumptions and tenets of the New Institutionalism and its increasingly important subfields.
Each of our three categories differs in its assumptions and definitions. Historical institutionalists see institutions as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall & Taylor p.6). Here institutions arise out of conflict for scarce resources especially in the context of power with the outcomes creating path dependency. In other words, as new institutions arise they are greatly and often unintentionally affected by the shapes and identities of the institutions already in place. This broad and eclectic subfield also recognizes that institutions are not the only important, causal forces in politics. Instead, they attempt to discover the role of institutions among a larger group of significant variables (Hall & Taylor 1996).
Sociological institutionalists provide us with a deeper definition of institutions than do their historical counterparts. Institutions are not simply formal or informal sets of behavior-governing entities, but instead work to form and prescribe the very identity of individuals within society. We see the adoption of organizational structures because they are valued within the cultural environment from which they operate not because of historical influence or path dependency. 0020Individuals are embedded in these cultural fields which, “determine the very concept of self-interest and utility” (Koelble 232). In this view, action is very closely associated with interpretation and the interpretation is shaped by the institutional and organizational forms dictated by the cultural context within which they arise.
Departing somewhat from these first two categories, rational choice institutionalism sees institutional forms as reflections of the utility-maximizing calculations and preferences of individuals. Actors overcome collective action problems that arise out of politics by strategically forming institutions relative to their preferences. According to Hall and Taylor, rational choice institutionalists postulate that individual’s actions are driven by a strategic calculus that includes a reasoned anticipation of the way others will behave as well (1996). This economically based approach dictates that institutions are created as utility maximizing tools and it follows that as actor’s preferences change so will the forms of the societal institutions.
While examining the nuances of each approach may be time consuming, there are several seminal works within the field that may help to clarify our understanding of new institutionalism as a whole. The abovementioned work of Peter Hall & Rosemary Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, does so by highlighting the two major issues addressed by each of the categories: specifying the relationship between institutions and behavior and explaining how these institutions are created and modified. Furthermore, the authors make a valuable distinction between the unique uses of institutions as explanatory variables while maintaining that the specific research question being asked should prescribe which particular institutional approach will be most useful in evaluating the hypothesis. In addition, Thomas Koelble’s essay, The New Institutionalism in Political Science, examines the major works that contribute to our understanding of the approach such as that of Cook & Levi (1990), March & Olson (1989), Steinmo, Thelen & Longstreth (1992), and the always important Lijphart (1999). Each of these works provides an example of institutionalism’s utility within the varied field of comparative politics such as comparative political economy and organizational analysis. Koelble deftly incorporates the pivotal role of these authors in his explication of new institutionalism and its subfields.
Generally the new institutional approach allows for the incorporation of environment and other contextual factors in examining the complex structures of societal interactions. It provides us with a clear independent variable, institutions, that can work to absorb some of the complexities of human behavior without losing its predictive power. However, it is difficult to operationalize a definition of institutions and this is reflected in the discord found among the approach’s subfields. The complexity of the approach also introduces the potential for reciprocal and collinear relationships that may make formal models difficult to construct. Yet despite their inherent strengths and weaknesses, institutional analyses are beneficial for explaining the substantive differences in organization and policy in similar regimes as seen in Lijphart’s examination of democratic variability across thirty-six countries (1999) and further employed by Shugart et al. (1992).
An alternative to these institutional approaches are those of rational choice. Arising out of neoclassical economics, rational choice is a formal model seeking to illuminate the role states, politics, groups and organizations have actually played in economic and political development (Levi p. 22). This approach dominates our current comparative political paradigm and, Levi tells us, offers the “microfoundations of macroprocesses and events” (Levi p. 23). Far from being isolationist, rational choice scholars offer testable hypotheses that address issues ranging from institutional evaluation to organization theory but one common and unshakable goal is the maintenance of the field’s commitment to explanation and generalization. Though a researcher may explore his or her own specific ideas, the level of fractionalization within the field is hardly that of the new institutionalists.
As always, it is important to note that there are several distinct assumptions made under the rational choice heading. These postulations are quite straightforward and are widely accepted within the field. First is the decisive assumption that individuals are rational actors. Further, these individuals interact strategically with each other to achieve their own goals. The choices an individual may make are constrained by various mechanisms, but largely by institutions and the scarcity of resources. Lastly, actors must make decisions while facing uncertainty and this uncertainty is accounted for by making decisions that are consistent relative to the actor’s preferences. Aggregate choice patterns in politics may be explained by examining these individual, utility-maximizing behaviors. A discussion of some of the more important rational choice works may help to elucidate the exact role this approach plays in the application of comparative politics.
Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action is absolutely foundational to the overall logic of rational choice. Here Olson deals with the specific issues plaguing the approach, namely the problem of transcending an individual’s actions to reach explanations of group-level rational behavior. He suggests that groups are formed for the pursuit of common goals but that the manner in which the groups attempt to attain these goals may advance or retard this quest in varying ways. In this line, Olson differentiates the conditions under which individual and group level actions differ as well as why there is variation in behavior between large groups and small groups, especially in the context of collective good distribution. Olson integrates institutions into the analysis in a very convincing manner, underlining the complex ways in which they work to constrain individual actions while simultaneously showing how institutional arrangements form in response to the need to provide collective goods. Moreover, Olson proposes that purely economic interests are not the only incentives propelling individuals to cooperate within an organization. This introduction of non-political goods, such as social status and personal acceptance, allows for an explanation of human behavior beyond the typically cold, rational assumptions (Olson 1965). The overall power of Olson’s work lies in its application of multifaceted, economic principles to political science. It does so in a linear way while also acknowledging the emotional character of human beings.
A second seminal work in the field of rational choice is Margaret Levi’s A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis. Levi applies the rather broad economic principles of rational choice specifically to comparative politics by providing us with practical applications of the theory to our studies. For instance, the narrow behavioralist assumption made by the approach and its general ignorance of the psychological motivations of humans is ameliorated through what Levi proposes as a pertinent theoretical combination: culture and rationality. The importance of the folk theorem the “belief that there are often multiple equilibria in games in which numerous individuals engage in repeated play” (Levi 30) is important for promoting such healing and although Levi’s ideas may be as yet underdeveloped, her argument regarding the incorporation of rational choice and various other approaches is a powerful platform for maximizing the explanatory potential of the rational choice model.
By and large the strength of rational choice approaches lies in their parsimony as well as their ability to produce sound, testable hypotheses (Levi 27). It is a formal model that provides important empirical clues to political behavior. But like the operational issues riddling most political theories, defining preferences in rational choice often proves to be tricky. The inability of the approach to recognize individuals as emotional, thinking beings, moreover, often leads to a ‘rock-like’ modeling of people that is not useful for comparison to the realities of our world. Yet the economic and game-theoretic applications of the approach have been extremely useful for debunking collective action myths, furthering the discipline of historical approaches (Levi 1997) and generally orienting the field in a more positivist, social-scientific direction.
Yet another major approach to comparative politics is that of political culture. This school seems to appear as a response to the dominant, economic models of political analysis. Scholars of political culture assert that cultural contexts and complexities provide a sort of theoretical backdrop for political outcomes that we cannot, or should not, ignore if we wish to make further gains in comparative politics. Unfortunately, the term ‘political culture’ has been quite ambiguous and is a phrase supposing to capture the beliefs, perceptions, values, norms, etc. within a specific society. Consequently, this approach attempts to define political culture more concretely and questions which variables one must look to in order to measure the enduring beliefs of a unique group (Lane 1992). Political culture, as an approach, is at once complicated and promising; the level of expertise that may arise when an individual researcher immerses himself in a particular society is eclipsed by no other method. Finding empirical ways to apply such an idea may link human behavior to its cultural context and resultant political outcomes in a more comprehensive manner than is currently available.
The first, and arguably most obvious, assumption the political culture approach must make is that observable, enduring and distinct differences exist across cultures and that this variation affects politics. There are also several assumptions regarding behavior and learning on both the individual and group level. Primarily, there are general behavioral orientations that inform the way individuals operate in certain situations and these differ from attitudes in their level of specificity. Next, we assume that these orientations are not static and that they are learned through exogenous social mechanisms. Our last assumption posits that our most formative knowledge will provide the basis for the continued accumulation of knowledge throughout life. With such straightforward assumptions it is easy to forget the extreme difficulty involved with using culture as the most significant independent variable.
In Ronald Inglehart’s piece “The Renaissance of Political Culture” we come face to face with the empirical reality of analyzing political culture. This oft-cited paper operationalizes the variables of culture as the ‘satisfaction syndrome’ characterized by life satisfaction, personal satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for the existing order (1988). An examination of these factors as they affect Western Europe, the United States and Canada as well as a few outlying countries (South Africa, Japan, etc.) produces the results we would expect to see: Scandinavian countries consistently rank the highest on satisfaction scores, the U.S. is solidly in the middle, and Southern European as well as South American countries rank lowest. Inglehart’s cultural definitions seem to have tapped into a consistent pattern that may work for predictive political purposes. His work serves to show us ways in which culture can actually play a role in shaping political and economic life rather than just proposing that it may do so in an abstract, immeasurable way. Meanwhile, Inglehart still manages to address cultural change and development in a thorough manner.
Another important work in the field, Ruth Lane’s “Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory”, also works to expand the scope of phenomenon that political culture may explain by offering alternative ways we are able to define and operationalize our variable. This includes an extension of the political cultural approach to include the recognition of distinct sub-cultures as well as the inclusion of cultural rationality in explanatory models. Lane’s essay extends the discussion of the applicability of political cultural approaches; perhaps they work best in tandem with already explicit, rational models to explain political phenomenon. A cultural political paradigm would then integrate the sociological and individual approaches within a reorientation of the rational choice model (Lane 1992). She argues that preferences are created by culture and are then used to make utility-maximizing decisions. In other words, rationality is culturally contextual.
The strength of this particular approach is the depth of understanding we are able to reach by cultural and language immersion. Using culture as a political determinant allows us to capture issues that are unique to a single society. However, opponents of political culture studies believe that the complexity introduced prevents us from operationalizing culture in any meaningful way; it is simply a catch-all, used to describe those things which we are not able to advance past an impressionistic view. Furthermore, the often ‘one of a kind’ nature of societies keeps this approach from generalizing well to other areas. But these problems are not singular to political culture and country studies, discussed by Lane, are good examples of the ways we can relate sub-national cultures to patterns of national-level culture. The work on postmaterialst values can also serve as an explanatory bridge between economics and politics as defined by dominant cultures while area studies have traditionally proved to be quite useful for examining the various political forms of society.
Each of these three major approaches shares commonalities despite their often markedly different assumptions and evaluations. Though it is impossible to fully explicate each method under such space and time constraints, several points may be made about their implications. First, it should be obvious that there is nothing mutually exclusive about these three approaches. Rather, each uses pieces of the other to explain parts of their theory more fully. The role of institutions is a pivotal component for each, though these roles are distinct within each model and the emphasis given to certain variables differs. However, if we create a spectrum of relationships the political cultural and institutional approaches are more closely aligned than either is to the rational choice approach. Yet this first glance may not take into account the recent work done that combines cultural and rational models in a meaningful and truly exciting way. But none of the approaches is in dynamic opposition, and we often see vehement disagreement within the subfields of comparative politics as much as we see among the overarching approaches.
Overall, comparative politics is well on its way to forming the unique identity it so craves. The continued exploration and application of each of its main approaches can only expand the body of knowledge we are trying to accumulate. The complex nature of human interactions, political outcomes, and the rest of the penumbra dictates that we use the available tools in ever more creative ways. As our work becomes more quantitative and differences continue to shrink in the face of globalization, I am hopeful that the field will embrace cross-disciplinary interaction. It is only through continued experimentation and academic conversation that we will truly find what works best for our comparative political approach.
References
Hall, Peter and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.” Political Studies 44: 935-957.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” The American Political Science Review 82(4):1203-1230.
Koelble, Thomas A. 1995. “The New Institutionalism in Political Science.” Comparative Politics 27: 231-243.
Lane, Ruth. 1992. “Political Culture: Residual Category or General Theory?” Comparative Political Studies 25(2):362-387.
Levi, Margaret. 1997. “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis.” In Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997: 19-41.
Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action. Chapters 1-2.

POL 523 Midterm Exam

2009-03-10T17:56:00.000-05:00

Over the past forty years, three approaches have dominated the study of comparative politics. Consider how each of these approaches has developed and write an essay of no less than eight pages that addresses the following questions: What are the seminal works in each approach? What are the assumptions of each approach? What are their strengths and weaknesses? To what extent are these approaches complementary or antagonistic? What are some of the substantive areas of comparative politics to which each has been applied? Cite relevant theoretical and empirical literature. If books or articles not listed in the course syllabus are used, please include their references at the end of the essay. Post your essay on this course blog by 18:00 Wednesday, March 11, 2009.

The Enigma of Political Culture

2009-03-03T16:55:00.002-06:00

Dan Blazo

POL 523

Guo

3 March 2009

The Enigma of Political Culture

Culture, by its very nature, is an eternally complex idea. Scholars have adopted various interpretations of the concept, albeit often under the guise of a previously employed interpretation. I believe a concise definition (or perhaps a few concise definitions) of political culture is necessary for the advancement of research in this field. Do factors such as urbanization and education direct people towards different cultures, or to different subcultures within a broader context? Is American culture subject to the same methods of inquiry as Southern Culture? Or Ole Miss culture? Or Western Judeo-Christian culture? Where do we draw cultural boundaries, and why?

It is not emphasized enough by the authors that the study of political culture generally does not designate particular values or opinions, but rather “the points of concern to be debated” (Laitin 81). Thus Inglehart’s evidence for a rise in postmaterialist values denotes a cultural shift not because of the presence of postmaterialist values, but rather the increased relevancy of those postmaterial concerns. The Postmaterialism Index survey instrument shapes each possible response as relative to the alternative responses, insofar as a positive interpretation of postmaterialist values is weighted against a positive interpretation of materialist values. Most respondents are likely to agree with the declarations from both camps, yet they are asked to choose the statements of more importance. As measured, political culture is not necessarily an indicator of the existence of values, but rather the primacy of different points of concern within the political climate.

Laitin’s second thesis for guiding future work in political culture reveals an important caveat in the field. The author suggests that culture is viewed in the sense that: “Culture is Janus-Faced: people are both guided by the symbols of their culture and instrumental in using culture to gain wealth and power” (81). In addition to linking cultural norms with economic results, this thesis implies that a sort of cultural equilibrium underlies the social constructs of all societies. While some members of society will adopt cultural norms for their own sake, others will exploit the social compliance with these norms in pursuit of personal wealth and power. Thus the direct implications of social norms are offset by a counterforce of self-interested ambitions. Although political science is a long ways from analyzing such a component on a quantitative basis, this theory may very well account for the shortcomings of cultural explanations further down the road.

Satisfaction with one’s life is hardly an indicator of political culture, despite Inglehart’s inferential extensions of his findings. The use of such indicators in this debate reveals the infamous incompatibility between case studies and large-N quantitative analyses. I believe it safe to assume that all variations of political culture strive for life-satisfaction. Some such cultures may be more effective in this pusuit, but this does not necessarily signify a difference in cultural norms. Inglehart’s measure may be effective in emphasizing a rise in the relative political importance of postmaterialist concerns—a fascinating component of cultural evolution—but such a mode of inquiry is severely limited in its explanatory capabilities as it limits descriptions of “culture” to just two categories: materialism and postmaterialism. Therefore, the findings of research employing the “Postmaterialism Index” should be interpreted as evidence of cultural effects, but should not be extended to explain specific cultural attributes or implications. The quantitative study of political culture has not yet reached such explanatory capabilities.

In fact, the seminal quantitative works on political culture seem to be infected with the prejudices of the strict quantitative researchers who once strove to discount all explanatory claims of “political culture.” In other words, Inglehart’s and others’ early works on the subject perceive the cultural component to lie within the “error term” of more traditional scholarly explanations. The evidence of cultural effects is suggested to exist within the inadequacy of economic factors for explaining such variables as interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and political satisfaction. The independent variable in these analyses is simply “culture,” or, in some instances, “postmaterialism.” The level of analysis is generally national and the N is typically as large as the data permits. This approach differs from typical cultural analyses, which focus on smaller levels of analysis and smaller Ns. The more particular components of “culture” broadly defined are lost in universalistic theories.

Perhaps the “zoomed-out” quantitative analysis was a necessary first step in convincing political scientists of the relevancy of political culture. Perhaps quantitative approaches have since been employed to analyze particular cultural norms and particularities. These national-level analyses may eventually incorporate the culture-specific variables that generate variables like social trust and life-satisfaction. Nonetheless, this methodology will inherently fall short in accounting for the political implications of those elements we commonly associate with culture.

2009-03-03T16:47:00.000-06:00

Mandy McConnell
Dr. Gang Guo
POL 523
04 March 2009
The Cultural Approach, Preferences, and Institutions
After a meditative reading of the literature this week, I am left feeling a bit overwhelmed. Through its application, cultural theory suddenly feels like nothing more than an overarching term capturing the essence of all we study under the heading of political science. There are so many elements to it that the approach seems rendered useless. And so I cannot help but wonder: is the cultural approach paradigm actually valuable?
I do not doubt that culture is a lens through which we view experiences. Without mediating structures used in decision making humans would muddle through life, at best, in a state of utter chaos and confusion. But the relevance of culture in political science is best observed in its powers to ‘fill in the blanks’. In other words, I do not feel that culture can be used as a theoretical approach of its own but must be combined with other approaches that allow for more empirical observation in order to fulfill its true explanatory potential.
Even if we discover cultural referents that make us more or less likely to behave in some way are they not going to be complicated by the affects of other variables? The implicit, cultural idea that preference formation is dominated by endogenous processes is a stretch I am not willing to make. There are far too many factors that must be dealt with during decision making that cannot be explained away. For instance, we may create institutions that reflect our moral judgments of individuals’ actions (a manifestation of culture) but the way these institutions are actually implemented may mirror the independent economic, international, and complex domestic situations that occur at the time of structural inception. While culture provides us with a general background there are exogenous, intervening factors that are actually creating the political outcomes we see. Modern ideals were not formed, nor will they evolve, in isolation and it is not useful for comparative political approaches to assume so.
I do, however, generally agree with the notion that cultural norms form institutions which have political consequences. In turn, these institutions have the ability to subsequently reinforce preferences or to create new ones. But the issue of initial preference formation is intricate and even within a single society there may be multiple cognitions referenced that ultimately shape the face of our institutions; one, underlying preference template is virtually impossible to discover. Furthermore, the phenomenon of institutional and preferential change through the cultural approach is not adequately accounted for and Eckstein’s proposals, while interesting, do not address change generally but largely as it will occur in advanced, industrial societies. The accounts of institutional shifts, from a cultural point of view, feel post-dictive and not predictive. Does this allow for comparative generalization?
Again, and importantly, there will never be one general, world culture. No matter how small our planet is becoming through technological advances and globalization, we will always maintain unique social characteristics. We may recognize that each society is inherently different and that this affects the building of political institutions and norms but we will never find one underlying cultural cause for behavior that we can apply to all peoples. The significance of cultural factors should be taken into account when examining the actions and structures of a polity, but we cannot use culture as the explanatory variable only as one possible explanation out of many. Combining cultural with other comparative approaches allows us a more complete, and therefore constructive, picture of contemporary political behavior.

2009-02-24T18:00:00.000-06:00

Rationality in Collective Action
In his The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson argues that rational and self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common goal because individuals know that their effort will not have a noticeable effect on the situation and they can still enjoy the fruits of others’ efforts (16). This is one of the few rational choice theory assumptions that make this school of thought sound incoherent with reality. Rational choice theory seems to apply well to the stabilized and western worlds where individuals are mostly comfortable with the status quo. I believe that individuals in Third World countries will act differently, in most cases, when faced with issues that invoke collective action.
Olson’s argument that rational and self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common goals seems coherent when we consider stabilized and western worlds but does not seem to fit reality in some Third World countries. In stabilized and western democracies there is virtually nothing to rebel against. Democratic governments usually provide its citizens with all the expected basic needs, public goods and opportunities. In democracies, people enjoy their individual, social, human, civil and economic rights and freedom. People can openly exercise their right to vote, and be represented in government. There is political tolerance and acceptance of individual and ethnical differences; individuals are satisfied with the status quo. In other words, individuals in stabilized and western democracies have virtually nothing to rebel against, therefore making Olson’s argument plausible for this scenario.
When we look at Third World countries, including democracies, we see individuals faced with different incentives to rebel against the status quo and to participate in the attainment of a goal that invokes collective action.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Latin America was infested with coups and the military governments established brutally violated human rights. Practices such as murders, torture, and kidnappings were frequently executed. Theoretically, rigorous state repression will result in generalized demobilization but as Mara Loveman (1998) shows, during those hectic and repressive times in Latin Amerinca, in Chile and Argentina repression stimulated collective action. Individuals in these countries protested against government policies, and requested change in government behavior. Human rights organizations (HROs) were formed and even individuals that were not affect directly by the violation of human rights joined these HROs. Individuals participating in HROs faced consequences such as arrest, torture, disappearance and even death.
Loveman concludes that "state repression may stimulate collective organization and opposition from certain sectors of society as a direct result of the severity and cruelty of its attempts to stifle it in others" (517). As demonstrated by Loveman, individuals in Chile and Argentina risked their lives to resist the brutality and cruelty imposed by military governments. Their goal was to cease the spread of brutality and injustice to their neighbors even when they were not even directly affected by it; their incentive was the suffering of families that lost a beloved one. If those individuals were to act rationally, according to the rational choice model, they would not have joined HROs and risked their lives.
The emergence of HROs in Latin America in the 1970s-1980s shows that it was rational for individuals to join organizations and participate even when they did not know if their effort would breed the expected outcome – to cease the spread of brutality and injustice.

P.S: Since we are talking about collective action, check out the "Invisible Children Movement" and help us stop the suffering of our children and their families in Northern Uganda. Join "The Rescue of Joseph Kony's Child Soldiers" action plan on April 25th! Abduct yourself to free the abducted.
Invisible Children: http://www.invisiblechildren.com/april2009/index-en.html

Free-Ride or Die

2009-02-24T17:43:00.003-06:00

Dan Blazo

Weekly Reading Response

Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action depicts a stark departure from traditional democratic theory. As one of the seminal works in rational choice theory, this book introduces some components of economic theory and relates them to group activities and preferences. In doing so, Olson discredits the American Founders’ emphasis on restraining a “majority faction” from tyrannizing over minority groups. The greater efficacy of smaller groups in pursuing interests common to group members insinuates the threat of a “minority faction” acting in opposition to the will of the majority.

The Founders’ wariness of majority factions played a key role in drafting the US Constitution, as evident in Federalist 10 and 51. The Anti-Federalists shared this sentiment and grounded the Bill of Rights upon the premise of the need to protect minorities from a “tyranny of the majority.” The general consensus among these democratic theorists was that the mere presence of so many “minority factions” would make it impossible for any one group to impose its will upon the nation to the detriment of the majority. Thus the backbone of American governmental institutions did not see minority factions as threatening. Olson provides compelling logic in opposition to this assumption.

Of course, logic cannot legitimize social science theory without support from empirical evidence. One major strength of The Logic of Collective Action is the theory’s amenability to empirical tests. While many political theories—especially those originating in previous centuries—make no effort to incorporate testability, falsifiability, or tests of reliability, Olson’s rational choice theory outlays clear examples of circumstances in which certain factors are predicted to produce certain results. The subsequent research of rational-choice theorists and the prevalence of rational choice theory in social science today make Olson’s 1965 composition a most impressive synthesis of economic logic and social science.

Though scholarly developments in recent decades have made rational choice theory a force to be reckoned with among social scientists, some dissenting theories maintain strong support among scholars. The controversy between area studies and universalistic theory-testing fills countless pages of social science journals, but to what avail? Robert Bates believes that the battles between the two perspectives have been predominantly fruitless, and that a cooperative venture between the two schools ought to ensue. In “Area Studies and the Discipline,” Bates devotes substantial space to the practical effects of academia’s assimilation of universalistic theory. Tenured professors trained in area studies research are unharmed, and graduate students training in universalistic theory are well-prepared for professorships, but those “stuck in the middle” are in a difficult situation. From a scientific viewpoint, this discussion was meaningless, as it offered nothing to the collaborative search for knowledge. This topic may be considered an “area study” of social science, and indeed the supporting evidence shares the trademark components of such research: a lack of reliability and a deficiency of utility for further research.

From a rational choice perspective, Bates’ suggestions for the social sciences would presumably require collective action on behalf of a large group. Bates’ suggestions to incorporate culture and language immersion into social science education, as well as the integration of economics and statistics, is one for which the author admits would require more funding per student (especially in initial investments). Scholarly journals are currently publishing many works that refrain from adopting these conditions, so such investments would be risky for a small group to make. In fact, it seems irrational for any social science department to invest in such dramatic alterations of curriculum in an absence of pressure from publishers or department heads. Considering that Bates himself refers to academia as a “federation” of “semi-autonomous” faculty members, the formation of a large group in pursuit of [what Bates considers] an expensive common interest appears most unlikely. The incentive for making Bates’ recommended investments is merely provisional, the risks are rather severe, and the advantages that “free-riding” social scientists would inherit upon a group’s voluntary implementation of his proposals are assured.

Practical recommendations ought to be subject to the same theoretical principles for which the recommendations purport. Practicality is the foundation of rational-choice theory and the subject of investigation for all social scientific inquiry. Why should any social scientist consider his practical recommendations for his field of study to be immune from the tenets of the field’s underlying theory? Any such illusion of immunity is hypocrisy, as is a failure to subject research propositions to the theories proposed to be tested by the research.

Rational Choice Theory

2009-02-24T16:15:00.001-06:00

Mandy McConnell
POL 523
Dr. Gang Guo
25 February 2009
Essay IV
As the field of comparative politics, much like the various fields of the natural sciences, progresses paradigm shifts will naturally occur. Older notions of qualitative supremacy are giving way to debate regarding the utility of the new, empirical methods of knowledge building. The fight for generalizability is floundering in the face of an ever-expanding global society, and fissions within the tradition are deepening. Yet whatever our fate may be, I propose that some of the newly arisen divides within the comparative school are arbitrary and frequently unnecessary. This is reflected in my push for theoretical cohesion in the last several weeks and continues with my distaste for the dispute between area studies practices and rational choice theories.
In this unit’s readings the general, if implicit, tone is one of theoretical supremacy. Rather than working to find common ground it seems that these particular subfields are arguing to capture the hearts of political scientists everywhere. However, these approaches are not mutually exclusive and I find it disheartening to read essays such as that of Chalmers Johnson that whole-heartedly bash Bates’ proposal that Rational Choice may offer some good. Yet Bates is not entirely correct himself; his differentiation between area studies and ‘social scientific’ approaches necessarily demotes the former’s value. Perhaps we are approaching things from the wrong perspective.
Assuming that actors work under bounded rationality, I do not see a reason why area studies must necessarily be precluded from rational choice. First, this notion removes the ‘dehumanizing’ nature of assuming rationality; if we recognize that behavior is shaped contextually we are no longer supposing that humans are emotional robots. Further, we need not assume that actors are working for utility maximization but that they are evaluating their choices according to the expected costs and benefits of an action as it relates to their preferences. This does not mean that they will always act to achieve their preferential outcome but that they will make decisions relative to its attainment. How closely these preferences mimic those of the populace at large depends upon the contextual environment in which the leader is operating. Rationality, then, is dictated by the decision matrices available under different institutional (contextual) constraints. These institutions are built by one of the most enigmatic, and important, variables of area studies: culture.
In other words, the preferences that underlie rationality are defined by the languages, customs, and histories of each unique civilization. Taken together, these things create a worldview, or paradigm, which individuals use as a reference point for evaluating the world generally. Without an understanding of these differences between societies we have no basis for our rational choice methods. For instance, in an autocracy a leader may be making rational choices given his constraints: assuming the leader wants to stay in power he must please the military and perhaps a small group of elites. Therefore, the autocrat will decide to enact or give precedent to policies that please one or both of these groups in order to maintain or expand his power. In contrast, a democratic leader needs to please the general voting population, BDM’s ‘selectorate’, to retain his position and therefore will make choices that may go against his personal preferences but that reflect the wishes of the greater population. The assumption that leaders want to maintain power is not farfetched and does not take away from the larger point: cultural factors within societies shape the institutions that govern and in turn create decision matrices for leaders.
I believe this simple example highlights the potential importance of area studies for rational choice approaches. The attempts to generalize rationality across all societies may flaw the approach, but taking into account the specificities of unique polities merges two areas of study that have great promise for knowledge building. The recognition of complexity in all things political is not an admittance of defeat, but it does require that we approach our studies with a degree of subjectivity absent from the natural sciences. Therefore it is reasonable, if difficult, to use an individual assessment of a culture in order to understand an actor’s decision making options within that societal arrangement. Within different contexts, the same action may have different implications giving us a need to understand the general motivations behind the individual in charge, or the basis for their rationale. By working to combine useful methods instead of trying to differentiate between their causes and benefits, perhaps we will find answers previously overlooked.

New Institutionalisms

2009-02-17T17:59:00.008-06:00

Hall, Taylor, and Koelble identify three types of “New Institutionalism”: historical, sociological, and rational-choice, each of which has its strengths and weaknesses. The rational-choice model presumes that institutions are intervening variables capable of affecting individuals’ choices and actions, but incapable of determining them. In contrast to the other two approaches, the rational-choice model views cultures, fields, and sectors as “obscure phrases for collections of individuals” (Koelble). Historical institutionalists contend that institutions indeed play a determining role in shaping the actions of individuals, though institutional structures and functions are at times affected by collective and individual choices. Sociological institutionalists argue that institutions themselves are dependent upon larger “macro-level” variables such as society and culture, implying that individuals are [primarily] socially dependent and rather unimportant (as explanatory variables). Sociologists view institutions as more than just formal structures, including conventions and customs in their analyses.

The historical and sociological approaches overlap in some general critiques of the rational choice model, emphasizing the overestimation of actors’ ability to rationalize as embedded in rational-choice theory. Sociologists go so far as to claim that the very concept of rationality is dependent upon the environment. Rational choice theorists have adjusted their claims in response to some of these critiques, most notably those concerning the availability of information and transaction costs(North).

Some of the most significant differences among the three fields, it seems, lie between the sociologists on one side and the historical and rational-choice theorists on the other. Sociological institutionalists argue that individual action is the product of social/cultural institutions; historical and rational choice theorists argue that rationality and individuals’ actions are in part shaped by structural and institutional factors, but are driven more by functional motivations. Is this necessarily a disagreement? Or is it merely a difference of scope?

The authors seem to suggest two somewhat paradoxical ideas: that the three fields of comparative politics each provide optimal theoretical lenses for different research questions, and that the three should integrate more to maximize the efficiency of theories. Koelble suggests that researchers should adapt a particular approach depending on the research question, stating,

“…each [approach] has a set of features superior to its competitors, depending
on the research question. Social science concerns itself with the
discovery of patterns, and it is the task of the researcher to show why he or
she chose a particular theoretical lens to investigate the discovered pattern”
(243)

Would integration deduct from the explanatory power of these theories? Certainly not in all cases, as evident in the rational-choice theorists’ concessions about institutional restraints and transaction costs. So is a more encompassing integration advisable? Or, more specifically, what questions does a conglomerate approach appear most likely to provide the best answer? The authors seemingly in favor of greater integration have failed to provide a persuasive example of when such conglomeration would provide the best “theoretical lens.”

I believe Sociological Institutionalism to be incompatible with the Historical and Rational-Choice theories due to one crucial difference; individuals are viewed as historically negligible by sociologists. Collective action, as shaped by “macro-level” variables and intermediary institutions, is understood as the driving force for both institutional change and stability. Institutional “functions” are seen as less deterministic than their structures, which change only in accordance to collective action.

While this perspective may offer an interesting insight to compare alongside the historical and rational choice models, its prospects of academic integration with political science appear bleak. As the authors continually claim, each approach is more suitable for some research questions than the others. In fact, each school of the academic sciences is best at addressing certain questions that explain, in the context of their perspectives, the mechanisms of the universe.

Astronomers, physicists, mathematicians, and evolutionary biologists all claim to have achieved a better understanding of the world with their cumulative research, which they have indeed accomplished. It is the relevant subject-matter for which they seek to explain that creates the foreignness between explanations. The level of analysis ranges from subatomic to galactic, but always in accordance to the general mission: improving our understanding of the way our world operates.

While this may seem redundant or patronizingly obvious to graduate students, it underlies a crucial reason for the diversity of approaches in comparative politics. Comparative theorists may be apt to collaborate efforts across broader theoretical assumptions—in part because of substantial theoretical overlap—but unification of theories may only obscure and “thicken” those concepts for which each was intended to explain unilaterally. Assuming application of the rigorous tests of scientific inquiry (perhaps those proscribed in DSI), each theory is subject to explain the observable occurrences within its scope of inference. Theories may compete in their explanatory capabilities for specific topics of research, but the three overarching theoretical frameworks of comparative politics are unlikely to suffer any damage from such competition. If one sociological comparativist constructs a model that a rational-choice comparativist surmounts, the logical explanation of the sociologist’s shortcoming is that his theory was inadequate, not that sociological institutionalism had failed.

The approaches may indeed influence one another, and for the benefit of each. North’s adjustments to the rational-choice model are prime examples of such advancements. Critiques across “new institutionalisms” certainly provide pressure for each field to improve itself. But an integration of approaches would consist of a hodgepodge of theoretical claims without a robust underlying direction of inquiry.

Essay III

2009-02-17T16:35:00.002-06:00

Mandy McConnell
Dr. Gang Guo
POL 523
18 February 2009
Review Essay III ‘New Institutionalism’
This week’s glimpse into the current, institutional direction of comparative political research has proven quite interesting. It is important for us to understand the past, present, and foreseeable future of our school by acquainting ourselves with literature related to the subject, and this unit’s readings do just that. For most of our authors, institutions, regardless of the particular approach, shape the interactions, preferences, and power distributions of actors within the political system. Furthermore, new institutionalists in political science see these actors as working with bounded rationality and limited information shaped by the distinct environment under which they operate. These assumptions, however, leave several theoretical holes by entertaining rather overarching and vague ideas of human behavior, and although the new institutionalism heading is commonly broken down into its three distinct forms, I would like to discuss the approach’s shortcomings in a much more general manner.
While I will not deny the importance of institutions in our lives as social creatures, I do not agree with the largely deterministic nature of the institutional approaches. I am not sure that all human behavior can be explained by organizational constraints or historical accounts. What happens when individuals act outside of institutions or when institutions are inchoate or unformed? In these cases, something else must be at work to shape our preferences. Claiming that all behavior outside of institutions is dictated by cultural norms may not be able to account for actions under extremely complex issues such as trust. For instance, low levels of intergovernmental trust in the working, majority class of Latin American citizens may severely alter the willingness of individuals to participate in institutional arrangements. Simultaneously, there may be a lack of interpersonal trust leading to a highly individualist society where preferences are not culturally, or rationally determined but are decided by each person’s desire to avoid joining in collective activities. Yet we continue to see the creation of institutions in even the least trusting of developing societies begging the question: why?
Furthermore, institutionalism does not adequately address the idea of free-will and the availability of multiple decision making matrices. How do we know, with complete confidence, that institutions absolutely dictate the behavior in our lives? Do people ever, like we see with the hypothetical trust example, opt out of institutional rules or influence to follow a different path? Although our intellectual course has brought us back to analyzing institutions, we must address these substantive issues that arise from doing so. Unfortunately, I did not find much space donated to broaching such topics in this week’s work.
Overall, it seems that sociological institutionalism would be the best starting point for examining the abovementioned questions as well as many others we commonly see posed. However, I do not see the potential for a coherent explanation arising from one of the institutional approaches individually. The complex nature of comparative politics outlined needs the heft of a combined agenda if we are to further our research in a meaningful way. In this sense, my problem may does not lie with the focus on institutions as units of analysis but with the differentiation between the three analytical styles. There will always be some difficult issue, such as trust, that calls for an equal examination of historical, sociological, and rational choice factors in order to fully capture its implications and causes. If we do not recognize this and continue to stress the importance of distinguishing between the three main approaches instead of applying them in a reasoned and united fashion, we may never make headway within our ‘new institutionalism’.