First topic:

Conceptual and Measurement Issues Regarding the Study of Regime Types, Regime Transitions, and Democratization

The study of democratization is one of the most venerable literatures in the comparative politics field. The transition of more than thirty countries from nondemocratic to democratic political systems has challenged scholars in the field of comparative politics to engage in cross regional research. The study of the democratization phenomena invites students of comparative politics to understand and explain processes of political regime change and functioning.

In the 1980s, many authoritarian regimes around the globe succumbed. The most extreme changes were observed in Eastern Europe. A great deal has been written on the subject by enthusiastic and intrigued scholars and hundreds, if not thousands of case studies have been done. Most of the research on this topic has been empirical and little attention has been paid to the examination of the concept “regime” and how it is distinct from “state” or “government.” Another problem regards the question of basic regime type. A regime change necessarily implies that a state is shifting from one regime type to another. A clear distinction between democratic and nondemocratic regimes is indispensable for the study of democratization and regime change. A third problem regards the little interest on the role of some important agents and/or institutional factors in the process of democratization. Some scholars argue that political parties, for instance, have been left out of the analysis of regime change and the process of legitimization. The success of these scholars’ responses to the challenge of furthering research on this topic will depend on their ability to overcome conceptual and measurement issues – which are prerequisite for theory-building and theory-testing.

Barbara Geddes in “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years” synthesizes the result of the large number of studies of late-20th-century democratization published between the early 198os and late 1990s. Through her work we can see some of the problems scholars face when they engage in cross national studies. Conceptual and measurement problems are just among the many this research agenda has to overcome.

The past research has found that one of the few stylized facts to emerge from studies of regime transitions is that democracy is more likely in more developed countries. Scholars such as Jackman (1973), Bollen (1979), and Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) have found beyond reasonable doubt empirical evidence that there is a positive relationship between democratic government and economic development. These studies have covered several different time periods, and have used the best sophisticated statistical models; therefore, we can conclude that the positive relationship between economic development and the likelihood of democratic government exists.

Another stylized fact is also reasonably well established. Transition specialists argue that poor economic performances increases the likelihood of authoritarian breakdown, as it increases democratic breakdown and defeat incumbents in stable democracies. But as Geddes points out, virtually every suggested generalization in this literature has been challenged. There seems to be little agreement between different specialists working from different parts of the world.

For instance, one of the most widely acceptable generalizations was that transitions of regimes took place as a consequence of important divisions within authoritarian regimes. This claim was specially supported in transitions that took place in Latin America. In Latin America, the first steps towards democratization could be traced back to splits within the military. The story also fit the transition from a nondemocratic government to a democratic government in Greece. However, democratizations that occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union could not in most cases be traced to splits within the military; nor can the most transitions in Africa.

One of the conceptual problems raised by cross national studies on this topic is that there is a lack of important clear definitions of crucial concepts in the analysis of transition such as state, regime, government and democracy.

Margaret Levi in “The State of the Study of the State” writes that the “consideration of the state as a conceptual variable ebbs and flows; there are good reasons for claiming that the state is useless as concept and equally well founded resistance to shelving it” (2003:34). The notion of nation-state is problematic because it is possible to observe a number of states without nations and a number of nations without a state. Levi argues that the European model of state is limited in descriptive and theoretical usefulness in understanding the degree of stateness of various countries.

There are several reasons why it has been so difficult to use the concept of the state in comparative analyses; these reasons have to do more with the methodology of understanding state than with the applicability of the concept itself.

First, the state is a result of various factors, not just a single one, even though at times, one variable accounts for most of the explanatory work such as the ruling party or bureaucracy. A good analysis of the state will be able to differentiate between factors and determining the importance of each. Second, the state is abstract. The state decisions are not made by the state per se but by state personnel or rulers. Third, the state seems to the agent of transformation and what is being transformed at the same time. This aspect of the state requires a dynamic model. And fourth, the state is “historically and geographically bounded” (34); a notion that does not endure across time and place. States not always exited and they are not everywhere.

The problems scholars face in trying to use the state as a conceptual variable is how best to define it. Since there is no clear and shared definition of what the state is, it is difficult to determine what role it is playing and how strong it is. Levi states that state theory has gone through several modifications and distinct controversies have dominated the discussion at different times. Early theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau were concerned with the problem of social order, and they based their arguments on assumptions about the state of nature. In the nineteenth century, anthropologists gave rise to the ongoing debate about the circumstances under which cooperation and the production of public good is possible without a state. Another controversy is whether the origin and maintenance of the state is based on consent or coercion. Those are ongoing debates that deal with state intervention in the market or individual lives. These ongoing controversies reflect the difficulties of determining what role the state plays in our lives and how strong this institution is.

Levi also tries to shed some light into discussion of what defines and distinguishes states from governments (41). She explains that states are comparable but distinct from city-states, empires, other forms of institutionalized power and identity over a given territory. States contain but are also different their laws, bureaucracies, and governments. States can be formed but not selected; governments are selected. A government is the institution that sets and administers policies, and the different types of governments are distinguished by arrangements for making and implementing legislation and law.

Levi concludes that “state theory remains in its infancy” despite all the literature. Writing and thinking that has been addressed to the consequences state intervention in the economy and of the problems of democratic accountability (55). Defining a clear concept of state will enable us to untangle the complex relationships within the state ad among the state, government and civil society (55).

Geddes also discusses some of the conceptual problems faced by scholars conducting cross national studies. Geddes discusses some of the conceptual problems of identifying different authoritarian regimes. Some may think that all authoritarian regimes are the same but as Geddes points out they “differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy” (121). This conceptual issue may cause controversies in findings. Since for a period of time scholars were not aware of the differences between authoritarian systems, theorizing was at an abstract level and scholars did not really know how the characteristics of regime influence transitions.

Different authoritarian regimes draw on different groups to staff government offices and different segments of society for support. These different authoritarian regimes have different procedures for making decisions, different ways of responding to opposition and the public needs, and different ways of handling the choice of leaders and succession. Because authoritarian regimes are different, they also break down in systematically different ways.

Geddes proposes a way of facilitating the analysis of these different authoritarian regimes by classifying them into: military, personalistic or single-party. In military regimes, a selected group of officers decides who will rule and exercises some influence on policy. Examples of military regimes include the Brazilian (1964-1985) and the Argentine (1976-1983). In single-party regimes, even if other parties exist, only one party exercises control and has access to political office. Examples of single-party regimes include that of Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico and the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM). Personalistics regimes differ from these two authoritarian regimes because access to office and policy outcomes depends on the discretion of an individual leader. Examples of personalistic regimes are Rafael Trujillo’s in the Dominican Republic (1930-1961) and Idi Amin’s in Uganda (1971-1979).

Although the distinction between authoritarian regimes seems clear, it is not always easy to classify them (123). Scholars need to create criteria for classification of regimes – which it is not an easy task. Even though Geddes emphasizes control over access to power and influence as criteria for classification, the difference between authoritarian regimes are not so obvious.

Military regimes are led by military officers, where one group of officers determines who will lead the country and still exercise influence over policy. Some military regimes are institutionalized and senior officers have agreed to share and rotate in power. Many regimes headed by military officers are not in reality controlled by a group of seniors. During military interventions, one can easily observe that there are short periods of military rule followed by the consolidation of power by one individual and repression of the rest of the officers. These regimes are not military regimes; these are personal regimes even though the leader wears a uniform. Also because many dictators end up forming parties to support themselves, it is difficult to distinguish between real and nominal single-party regimes.

In addition to the barriers in creating criteria for distinguishing between authoritarian regimes, area experts criteria for distinguishing dominant party authoritarian regimes from democratic regimes vary by region. Specialists in Latin America usually classify Mexico as authoritarian regimes and African specialists classify Botswana, Senegal and Zimbabwe as democratic regimes. A common set of criteria must be developed so scholars will be able to compare across regions.

Democracy is a classic essentially contested concept. We have not reached, and maybe will never reach a final consensus on its definition and content. The concept of democracy as a form of government goes back the Greek philosophers. Samuel Huntington in “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century” discusses some of the problems surrounding the definition of democracy.

Huntington explains that as a form of government, democracy has been defined in terms of sources of authority for government, purposes served by the government, and procedures for constituting government. Serious problems of ambiguity and imprecision arise when we define democracy in terms of either source of authority or purposes.

The central procedure of democracy is the selection of officials through the competitive elections by the people they govern. Joseph Schumpter (1942) developed the most important formulation of his concept of democracy in his study “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.” Schumpter criticized what he classified as “classical theory of democracy.” He defined classical theory of democracy in terms of the “will of people” (source) and “the common good” (purpose).

After World War II, scholars tried intensely to define democracy in terms of source and purpose. But Shumpter had proposed what he called “another theory of democracy.” Shumpter’s theory stated that the democratic method is “an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (as cited in Huntington, 6). The earlier theory was based on rationalist, utopian and idealistic definitions while the latter was based on empirical, descriptive, institutional and procedure definitions. By the 1970s Shumpeter had won the debate after scholars concluded that only Shumpeter’s definition provided analytical precision and empirical referents that make the concept a useful one.

Following a Shumpeterian tradition, Huntington defines a political system as democratic to the extent that the “most powerful collective decisions makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” (7). His definition also implies existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, organize, assemble, and publish that are necessary to promote political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns.

Huntington makes several additional points regarding the concept of democracy. First, the definition of democracy in terms of election is a minimal term. People want to associate democracy with effective public control over policy, responsible government, honesty and openness in politics, and so on. But doing so raises again the problem of source and purpose of governments. The problem with the subjective nature of many political democracy indicators such as freedom of the press, openness and fairness of elections, restriction on political parties and such are more appropriate measures for political freedom or right than of democracy.

Second, even a society chooses its political leaders through competitive elections, these leaders might not exercise real power. These leaders may be just representing a larger and more powerful group; they might be just puppets or the front of some other group. And if the most powerful decision makers are not elected through competitive elections by the people then the political system is not democratic.

The third issue regards the fragility or stability of a democratic political system. Stability is a central characteristic of any political system. A political system may be however, more or less stable or more or less democratic. So systems may be appropriately classified as democratic but may be also unstable systems at the same time. The practice of combining political stability and democracy creates a source of invalid measures because democracy and stability do not have same causes or consequences.

Fourth, is the issue of whether treating democracy and nondemocracy as dichotomous or continuous variable. When analyzing variations in the degree of democracy among countries, scholars have chosen to use continuous variables. They develop measures of democracy combining indicators of fairness elections, restrictions on political parties, freedom of press and other criteria. The problem of choosing this path is that it creates several problems such as the weight of indicators. For instance, Huntington presents twenty one variables that seem to contribute to democracy and democratization (37) but we do not really know which variables weight more since no single factor accounts for democracy, and the combination of causes producing democracy varies from country to country. Another problem is choosing between a dichotomous or continuous variable.

Huntington’s point about treating democracy and nondemocracy either as dichotomous or continuous variable sheds light in some of the practical measurement problems scholars face when conduction cross national studies on this topic. Measuring democracy it is not an easy task. The scholars attempting to measure this ambiguous concept has to choose between a categorical versus continuous measurement, objective versus subjective indicators, and single-time versus multiple-time measures.

Analysts choosing a dichotomous variable know that there are countries that will fall in between the two categories. The treatment of democracy is a dichotomous variable seems to be based on convenience and simplicity of such a measure. Advocates of a continuous variable argue that categorical variables incorrectly treat countries within a category as homogeneous with respect to democracy.

David L. Epstein at al. challenge Przeworski et al (2000) findings regarding the key hypothesis in modernization theory – that political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita income rise – on the grounds of methodology and substantive dissent.

Epstein at al. review and critique the work of Przeworski and argues that they mistakenly employed a dichotomous classification of political systems, which governments were either democratic or authoritarian – with rather stringent requirements for being included in the democracy category. Epstein at al. argue that the approach ignored the possibility of an intermediate category, so they propose a trichotomous measure of democracy rather than dichotomous. After employing this different method, Epstein at al. find, contrary to Przeworski et al., that the modernization hypothesis stands up well.

Fifth, nondemoncratic regimes do not hold competitive elections and nor promote voting participation. Nondemocratic regimes have little in common. There are several categories of such regimes: absolute monarchies, bureaucratic empires, oligarchies, aristocracies, fascist and communist and more. The distinction between regimes is crucial to understanding twentieth-century politics.

In conclusion, the study of democratization is one of the most venerable literatures in comparative politics. The study of the waves of democratization has challenged students to engage in cross regional research. A great deal of research has been devoted to this topic by enthusiastic and intrigued scholars, and a variety of theories has been developed. However, little attention has been paid to the examination of the crucial concepts in the analysis of transition – such as regime, government, state, and democracy. In other to further research on this topic, scholars will have to overcome conceptual and measurement problems.

Second Topic:

Conceptual and Measurement Issues Regarding the Study of Social Movement, Revolutions, and Civil Society.

According to Goodwin and Jasper (2009) social movements are “conscious, concerted, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means” (14). Social movements are more conscious and organized than fashions; they last longer than protests or riots. Ordinary people form and join social movements in order to fight against something, either explicitly or implicitly.

Our understanding of social movements has grown as these movements themselves have evolved. In the nineteenth century, much of the protests that took place were urban riots, so scholars focused on the nature of crowd. In the 1950s, scholars focused on theories of mass society since there was a need to understand how the Nazis could have taken control of an otherwise civilized nation. Scholars studying America, who have had examined the labor movement and the civil rights movements, focused on the political dimensions of protest. Scholars the came after 1960s, had a tendency to see protestors as reasonable people since protest in decade did not involve a fight for equality, but they were mainly concerned about lifestyles and cultural meanings. In recent years, social movements have become more global in scope. The research in this field is undoubtedly evolving.

Most of the literature on social movements was developed by students of collective behavior. The two main problems generated by this collective behavior perspective is that despite looking at movements as purposeful phenomena, many students of collective behavior placed most attention on unexpected dynamics rather than on strategies devised by rational, strategic actors. Also the analyses were often limited to a description of reality, without devoting attention to the structural origins of conflict which in turn became movements. Structuralist approaches deals with the latter deficiency and the organizational perspective deals with the former. It is important to emphasize the dynamic of collective action to social movements because only through collective action social movements emerge. Also the collective action problem has received a great attention within this literature.

Jeffrey Berejikian (1992) in “The Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem” describes the two most prominent methodological approaches to explain revolutionary collective action, and argues that the two approaches result in theoretical inconsistencies and/or explanatory inconsistencies. Berejikian proposes an alternative utilizing the concept of framing which addresses the agent-structure problem and in turn leads to greater theoretical coherence and resolution if anomalous cases.

In the late 1970s, the study of revolution took two distinct paths. Theda Skocpol (1979) in “States and Social Revolutions” argued for a structural and nonvoluntarialist study of revolutions. Skocpol focuses on social structures. At the same time, Samuel Popkin (1979) in “The Rational Peasant” argued for a study of peasant revolutionary action based upon the axioms of rational choice. Popkin focuses on individual actors. The two scholars basically deny the legitimacy of each other. In a sense, these two studies are methodologically incompatible.

This methodological incompatibility reflects a larger theoretical debate in the social sciences – the agent-structure problem. This problem reflects the two “truisms” about the social world. First, intentional and conscious individual (agents) actions reproduce and transform reality. Second, society is made up of interconnecting social relationships (structures) that constrain the interaction between agents. The challenge for political scientists is to disentangle the interaction between agents and structures.

Skocpol’s approach to the study of revolutions is an explicit defense of methodological structuralism. Her research denies methodological individualism, which assumes that revolutions are consequences of intended actions, because it incorrectly assumes that social order does not rest in consent and it is not supported by evidence. She sees individuals as participants in this complex unfolding of multiple conflicts, rather than purposive actors.

Skocpol presents two assertions about the nature of peasant revolt. First, peasants are in a constantly revolutionary condition. The logic behind this assumption is that peasants are always subject to economic, political and cultural marginality; therefore, she assumes that peasants always have a reason to rebel against landlords and state agents. This idea of grievance is inherent and defined by the peasants’ position as a social class. The peasants will collectively mobilize as a function of structural positioning. In order to revolt, peasants needs to be connected by solidarity and community autonomy (tactical freedom), which in turn gives them a degree of leverage against the elite. Second, tactical freedom will only be successful if accompanied by a relaxation of state coercive power. The state is important here because Skocpol assumes that the landed elite are depended upon the state for support and even the use of force. So if the state does not have the capacity and ability to repress peasants, then tactical freedom is translated into attacks against the landed elites.

Even though Skocpol is defendant of structuralism, she implicitly makes the argument that revolts are a consequence of individual action. A model of a rational maximizer peasant is implied throughout Skocpol’s work and it is also appear to be a necessary condition for the structuralist explanation to work.

One of the measurement problems one may be able identify with Skocpol’s analysis is the difficult in measuring grievance. As just discussed, Skocpol assumes that peasants are, in a variety of ways, subject to marginality and they will collectively mobilize as a function of their position in society; peasants want more land, greater autonomy, and so forth. Many studies of civil wars have taken into account grievances but the results usually do not support this assumption. In studies of civil war, grievance has usually been seen as one of the proxies for motive but there is little agreement on which variables would be most appropriate to measure such a complex and broad concept. Some of the objective measures of grievance are ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality. Even these objective measures of grievance are still too broad and scholars have to be very careful is choosing variables that will enable them to truly capture grievance.

On the other hand, Popkin’s work is based on an individualistic methodological perspective. For Popkin, individuals will choose to participate in revolutions as a result of a calculated effort to improve one’s future position. Popkin asserts that peasant virtually employ a rational maximizing decision rule to all of their activities. In focusing on the individual, as a rational maximizing actor, Popkin rejects what Skocpol proposes to be the central analytic variable – social structures. For Popkin, the “aggregation of intentional individual actions, rather than the permissive structures, accounts for revolutions” (Berejerkian 650).

One of things that these two approaches share in common is the lack of a clear solution to the free-rider problem. In the “The Logic of Collective Action,” Mancur Olson wrote on the collective action problem:

“The notion that groups of individuals will act to achieve their common or group interests, far from being a logical implication of the assumption that the individuals in a group will rationally further their individual interests , is in fact inconsistent with that assumption” (Berejerkian 649).

Given the above discussion, Skocpol’s analysis findings – peasants will act collectively to address their class-defined goals and aspirations – does not match the assumption of rational maximization as a decision rule. Evidence is found on historical instances in which, given the necessary and sufficient structural conditions as described by Skocpol, peasants chose not to revolt. Even though Popkin goes further than Skocpol and acknowledges the free-rider problem, his four conditions under which peasants would contribute to a revolutionary movement are unable to provide predictions about revolutionary action.

Popkin’s first condition is a cost-benefit calculus. There are two instances for this set of explanation. First, the benefits of participation flow only to those that contribute. Second, costs of defection outweighed those of contributing. The first condition is problematic. There is little data available to show evidence the peasants would in fact incur the risks of engaging in open revolt. The second is there are sufficient selective incentives. This notion is always problematic because revolutionary struggles require increased popular action – and therefore contributions – above and beyond what was hypothesized by the organization when it first emerged. The final condition is that each individual must view a personal contribution as critical and necessary for the success of the organization. This is view is also problematic for several reasons. One of the reasons is that during the process of revolution, some task will require more from specific individuals than others. For example, helping make protest signs will incur fewer individual costs than engaging in a fight against the state.

Also, the rational-choice theory is unable to account for the ways group solidarities, moral commitment to the collectivity, and nonrational values may become incentives for people to mobilize and act independently of individual self-interest. Explanations based on the individual level of analysis cannot account for effects of acts of defiance that at times motivates rebellions.

Berejikian intends to present a model of peasant revolt that will make explicit the connection between the structural context and individual decision rules by expanding the concept of “framing.” Berejikian argues that understanding revolutionary movements requires acknowledging that individuals invoke different decision rules n alternative structural contexts.

Berejikian has an ambitious goal, bridge the gap between the agent and structural analysis; however, I do not think his fixes the problem. The author argues that the point is that the decisional determinant is not the expected outcome, but how the choice is perceived relative to the status quo (reference point) (652). In order for this status-quo-sensitive model to move beyond a tool of criticism and add to our understanding of revolutionary action, it is necessary to conceptualize a social-structure frame.

He defines social frame as “the perceptions by individuals that participation in the existing social structural arrangements means either gains or losses” (652). Berejikian’s definition of social frame does not convince me that the agent-structure problem is solved. It seems that the methodological Individualism has a lot more weight and explanatory power the methodological structuralism.

Some scholars say that what distinguishes social movements from other types of political activities or demonstrations is the adoption of unusual patterns of political behavior. But the distinction between social movements from revolutions and other forms of political or social demonstration is not clear.

Some may say that protest is a core feature of social movements but there are some objections to this perspective. First, public protests play a minimal role in movements advocating personal and cultural change, religious movements, and such. It is also debatable the notion that are unconventional and/or violent forms of political activity. In the past decades, protests have taken the form of public expression and no longer belong to extremists groups or radical sectors. Also it is unclear if protests pose a challenge to democratic stability and the legitimacy of elected governments. On one hand, some could argue that protests are no longer an extreme and unusual form of showing public discontent but rather they are just one form of political participation. On the other hand, others may argue that protests represent a warning sign of deep-seated public disaffection that could challenge the legitimacy of representative democracy.

Whether protest is a core feature of social movements or not and whether is poses a challenge to order or not, many studies have drawn attention to this political phenomenon. Pippa Norris et al.(2005) finds evidence that protest politics has risen dramatically in many countries in the late twentieth century (198). Because of the increase in frequency of this form of political demonstration, scholars should pay more attention in developing a clear concept that either distinguishes protests from other forms demonstrations – rebellions, revolutions, strikes and so forth – or places protest as some have suggested, as core feature of other types of demonstrations.

While scholars debate the importance and implications of protest, others go a step further and emphasized the importance of a strong and active civil society to the consolidation of democracy – which to me sounds ironic due to the ambiguity of what makes up civil society. This research agenda focuses on the influence of norms and networks of civic engagement and associates these with the performance of representative government.

Robert D. Putnam concludes, after a twenty year quasi-experimental study of subnational governments is different regions of Italy, “systematic inquiry showed that the quality of governance was determined by longstanding traditions of civic engagement (or its absence). Voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies and football clubs … were the hallmarks of a successful region” (66). Putnam also points out that historical analysis suggested that these networks of organized reciprocity and civil solidarity were a precondition for socioeconomic modernization. In “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Putnam suggests that there has been a decline in the level of participation of group activities in America and that it turn, poses a threat to democracy and quality of life.

Social scientists from several fields have suggested a common framework to understand these phenomena. This framework rests on the concept of social capital. Social capital refers to “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 67).

Social capital boils down to networks, norms, and trust – networks foster strong norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. The concept of social capital is too complex and broad. For instance, the norms of social capital can range from norms of reciprocity between two friends all the way to complex doctrines of religion. Trust is also a very complex variable to measure, but Putnam presents some very convincing evidence supporting the decline in trust. Putnam used an instrument survey that asked the question “can people be trusted?” Overall Putnam’s research convinces even the skeptical that individuals are indeed, less involved in group activity. What is not clear is how this decline in social capital affects stability and quality of life even though some attempts have made to establish that relationship.

E. Spencer Wellhofer(2003) in “Democracy and Fascism: Class, Civil Society, and Rational Choice in Italy” focuses on the conditions fostering transitions to democracy or fascism. Wellhofer finds only mixed support for the civil society thesis. The author suggests that “if civil society is predicated on trust fostered by civic organizations, trust appears to be more strategic than unconditional and, when broken, decays markedly” (104).

There are still answered questions about the relationship between social capital and democracy and Putnam recognizes. Putnam suggests that we must sort out the dimensions of social capital and unravel the types of organizations and networks that most effectively embody and generate mutual reciprocity, resolution of dilemmas of collective action, and the broadening of social identities.

Social movement and other forms of political demonstrations studies have grown impressively in the last decades. Scholars from different schools of thought have proposed a great number of theories and efforts have been made to merge all these distant approaches into a more comprehensive one. While innumerous analytical definitions have been put forth, we still lack a systematic comparison of conceptualizations. Heterogeneous social and political phenomena such as single-issue campaign, religious movements, and revolutions are usually all defined as social movements; the concept is ambiguous. Concepts are the cornerstone of theorizing; therefore scholars should pay attention to concept definition. The study of social movements is lacking an explicit and empirical agreement about the use of the term.

-Thati

p.s: Have an awesome summer guys!