Democratic or Authoritarian?

“If the constitution of a state is democratic, then every exceptional negation of democratic principles, every exercise of state power independent of the approval of the majority, can be called dictatorship.”

-Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy

Why do countries change their governments from authoritarian to democratic, and vice versa? This question is one of the most essential in comparative political science, but its broad scope poses many problems for scholars. Defining regime-types and classifying national governments accordingly has proven to be a major obstacle for scholars. The relevant literature has developed a unique approach, but has yet to exhibit theoretical consistency. National-level variables—such as the extent of government, the role of the elected government in overall governance, and national wealth—are unduly assessed either theoretically or empirically.

Case-studies are prevalent in the literature. Large N quantitative studies are inherently problematic in one way or another, given the rich diversity of political institutions and economic environments across nations. As evident in Geddes’ work, much of the empirical work lacks unifying statistical models and relies on single variable statistics and analyses.

Perhaps a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis is the only reasonable approach to this research question. Prior to determining the right approach, however, the qualitative components of the dependent variable must be clearly defined. Unfortunately, conceptual ambiguity remains prevalent in the literature.

Dichotomous and trichotomous measures of regime-types are inherently broad generalizations. Even these categories, however, lack clear definitions. “Democracy," according to the qualitative analyses in each of the readings, describes liberal democracies. A regime that does not meet the standards of democracy is described as “authoritarian," though it may or may not pass the "democracy tests" of the models. Huntington discusses the converse circumstance of a democratic regime, “If those democratic decision makers become, however, simply a façade for the exercise of much greater power by a nondemocratically chosen group, then clearly that political system is not democratic”(10), but devotes just one sentence to the most illiberal feature that has, at times, arisen in “free and fair” democracies: “Implicit in the concept of democracy, however, are limitations on power”(10). I perceive the author’s conception of these limitations to be in line with the concept of liberalism, or the limitations of government. However, these “limitations” are neither defined nor accounted for in any of the authors’ classifications.

Moreover, the authors fail to recognize that their conception of democracy is necessarily that of liberal democracy. “…Popular election of the top decision makers” essentially serves as the requirement for democratic rule in the empirical models(Huntington 9). However, such electoral systems have, at times, produced authoritarian democratic regimes. Democracy—as defined by the authors—and authoritarianism are not mutually exclusive; liberal democracy and authoritarianism are. False classifications are likely if liberalism is not taken into account in the classification process, which seems to be the case for all of this week's literature. A country that meets the minimum criteria for the "democracy" category is automatically categorized as a democracy. There is no positive screening for authoritarian elements, for the authors assume (empirically, but not conceptually) that the minimum criteria for the democracy category is enough to ensure that no government that could meet these standards could ever be considered an authoritarian regime. The "façade" is undetectable.

Both qualitative and quantitative aspects of the authors’ approaches are theoretically ambiguous. One example is Huntington's "façade " scenario, which is too essential to the "procedural" conception of democracy to shrug off with a single paragraph, as the authors do. How is one to determine what qualities denote a "the exercise of much greater power?" concealed behind the facades? (10)

Contemporary Marxists make a persuasive argument that according to the authors' descriptions, the United States' government is not a democracy, but a façade. A “much greater power” than that of the elected government may reasonably be considered the control of the monetary system (in a system of fiat currency, as we have today). Are the IMF, the World Bank, or the Federal Reserve “democratically chosen”? Of course not. Nor are the Supreme Court, the UN, NAFTA, NATO, the EU, etc. Yet all of these governing bodies play central roles in the lives of civilians. How are we to define “power” and “democratically chosen group”s? The literature makes no apparent effort to address these legitimate concerns while classifying national governments.

On the contrary, Libertarians may reasonably argue that the authors' descriptions of regime-types would imply that the United States government is not a democracy because it exceeds the "limitations on power," in the sense that it violates the principles of classical liberalism, rather than being not powerful enough, as the Marxists suggest.

Another instance of theoretical ambiguity is apparent in Chapter Two of The Third Wave, where the author explicates a conceptual difference in the “democracies” of the second wave and those of the third. A government elected by at least 50% of male voters is deemed a democracy in the second wave, while such a government would be classified as “authoritarian” in the third. Therefore, Huntington conceives democracy to be conditional across time—but not space. However, each country experiences a unique history that cannot be generalized across time any more than it can across space.


Aside from conceptual ambiguities, the large N empirical analyses suffer from overgeneralization. For example, Epstein et al find that, "higher incomes per capita significantly increased the likelihood of democratic regimes, both by enhancing the consolidation of existing democracies and by promoting transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems"(556). However, this phenomenon is probably underrepresented by the data. The economic variables are measured incorrectly by Epstein et al and Geddes, since the value of national currencies does not reflect the real worth of the unit of currency for which the values are associated. Inflation cannot be accounted for among different countries by means of an aggregate value. This way of measurement implies that the “modernization” process has no effect on the prices of goods relative to the national currency. In fact, the decreased cost of living complementing industrialization counteracts the real value of international inflation. This is due to the decreased costs of production, increased trade, and greater domestic demand. The value of a national currency in a “modernizing” nation is expected to increase domestically, relative to the international currency exchange (ceteris paribus). Therefore, the wages of industrializing nations as measured do not reflect the changes in real income of a nation, but rather the shifts of currency exchange values relative to the international community.

Further research should specify the pertinent concepts affecting national classifications. When employing large N analyses, researchers should take greater caution in controlling for cross-national disparities that are not intended to influence the values of the independent variables.

-Dan Blazo