Advancing Scientific Understanding in Comparative Politics?

Are we advancing scientific understanding in comparative politics? According to Caporaso (2000) comparativists have a commitment to explanatory accuracy that results in a fragmented discipline (Laitin 631). To mention a few, disagreement regarding the appropriate methodology and research norms and the different ontologies of research schools in comparative politics are among the sources of fragmentation. This fragmentation in turn, limits the ability of the field to advance scientific understanding. In order to make progress in our field, and advance knowledge about political phenomena we need to overcome these barriers and establish a common ground for the exchange of ideas that will only benefit the field.

One of the goals of our discipline, or any discipline, is to advance its scientific knowledge. The goal of comparative politics is to advance knowledge about political phenomena. But what is exactly scientific understanding? Zucherman (2003) contends that “the search for nomological explanations has bedeviled political scientists, leading some to suggest scientific understanding is an illusion” (281). Covering laws and causal theories have defined the forms of acceptable explanations, but Zucherman makes a point when he argues that these are inappropriate and inadequate standards for scientific understanding (281). There are several flaws in the standard forms of scientific understanding. Among them are – the strong intuition that explanation needs to establish causal relationships, and covering laws do not explain because they abstain from causal claims. Given these flaws, explanations in science, argues Zucherman, need not to include covering laws or causal accounts (284) – a relief for those that feel pressured to fit their research into the “standard form of acceptable explanation.”

Among the sources of fractionalization within the field is the selection of the appropriate methodology. Barbara Geddes, in her chapter “The Great Transformation in the Study of Politics in Developing Countries,” argues that large-N studies had a bad reputation among scholars in comparative politics due to the poor quality of data available and the common view that quantitative research lacks sensitivity to real world scenarios (366). Historical institutionalists and comparative historical sociologists place a very high value on empirical evidence. However, they do not agree on one thing: the value of small-n versus large-n. Both research schools place great emphasis on description of processes leading up to their observed outcome. For practitioners, this process is considered solid evidence. Historical Institutionalists are defenders of selection of cases based on the outcome, the use of small-n research designs, and the idea that path-dependence process cannot be explain in terms of causal mechanism. They believe conventional norms limit their ability to focus the processes central to understanding. In contrast to historical institutionalists, modelers do not place great emphasis on the presentation of evidence. They seem to reject the idea that arguments need to be confirmed empirically; they are arguments are written in mathematical form.

The discussion of the state of research of the state by Margaret Levi captures the distinct nature of these two research design schools. Levi argues that in order to improve the quality of the research regarding the state, scholars should “go beyond thick descriptions of specific states at specific times to develop models and falsifiable hypotheses derived from realistic and logical presuppositions … which are then tested against empirical evidence” (51). The field needs the input of historical institutionalists, comparative historical sociologists (descriptions and empirical evidence) and modelers (models and falsifiable hypotheses) in order to improve the quality of the field’s findings.

Also, the ontologies of the research schools limit the field’s ability to explain political phenomena. Zuckerman suggests that rationalists need to reduce the domain of what they study or expand their theoretical principles (291). Structuralists need to reject their realist assumptions.

The above narrative suggests that the field of comparative politics suffers from an internal division, leading to the inability to advance in scientific understanding. There is no unified methodology, research design, nor ontology. However, even in the midst of disagreement there is a light at the end of the tunnel. According to Zucherman, the field enhances scientific understanding in political science in two forms: (1) by testing general propositions that stand as covering laws across states and points of time, offering a mode of counterfactual analysis and (2) by establishing boundaries of general propositions and theories (281). There is no doubt - the field is indeed advancing in scientific understanding, however, if we would overcome some of the internal divisions within our field, we would not only grow as a subfield faster, but also we would become a more unified discipline, bringing different research schools together.